Daily Report

East Europe

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Prime Minister Leaves for France, To Sign Treaty

AU1312142994 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 11 Dec 94

[Interview with Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi by Amalia Dhamo at Tirana Rinas Airport on 11 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi left today on an official visit to France during which he is expected to sign a treaty of cooperation and friendship between Albania and France. Before departure, Meksi gave the following interview for television:

[Dhamo] Mr. Prime Minister, you are leaving for Paris to sign a treaty of peace and cooperation with Alain Juppe. Do you think this treaty will be a step forward toward expanding relations between France and Albania?

[Meksi] The treaty of friendship and cooperation between Albania and France will be signed by our delegation and that of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I believe it is a treaty of special importance for the comprehensive development of relations between our two countries. It is known that Albania and France have a traditional friendship that goes back before World War II, with the presence of a classical lycee [high school] in Korce. This friendship was also developed at other times and this treaty creates the platform necessary to set up high-level relations in all fields of bilateral, reciprocal interest, starting with foreign policy, economic relations, human relations, culture, science, technology, investments, etc.

It is understood that other agreements will be signed between Albania and France in the very near future, and these find the necessary legal and political basis in this treaty. [end recording]

Interior Minister Musaraj and other officials went to Rinas Airport to see Prime Minister Meksi off.

Zhulali, Delegation Leave for Croatia, Slovenia

AU1312134194 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 11 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A high ranking military delegation presided over by Albanian Defense Minister Safet Zhulali left today for the Republic of Croatia. In addition to visits to military units and objects, our military delegation will conduct talks at the Croatian Defense Ministry. The delegation intends to sign a cooperation agreement between the two defense ministries.

After the official visit to Croatia, Zhulali will visit Slovenia, invited by his Slovene counterpart. Apart from talks at the Slovene Defense Ministry, a memorandum of understanding is expected to be signed.

Bilateral talks and other activities, as well as the signing of documents, will serve relations and cooperation of mutual interest in the military sphere, as well as help strengthen confidence, security, peace, and stability in the region.

Cooperation With Italy Seen as 'Priority'

AU1412092394 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 12 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Albanian President Sali Berisha received an Italian delegation of finance police today.

Albania, committed to setting up a law-governed state and market economy and embarking totally toward integration into Europe, considers promoting friendship and all-around cooperation with Italy to be a priority. President Berisha told Italian delegation members: I am optimistic about the successful future of our bilateral relations. At a Budapest meeting with Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and Foreign Minister Martino, we decided to give a powerful impetus to our relations in all fields. Prime Minister Berlusconi and Minister Martino assured me that Albania is at the top of the list of countries to get Italy's cooperation and support. For my part, I assured them that relations with Italy are of very great importance for Albania, President Berisha continued.

President Berisha also underlined that Albania considers cooperation in the fiscal and financial sector to be of interest and a main guarantee for a useful development of economic cooperation between the two countries. The agreement to avoid double taxation and other agreements envisaged are concrete steps in this direction.

Expressing thanks for the hospitality shown toward them, the members of the Italian delegation said that Italy considers the Adriatic Sea not as a border demarcation with Albania but as a link of cooperation with it. They stressed: We are ready to cooperate and contribute, through our experience, to your financial and fiscal system and operative sectors.

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Former Army Chief Resigns To Run for Office

AU1412115794 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 9 Dec 94 p 32

[FBIS Translated Text] Army General Lyuben Petrov [former chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff], who is awaiting further orders, yesterday submitted a report asking to resign from the Army on the grounds of participation in the election campaign on a list of party candidates. This was confirmed yesterday by Deputy Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov. The Defense Ministry will take action on the report of the former top army officer and current candidate to parliament only after it receives a reply from the Central Electoral Commission.

BTA has reported that, according to Pavlov, the Defense Ministry leadership has no reports of election campaign agitation within Armed Forces units. Troops serving in remote units will be bussed to population centers to cast their votes, but they will not be taken to the polling stations.

Under a decision adopted by the Central Electoral Commission, servicemen detained on remand will vote in the prisons where they are held.

Parties Allegedly Trying To Buy Gypsy Votes

AU1412113494 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 9 Dec 94 p 1

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—Citizens have reportedly given tipoffs to district electoral commissions throughout the country, alleging that various political forces are buying Gypsy votes. According to reports from KONTINENT correspondents, so far, no district electoral commission has received a written complaint about the offering of bribes.

Our correspondent in Pernik Iliyana Todorova reports that the Bulgarian Business Bloc has bought Gypsy votes for sums up to 150,000 leva. An anonymous source who declined to provide written confirmation of his allegations has claimed that people in a white Volga automobile with an official registration number struck a deal with their dark-skinned partners in the yard of the ore-enrichment plant. Unless a complaint is made, the district electoral commission is unable to take any action.

According to reports, the DAR [Democratic Alternative for the Republic] has been making the most substantial offers. Aleksi Dzherov, the New Choice candidate, told KONTINENT correspondent Aleksandur Bozakov that the DAR was buying Gypsy supporters by offering 60,000 leva per vote. A BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] representative is alleged to have offered 15,000 leva to notorious Romanies to persuade them to cast their votes for the BSP candidate.

Acho Yordanov, the famous Romany leader in southern Bulgaria, has also joined in the bribery action. In Svilengrad, he reportedly declared that he would give 20,000 leva to anyone who votes for the DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement]. However, Yordanov rejected the charges in a statement to KONTINENT.

SDS Leader Prefers Strong President to 'Chaos'

AU1412133494 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 12 Dec 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Filip Dimitrov Wants Strong Presidential Rule"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "If the bipolar model does not assert itself in the next National Assembly, I will plead for a strong presidential rule," said Filip Dimitrov, leader of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], on 11 December at a preelection meeting in Sofia's Busmantsi district. Dimitrov stressed that Bulgaria needs a strong government. A National Assembly comprising five or six parties could repeat the chaos of the previous parliament and prompt the formation of a new cabinet similar to the one led by Professor Lyuben Berov, the SDS leader said. According to Dimitrov, a standard democracy with clearly outlined poles in parliament is the best road for the country. "The SDS supports the bipolar model in order to clearly demonstrated the division between us and the Communists," said Dimitrov.

Dimitrov pointed out that the SDS will seek a coalition with the People's Union, if the Democrats and Agrarians clear the 4-percent barrier. He described Stefan Savov as clearly an anti-Communist but also as a politician with poor judgment. In addition, Dimitrov stressed that it is not clear in what direction some of Savov's supporters will turn after the elections. He also said that some of Anastasiya Mozer's candidates to deputy do not inspire confidence because it was they, in the past, who convinced Milan Drenchev to leave the SDS. Filip Dimitrov appealed to the voters to vote only with the blue [SDS] ballot in order to prevent the Communists from getting their votes.

SDS Leader on Possible Post-Election Situation

AU1312154794 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 8 Dec 94 p 18

[Interview with Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces, by Vesela Petkova; place and date not given: "Everything Is a Matter of Power. Give Us the Power"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Petkova] Are you not afraid that, if the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] forms a cabinet, it may be sabotaged, as happened in the last parliament?

[Dimitrov] This danger would exist only if the SDS does not have a majority. If it does, we will be able to ensure that no shirking or betrayals occur in the parliamentary group, so that we will be able to manage the situation.

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Things would be much more complicated if we did not have a majority, and this would not be good for Bulgaria. [passage omitted]

[Petkova] Various alternatives are already being discussed for possible cooperation in the new parliament....

[Dimitrov] ...The same thing happened before the 1991 elections. Do not concern yourself about it.

[Petkova] ...According to most people, the best thing for the country would be a coalition government of the two large political forces. The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] has declared several times that it is willing to take part in such a cabinet.

[Dimitrov] This sounds extremely touching. Just imagine, we will all clap hands and embrace one another, and then each proceed to go our own way—one side toward restoring the land, and the other toward the old system; one side toward combating inflation, the other toward the so-called expansion of production, which can be deciphered as meaning nothing other than increasing inflation. Is this what is being suggested?

[Petkova] Would you really dislike being in opposition? Zhan Videnov is firmly convinced of this.

[Dimitrov] I will not comment on his statements, out of respect for my opponent. It is evident that they cannot pass as being very intelligent. This whole game about "let's sit down together now and rule the state together" contradicts all democratic rules and is again an expression of the Communist Party's impotence. In the final analysis, it indicates that no one of them can or wants to govern Bulgaria.

[Petkova] What form of opposition would you like to have?

[Dimitrov] We will get the opposition that the Good Lord gives us, and it will be a Communist Party opposition, this is clear. It is of no importance whether we like it or not. Nowhere is it written that those in power have to have an opposition of their liking. Quite the contrary, it is absolutely democratic for them to get one that they do not like.

However, the important thing is for us to have the power. At the moment, everything depends on this. These elections will either give us the power to solve Bulgaria's problems, or not. If we have the power, we will demonstrate our efficiency, our firmness, and, if you like, our success. Everything is a matter of power. Give us the power. [passage omitted]

[Petkova] Do you have any criticisms of the caretaker government?

[Dimitrov] The caretaker government is doing some good things and some bad things. This is understandable given the complex situation that it is in. The caretaker government's mandate will end very soon, and it will not even have time to see the fruits of its efforts—if indeed it achieves anything. In addition, its efforts are necessarily limited, because it only has two months, plus the Christmas vacation. This is why we should not attach any excessive importance to the caretaker government, and we should not get into the ridiculous position of collapsing in wonder at every one of its acts, like fond mothers admiring the deeds of their children. [passage omitted]

[Petkova] Your one-year term of office as leader of the National Coordinating Council expires on 21 December.

[Dimitrov] That is so.

[Petkova] Will the National Coordinating Council elect a new leader before the end of the year?

[Dimitrov] I assume that this matter will be raised before the end of the year. That is in the order of things, but I cannot tell you the precise date. The way this issue is commented on will largely depend on the outcome of the 18 December elections. Please bear in mind that we do not believe we will lose these elections. [passage omitted]

Agrarian Union Leader on Possible Alliances

AU1312154694 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 7 Dec 94 p 11

[Interview with Anastasiya Mozer, secretary of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union and cochairman of the People's Union, by Georgi Kadiev; place and date not given: "Union of Democratic Forces Is Our Ally, It Is Normal To Form a Government With Them"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Kadiev] Mrs. Mozer, you had an unexpected meeting with President Zhelev last week. What did you discuss?

[Mozer] I visited the president with Stefan Savov [cochairman of the People's Union] to express our dissatisfaction with the decision by the Central Electoral Commission on allocating television time, which in our view is absolutely undemocratic. A large section of the Bulgarian people and of the agrarians in particular were not represented in the last parliament. The decision deprives these people of the right to be informed. The president agreed with us. He has always supported honest and fair elections, but the Central Electoral Commission vitiated this idea by its decision.

However, every bad thing brings something good. We will tour as many places throughout the country as possible.

In addition, we told the president that we approved of the caretaker government.

[Kadiev] Did the president commit himself in any way to the campaign of the People's Union?

[Mozer] No, although it seems to me that he has nothing against a democratic alternative to the bipolar model of the kind that we represent. This bipolar model is like the

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situation in England and the United States, which have a 200-year-long history as democratic states, but it is not healthy for us.

[Kadiev] What are your coalition's chances of entering the next parliament? Did you discuss with Dr. Zhelev what alliances you might form there?

[Mozer] We did not discuss this issue in particular. However, I can tell you as of now that a coalition with the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] is out of the question. This party has attracted another satellite into its orbit, namely the Aleksandur Stamboliyski BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], and thereby burnt its bridges as regards cooperation with us.

[Kadiev] Does this imply that you will seek to form a coalition with the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]?

[Mozer] The SDS is our natural ally. We have a common understanding of the reform, and it is normal for us to form a government with them.

[Kadiev] However, the SDS, like the BSP, took Ivan Glushkov [chairman of Christian Agrarian Party] under its wing....

[Mozer] That's their business. Glushkov is one of those people still casting about in search of a director. He stated once that his is not an agrarian party, but now he declares that it is. At one time he said that he expresses the interests of the intellectuals, but now he is merging with the agrarians.

[Kadiev] Are you not afraid that the strained relations between Filip Dimitrov and Stefan Savov will damage future cooperation with the SDS?

[Mozer] No. We members of the Nikola Petkov BZNS also left the SDS, which for a long time now has been changing from a coalition into a blue party. For this reason, it is quite natural for parties like ours and the Democratic Party to preserve their own identity.

[Kadiev] You have plenty of enemies in the SDS. Aleksandur Yordanov has reminded us of the personal files of your active members.

[Mozer] Yes, Yordanov has said a lot of foolish things. If he and people like him worked as hard as they talked, Bulgaria would be in a different state.

[Kadiev] Would you form an alliance with another party in the next parliament?

[Mozer] Of course, but first we have to see who they are and what positions they hold. We cannot fail to maintain contacts with the DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement] because we largely represent the same electorate. Most of their voters are farmers by profession.

[Kadiev] Have you had meetings with representatives of other agrarian formations, such as the BZNS Confederation?

[Mozer] No, we do not want to, because in my view none of them has any justification for forming new petty agrarian parties. In fact, many of them are former members of our own organization. They now want us to join this confederation as well. We told them that we restored the unity of the Agrarian Union and do not need any confederation. If they want to join us, they are welcome.... They also include people from the old state nomenklatura, such as Georgi Andreev, who have no place in our party.

As far as Drenchev [chairman of Center for United Agrarian Forces] is concerned, no one expelled him from the BZNS. He was toppled from power, but these things happen in a democratic country. As for the rest, they are purely and simply self-proclaimed figures who have done nothing for the Agrarian Union.

[Kadiev] Is it true that Georgi Petrov [leader of Nikola Petkov BZNS who recently left SDS] has asked to rejoin you?

[Mozer] Yes, he discussed this with me as long ago as last August. We told him that he is welcome, but he has not contacted us. He came to us later on, about a month ago—but it was already too late. Our candidates' lists were prepared, and he wanted to be a leader. Time is needed for things like this—for people to accept him and to assimilate him into their ranks. In addition, one has to prepare the ground very carefully for such an undertaking. One has to work toward it over the long term. [passage omitted]

BSP Opposes Attempts To 'Disunite' Nation

AU1312143094 Sofia NOVINI 5 in Bulgarian 8 Dec 94 p 3

[NOVINI staff report: "BSP Opposes Attempts at Disunification in the name of Macedonianism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] has frequently and strongly stated its principled positions regarding the policies of the Bulgarian state on various aspects of the Macedonian question—states a fax issued by the BSP election campaign press center in connection with the address made by Ilinden OMO [Ilinden United Macedonian Organization] to the political parties in Bulgaria.

Bulgaria was the first to recognize the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM], and in principle this act was justified, but Bulgarian diplomacy performed this act spontaneously, with no clear concept of either history or the prospects for our future relations. The document continues: The BSP supports the process of developing an independent Macedonian state on the territory of the former Yugoslavia but opposes attempts, under the banner of Macedonianism, to disunite the Bulgarian nation, to pillage our national history and culture, and to raise claims regarding a "Macedonian minority" in the Pirin region.

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The document stating the viewpoint of the Bulgarian Socialists concludes: In this connection, not only are the positions and claims expressed by Ilinden OMO a threat to the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Republic of Bulgaria but they also hamper the normalization and development of mutually advantageous relations and ties between the two countries.

Videnov Discusses BSP Aspirations, Intentions

AU1112194094 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 6 Dec 94 p 9

[Interview with Zhan Videnov, chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council, by Monika Yanova; place and date not given: "Zhan Videnov: Prime Minister Post Is Important, But Not Goal in Itself For Me"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Yanova] Mr. Videnov, what is the best election result for the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]?

[Videnov] What kind of a question is that? Of course we want a clearly expressed victory for the red [BSP] ballot. This would provide Bulgaria with a stable, strong, and efficient government for the entire next parliamentary mandate. The most decisive years of the transition lie ahead. Our country cannot afford another cycle of political irresponsibility, confrontation, and instability.

We must not allow a situation where the voters again support insolent demagogy, as was the case in 1991. Back then, the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] received a vote of confidence to effect changes, but within just a few months it succeeded in leading reform toward a dead end. Afterwards, for two years the SDS subverted the most important elements of the transition: privatization, tax reform, foreign policy relations, and the security bills. Now the SDS wants total power, but it is incapable even of ruling its own organization. The greatest critics of the situation in our country are those parties, politicians, and statesmen who contributed most to this situation. There must be an end to this.

[Yanova] Are you not afraid that after you win you will not generate sufficient support to form a cabinet?

[Videnov] This contradicts political logic. In every developed political democracy the greatest political force participates in governing the country. Naturally, I am familiar with the absurd formula according to which "everyone who does not vote with the red ballot is against the BSP, ergo, for the SDS". There will be pseudopoliticians who would again try to force upon the country a government without the participation of the BSP. This time, however, they would have to face their responsibility to our society. They have already damaged our country enough with their adventures.

[Yanova] Is your goal an election victory or participation in the government?

[Videnov] The BSP's goal in the elections is to change the manner in which the transition is taking place in Bulgaria. This is possible only with the direct participation of the BSP in a broad, representative, lasting, and successful government after the elections. We need an absolute parliamentary majority or a significant advantage vis-a-vis the other parliamentary factions. The possibilities of developing future cooperation with other parliamentary and extraparliamentary forces is also very important.

[Yanova] Will you form a cabinet if you have to rely on the support of a new "dynamic parliamentary majority?"

[Videnov] The possibility of such a government was exhausted last spring, and therefore we headed toward elections. Returning to the starting point is undesirable and impossible.

[Yanova] What about the possibility of having a BSP government with uncertain parliamentary support, or even a boycott?

[Videnov] If necessary, we will try even that formula. However, the country needs a cabinet with the broadest parliamentary support.

[Yanova] In other words, you prefer a coalition?

[Videnov] Yes, with the clear commitment of the political forces that will participate in the ruling majority.

[Yanova] What is the greatest BSP risk in the forthcoming elections?

[Videnov] Confrontation. If we allow confrontation to determine the election results we will face another stalemate at the National Assembly. This would undermine confidence in the political forces—and not only toward the major forces, as some people hope. Throughout the world, at times of a difficult transition, small parliamentary factions cooperate to form a strong majority, commit themselves to such a majority, and profit from this. Only in our country do unscrupulous "balancers," who obtain the main profit from confrontation, remain unpunished.

[Yanova] Do you mean the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS]?

[Videnov] All small parliamentary factions and extraparliamentary forces showed the same weakness. They successfully hid themselves behind the approximately equal power of the BSP and the SDS in parliament and behind the insane slogan "communism or democracy." However, the moment of truth will come after the election victory of the BSP and defeat of the SDS. Everyone must make a choice between responsibility and demagogy.

[Yanova] Some time ago you said that the 37th National Assembly could exist for only six months, and afterward there would be new elections. Why do you want to send us to the polling stations again so quickly?

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[Videnov] Do not forget that "elections to the end" was not the slogan of the BSP, but of its opponents. However, if parliament forms another repressive cabinet, as in the case of 1991, its life will be very short. The same awaits us if the situation of 1994 reproduces itself. Back then, those who entrenched themselves most strongly in the government became its loudest critics, while the BSP had to do all the work, carry the load and have no rights at all. This produced a clash between the president and the parliament, and subsequently a general political crisis. I recommend to everyone, even the SDS voters, to vote against such instability.

[Yanova] A common victory divides most. Are you not afraid that victory could split the party?

[Videnov] We do not have serious conflicts and I do not envisage any. There are differences but there also is a sense of responsibility.

[Yanova] Why did you not protect your people when the lists were formed, and why did you allow a confrontation between the ambitions of local party members and the former deputies? Many of them feel themselves personally insulted by you.

[Videnov] I strive to work with people who can prove themselves in politics. If I were to judge by the lists, all those who had ambitions for a parliamentary career have implemented their aspiration.

[Yanova] Do you want to be prime minister?

[Videnov] Yes, but only if my party, its coalition partners, and the parliamentary majority, clearly support this. There will be no fleeing from the duty, or a hunger for power.

[Yanova] Would this not bring you closer to the end of your political career? It is well-known that highranking posts wear politicians out.

[Videnov] Only the moral wear and tear is horrible, and I will not allow it. The executive power rejects quickly and painfully only wrong ideas, incompetent leaders, and irresponsible politicians.

[Yanova] Have you already selected your ministers?

[Videnov] We are ready to launch our government team immediately after the elections. However, even if we have an absolute parliamentary majority we will negotiate for the maximum broad support, and it is not fair to force upon our potential partners a ready team. We could compromise with persons and posts, but not with our commitments to the voters.

[Yanova] Is it true that a large part of the BSP leaders intend to move to the Council of Ministers building? This includes Krasimir Premyanov, Nikolay Dobrev....

[Videnov] In the BSP leadership there are politicians with possibilities and ambitions who could find a proper place in the executive power. In addition, we could find some noted experts for the most delicate spheres.

[Yanova] Nikolay Dobrev has ambitions for the power ministries, and more specifically for the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Am I right?

[Videnov] His ambitions are rather justified against the background of his record as a member of the National Security Commission. However, I repeat: No one has a written contract concerning any ministerial post after the elections.

[Yanova] How would you govern if the Supreme Court were to begin to cancel the government's decisions, while the Constitutional Court did the same with the bills adopted by parliament?

[Videnov] This danger exists, but it is not inevitable. Recently, the judiciary has been acting in a very biased manner. The Supreme Court refused to review any complaints against Filip Dimitrov's cabinet, and used to cancel the decisions of Berov's cabinet without even reading them. Within just two years, the Constitutional Court changed its position on the mandate of the Supreme Economic Council in order to please Georgi Markov. The Chief Prosecutor's Office dealt only with the People's Court, the BSP archives and the immunity of three or four parliament members. [Chief Prosecutor] Ivan Tatarchev attributes the dissipation to crime, for which, to his political opponents, he himself is responsible. This situation cannot continue. Nowhere in the world does society allow itself to be mocked by its own administrators.

[Yanova] Does this mean a "red broom" in the judiciary?

[Videnov] No, there are also other methods. We will maximally strengthen control of the executive power in order to avoid being dependent on the judiciary in the struggle against crime. We will improve the quality of the laws adopted by parliament. Every government decision will be perfected from a judicial point of view. In the final analysis, society will force the judiciary to control the institutions, rather than fight against them.

[Yanova] Will you amend the constitution?

[Videnov] Several amendments are necessary. We must guarantee the constant activity of parliament, overcome the absurd self-isolation of the judiciary vis-a-vis our society, and introduce a better control over the executive power, including the caretaker cabinets.

[Yanova] Is Indzhova's cabinet acting against the BSP?

[Videnov] So far I do not think the caretaker cabinet acts against any political force. However, it definitely acts against the former and future parliaments and the future cabinet.

[Yanova] How?

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[Videnov] I would ignore the superficial "revelations" of the caretaker cabinet ministers concerning the activity of former ministers, who in many cases were their bosses. I also am not concerned with the prime minister's childish nagging of the former deputies. However, with certain semi-populist, incompetent, and harmful actions this cabinet is already creating problems for the future cabinet.

[Yanova] For example?

[Videnov] The cabinet protracts the preparation of the budget, the talks with foreign economic partners, and mass privatization. It justifies itself with the limited mandate of a caretaker cabinet. However, this does not prevent it from approving "strategies," wasting money with a light hand, and playing the personnel reshuffling game. The result will not be a positive one for the country. However, the BSP will not allow the cabinet to transfer its responsibility for those acts to the next cabinet.

[Yanova] Is this why the president became the BSP's Number One Enemy?

[Videnov] The term is inappropriate. The parties must view the president through the lens of the Constitution. The head of state must personify national unity rather than political confrontation. This the duty of all. Our claims against President Zhelev are related to his rather broad interpretation of presidential prerogatives. This is especially dangerous under conditions of a cabinet and parliamentary crisis.

[Yanova] Do you mean the personnel changes in the Army, the security services, and the Foreign Ministry?

[Videnov] I mean most of all the moment that was selected to implement those personnel changes—because when there is a parliament, the political forces have the constitutional mechanisms to control such changes, and answer to society for anything related to the change. When a situation exists where, precisely, the president insisted on not having a parliament for several months, having a cabinet that is personally loyal to him, and having the right to a presidential legislative initiative, it is our duty to be aware of the fact that an authoritarian tendency is possible. The future parliament will review the hasty, unfortunate, and ill-intentioned actions of Indzhova's team.

[Yanova] Will you insist on early presidential elections?

[Videnov] This variant should not be excluded under specific circumstances, and most of all if a conflict between the institutions is provoked. However, this is not our basic goal. Regular presidential elections will take place in just two years. This period of time could even prove insufficient for organizing the support of the nationally responsible forces for a new president.

[Yanova] Would you form a coalition cabinet with the SDS?

[Videnov] A coalition of the two major political forces could be a very good thing for the country. However, the SDS obviously fears most the prospects of cooperating with the Socialists. Apparently, they like the role of opposition, but society does not applaud those who play this role. Nevertheless, the BSP does not relinquish its policy of the outstretched hand.

[Yanova] Will you form an alliance with Dogan?

[Videnov] Our potential political partners are the Patriotic Alliance and the Democratic Alternative for the Republic [DAR]. The chances concerning the DPS, the People's Union, and New Choice are much smaller. Everything depends on the election results.

Fuel Import Dependency Impacts National Security

AU1312120494 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 2 Dec 94 p 16

[Commentary by Krasimir Atanasov: "Gas Attack"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Turning off half the supply of the Russian gas pipeline to Bulgaria caused chaos in Bulgaria's economy, literally within several hours. Enterprises that are very important for the structure of our economy were in danger of being closed, and the power supply system also experienced difficulties because of its reduced maneuverability in anything related to the fuel. The whole thing proved once again to what degree Bulgaria depends on external power sources and how easy it is to apply pressure on us.

In several similar cases in the past when supplies of gas, oil, and coal have been limited, urgent intervention by high-ranking state officials has been necessary. However, the paradox is that five years after the disintegration of the former socialist system, mutual relations with the new states, suppliers of energy sources, have not been fully clarified and have not been based on international treaties into which compensation for possible losses has been incorporated. Furthermore, the chain of gas recipients does not end in Bulgaria. Turkey for example usually blames Bulgaria when the quantity of gas it receives is decreased.

Instead of working out a clear and consistent state policy, a situation has been allowed in which the supply often depends on selfish companies. This only increases the possibility of pressure and direct blackmail.

The power supply is a part of geopolitics and, simultaneously, a part of every country's national security. Those are two arguments that compel the state to seek and find prudent compromises, thus protecting the interests of its citizens.

Air Sofia Denies Shipping SCUD Launchers

AU1312123894 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 8 Dec 94 p 7

[Interview with Lilyan Todorov, president of Air Sofia, by Andrey Apostolov; place and date not given: "Dirty Games Attempt To Strike Blows Against Air Sofia"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] The diplomatic furor that aroused a high fever in our Foreign Ministry, connected with the "deliveries of North Korean launchers" [ostanovki] (as stated in the original—editor's note) for SCUD missiles to Iran by the private Bulgarian airline Air Sofia, as U.S. Ambassador William Montgomery claims, began with a false telex with a counterfeit signature on a fake sheet of company notepaper sent to the U.S. military attache in Sofia.

The sheet sent is indeed similar to the company's letterhead, but contains a few differences, and this leads experts to believe that it was produced on a laser printer. The hook was baited with a remarkable offer of services for shipping military hardware to the Persian Gulf region circumventing the Ministry of Transport. Some 10 days later, the letter from Mr. Hanson appeared, categorically declaring that Air Sofia was preparing to make three flights from North Korea to Iran carrying SCUD missile launchers, and that some of these flights had already been completed. The machine was already on the move and Air Sofia had no idea what was going on behind its back until, on 2 November, in a 70-minute conversation with Foreign Minister Stanchov, U.S. Ambassador William Montgomery "expressed the hope that the Bulgarian Government would speedily resolve certain urgent problems in the two countries' relations."

According to Mr. Montgomery, these problems were: the residential status of U.S. citizens staying in Bulgaria for a lengthy period and their relations with the organs of the Interior Ministry, which reportedly displayed marked anti-American attitudes; the unsettled position of the American University in Blagoevgrad; finding a site for the new U.S. Embassy; difficulties in attracting U.S. investments; exemption of U.S. Embassy personnel from VAT, and so forth.

However, in addition to the above, Mr. Montgomery acquainted Minister Stanchov with the U.S. request for the cessation of the deliveries by Air Sofia and for support of the U.S. candidate for the post of UNESCO executive director. Mr. Stanchov explained that the Air Sofia affair was being investigated by the appropriate organs and that the necessary information would be provided later. The "investigation," which was completed within 10 days of receipt of the Foreign Ministry directive—"for urgent action"—revealed that Air Sofia had carried out no flights of this kind at all. However, the whole case fails to make it clear why the U.S. Government, which has adequate information at its disposal on every plane that takes off or lands in North Korea and Iran, had singled out the company on the strength of a false fax and information that had not been checked by our special services.

What is even more interesting and intriguing in this affair is whether the "SCUD business" had been deliberately stirred up and the Bulgarian company involved with some longer-term aims in mind. According to information supplied by an absolutely reliable source, the U.S. Embassy, which was reportedly very "satisfied with the response and the quick reaction" of the Bulgarian side, also showed unjustified interest in other flights and aircraft operated by Air Sofia. What is even more intriguing: The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry representatives were reportedly prepared to offer any assistance to clear the matter up. In some countries, this is called industrial espionage, while others simply call it spying. In Bulgaria, it is merely a reaction to a directive carrying the stamp "for urgent action," connected perhaps with the Bulgarian side's request to Mr. Montgomery for help "to determine in a timely way the dates of the forthcoming official visit by the president of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United States...."

Air Sofia is one of the, if not the most, successful private airlines in Bulgaria. It operates w[illegible]s for Bulgaria a big fleet of aircraft and is one of the [illegible] airlines worldwide that operates the largest transpo[illegible]aircraft in the world : the "An-124 Ruslan." Lilyan Todorov, Air Sofia's president, said he did not want to make a big row about the affair, especially as it had not been proven that Air Sofia had any connection with the North Korea-Iran flights. Nevertheless, Todorov stated his own view and that of the Air Sofia management regarding the "SCUD affair."

[Apostolov] Mr. Todorov, what did the investigation establish? Is it not strange that so much interest is being shown in your activities?

[Todorov] The flights to North Korea were made by an Iranian airline, but permits are needed to make such flights. In this case, the permits were obtained through diplomatic channels, which entails a much more complicated procedure and much greater stringency. If the U.S. side wanted to block anything, it could have done it there. I say this because, when applying for a permit for any flight, one has to give the following information: the address and the name of the consignor and precise data about the goods; and the address and precise information about the consignee. Such aircraft fly on special diplomatic permits, and there is not a single sector of airspace in which one can fly without a permit.

[Apostolov] Perhaps one can say that this is a naked attempt to throw a punch below the belt?

[Todorov] Unfortunately this is exactly the case, but it was not caused by the U.S. side but by Bulgarian structures—various phantom companies that were registered as airlines, formed and then declared bankrupt the very same people five or six times in a row. They continue to operate now, and they are very troubled if a particular piece of business does not pass through their hands. They operate in areas were good receipts can be obtained, but when the time comes to submit accounts, they disappear into thin air. I am no specialist but the fact that they planted the information can be proved in a very short time.

[Apostolov] Does your airline have a good reputation among the specialists?

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[Todorov] We own six transport aircraft and one passenger aircraft, and we operate the "An-124 Ruslan"—the largest transport aircraft in the world. One of our planes operated for three months in West Africa, three were leased by Turkish National Airlines, and one is operating on a permanent contract in England (at Manston Airport). Do you think it possible for an airline to give advice to the U.S. military attache? Who would dare to give such advice, even if it were possible? Look at how it was worded: "In connection with the recent development of events in the Persian Gulf...." It is as if we were better informed about the situation than the United States.

The fomenting of this affair has only one purpose: namely, to bring our airline into confrontation with a power that can cause it harm. For a company like ours, it is not good for facts to be produced that do not correspond to the truth, because the cost of a flight by an aircraft like the "Ruslan" ranges from $200,000 to $500,000. A U.S. and a British company operated these aircraft four or five years ago as middlemen (Air File and Air Lift—editor's note). Now, when an airline appears from a small Balkan country, it is not good for it to enter their sphere of influence. Of course, this does not mean that these two companies are at the bottom of the scandal, but we know that they are competing against us, and we are fighting them with the means that we have available: namely, our professionalism. We know that none of the state structures will help us in this respect, but we do not want them to obstruct us.

Visiting NATO Delegation Discusses Cooperation

AU1312085794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 12 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A six-member working group of the Central Command of NATO Allied Forces in southern Europe, led by Captain First Class Robert (?Plain), deputy head of the Naval Operations Planning Department, has been visiting Varna.

The guests were received by Rear Admiral Khristo Kondrev, acting navy commander.

Cooperation between the Bulgarian Navy and NATO during the current year was discussed.

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Havel: West's FRY Policy Verges on 'Suicidal'

BR1412123794 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 14 Dec 94 p 9

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Sandro Scabello; date and place not given: "Havel: Dear Yeltsin, Days of Empire Are Past"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague—"Russia does not have the right to dictate to other nations which alliances they can belong to or whether this or that international body will accept those countries. We are an independent state, and we make our decisions completely autonomously and without interference." Vaclav Havel responded steadfastly to Moscow's "nyet" to NATO's enlargement eastward. Moscow's refusal has brought a sudden freeze in Russian-U.S. relations, reviving fears and anxieties in the capitals of Central Europe. In this interview with CORRIERE DELLA SERA, the president of the Czech Republic broaches the crucial issue of relations with the Kremlin, analyzes the Western failure in Bosnia, and discusses the nightmares and disappointments of postcommunism.

[Scabello] Russia's veto to its former satellites' joining NATO turns back the clock of history. How can it be overcome?

[Havel] It depends on the common sense and the decisions of NATO and the countries seeking membership. The Russians must be made to understand that NATO's expansion eastward does not threaten their interests, and, at the same time, a permanent dialogue at several levels must be maintained with Moscow. Russia must rid itself of the old Soviet mentality whereby NATO was opposed to the USSR. Much will depend on the West: How willing is it to submit to Russian pressures? Now we still have a chance, we can negotiate; tomorrow the situation could become unfavorable.

[Scabello] Yeltsin forecasts that, after the Cold War, a cold peace is about to fall on Europe. What dangers and repercussions would this present to the postcommunist countries?

[Havel] A cold peace is not in anyone's interest. Russia should ponder the fact that it is contributing to this coldness. I do not think it is legitimate to blame others for the new problems. If the freeze returns, we will be the first to suffer its results. We freed ourselves from Soviet domination only recently, have not yet solidly anchored ourselves to the structures of the Western world, and find ourselves in a kind of vacuum between East and West. This is why we are the first to feel the effects of any change of climate. And we pay a high price for it. Europe depends on peace on the continent. It must do its utmost to guarantee stability and security in our region.

[Scabello] Is it possible to find a fair middle path between the refusal to humiliate Russia and the security requirements of the countries of Central Europe?

[Havel] Your question is itself full of dangers because it embodies the potential for some kind of contraposition between East and West. If East and West live in proper harmony, it should not bother anyone if a country becomes a NATO member. The CIS, too, is a security structure, and it would be absurd if anyone were to decide who should or should not belong to it. Similarly, Russia cannot impose anything on NATO. There are no middle paths. Everyone has the right to decide on which side to stand. This right, which is based on the nations' will and is not imposed by some powerful nation, must be respected. We do not want to act either as a shock absorber or as a cordon sanitaire or a no-man's-land.

[Scabello] What should the international community have done to halt the killing in Bosnia?

[Havel] A disease must be treated from its onset, otherwise it will grow, expand, and worsen, with frightening consequences. I think it should have been extirpated at the outset by means of a vigorous intervention. It is sad, but there are situations in which it is necessary to resort to force to avoid subsequently having to pay a very high price in terms of human lives. Bosnia represents a major defeat for the democratic world. The fundamental principles of civilized coexistence between two different ethnic and religious groups have been sacrificed, principles on which democratic Europe is based.

[Scabello] Following the failure of the Budapest conference, many people are wondering about the usefulness of the CSCE.

[Havel] Steps forward were made in Budapest in the quest for a new identity, new scope was opened up, and certain conditions were created. We shall see in time whether the Conference is able to make use of these, but I would not be too hasty to announce that it is dead and buried.

[Scabello] In articles and speeches, you often mention the nightmare of postcommunism. How long will it last, and what is the solution to it?

[Havel] The monster of postcommunism is stalking Europe. It is the source of dangers, it creates great fears, and its appearance and language differs from area to area, but it can be faced and defeated. This, as long as the West does not close in on itself, does not opt for isolation and a shortsighted policy, which causes misfortunes, as history shows. Rather, it must help the young democracies, strengthen their respective societies, and not repeat the errors committed in the former Yugoslavia, where it yielded to the ethnic fanatics—an approach verging on the suicidal. [passage omitted]

Comment: Klaus's 'Mammoth' Address to Parliament

AU1312173894 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Dec 94 p 12

[Commentary by Jiri Leschtina and Petr Novacek: "A Whopper in the Chamber From Klaus"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] In a way, it is absurd that the prime minister notched up a first in the Chamber of Deputies when he delivered his address yesterday. Until now, Klaus had only come to the rostrum to answer questions from deputies. However, even his mammoth address cannot be viewed as a routine report on the fulfillment of the government's program for which the opposition has long been hankering.

An analysis of the formulation of the prime minister's address establishes clearly (and Vaclav Klaus has in no way concealed this) that it is his personal interpretation of the government's activity over more than two years. The Cabinet did not discuss the text of the prime minister's speech; the ministers did not even vote on it. The prime minister merely asked for detailed background material from the heads of the individual departments. He then crafted from them an undoubtedly succinct, synthetic outline of the government's transformation activities.

The lack of a critical tone will probably be the main shortcoming for which the opposition will berate the prime minister. It is hard to imagine, however, that Vaclav Klaus would publicly sprinkle ashes on his head and serve up reasons for criticism on a silver platter that would suit the nongoverning parties.

Nevertheless, even the coalition partners will probably not fully endorse all of Klaus's arguments. It will be hard for Jan Kalvoda to agree that the prime minister has "facilitated" the reform of public administration with the three paragraphs at the very end of his oratorical marathon. And, when he defended the association between the state budget and pension and health insurance, it was hard for the prime minister to speak from his heart to the people's party, which wants to separate insurance funds from the state's coffers.

The leader of the ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance] Deputies' Club had indicted previously that, if the ODA is not satisfied with Klaus's address, it will support the opposition's attempt to ensure that parliament pledges the government to submit a real report on the fulfillment of its program. Such a coalition caprice would not help the ODA too much now because the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] has a majority in government and could indiscriminately elevate, for instance, Klaus's last essay for LIDOVE NOVINY to the status of a government document.

On the other hand, the ODS would not, in the future, be forced to block the commencement of a tradition whereby the prime minister delivers an annual government-approved report to parliament on the state of the nation.

Dlouhy Wants More L-159 Avionics Suppliers

AU1312125394 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 3 Dec 94 p 2

[Article by "km, dd": "L-159 Aircraft Does Not Need To Have Only U.S. Equipment, Dlouhy Maintains"]

[FBIS Translated Text]—The Aero Vodochody L-159 aircraft does not need to have electronics and arms from only one firm. This can be derived from yesterday's observation by Industry and Trade Minister Dlouhy that Aero could manufacture this aircraft for the Czech Air Force in cooperation with the U.S. firm Rockwell, and, for export, avionics by the Israeli firm Elbit would be installed. In opposition to the Defense Ministry, Dlouhy's office had previously already supported Elbit.

"The best value in shipments of avionics in terms of quality and price was offered by the U.S. firm Rockwell. It is a question, however, to what degree this decision will affect Aero's access to the markets in certain other countries. Therefore, I believe we should keep our options open, so avionics from other suppliers could possibly be installed in the L-159 aircraft if they can facilitate the access to other markets," Dlouhy said.

Daily Criticizes Dlouhy

AU1312125594 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 6 Dec 94 p 5

[Commentary by Jan Gazdik: "Doubts About Rockwell"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seemed that the debates surrounding the selection of the supplier of the board avionics for the Vodochody L-159 aircraft, which were several times on the verge of a scandal, ended with the victory of U.S.'s Rockwell. The selection was made by Defense Minister Vilem Holan upon an agreement with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. The state—that is, the Army—is namely a major investor in the development of the L-159 aircraft in addition to being its buyer from Aero Vodochody. Nevertheless, judging by the 2 December statement by Trade and Industry Minister Vladimir Dlouhy, nothing has been decided. He described the U.S. firm only as a potential subcontractor. According to Dlouhy, the final decision will be made by the appropriate Aero bodies because this firm cannot be saved even by the 72 aircraft order for the Czech Army. However, no one has ever claimed any such thing. According to Dlouhy, "The idea is necessarily faulty that the manufacturer will always and completely respect the views of an albeit large, yet still just a single, customer."

Even if we disregard the fact, common perhaps only in the banana republics, that the victor in an international tender does not get the order, the timing of Minister Dlouhy's doubts regarding the suitability of the selection is rather odd—namely, at the same time, Czech Defense Minister Holan in person tells his U.S. counterpart, William Perry, that Rockwell was selected as Aero subcontractor. Minister Dlouhy believes, however, that the decision made by the Defense Ministry will encumber the sales of L-159 on markets in other countries.

If, however, by his statement Minister Dlouhy is addressing the Israeli Elbit, through which the Thai sales were arranged, he has the right to let them know, without

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any prevarication, that their cooperation in the export of the L-39, L-59, or L-159 is welcomed. Otherwise, it is a very odd signal that could, at best, cast doubts on the fairness in the selection. After all, even Minister Dlouhy must know that Rockwell was selected after a thorough analysis of the military-political, economic-export, and technical aspects of the L-159 production. The expert commission was composed of specialists from both Aero and the Industry Ministry. So, the head of the latter should know that the decision in favor of Rockwell was made also with respect to the position of this firm on the world markets. To change supplier at a time when the manufacture of the new aircraft is to run at full speed is certainly possible. In such a case, however, the question needs to be asked: At what cost (billions have been mentioned) and why?

Nor was the victory of Rockwell accidental in respect of the integration of the Czech Army into NATO (the British and Italians are to participate in the shipments). Moreover, with the U.S. avionics, the L-159 multipurpose aircraft has a chance of making it not only over the ocean but also in Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland.

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Vladimir Meciar Gives Acceptance Speech

LD1312210894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1856 GMT 13 Dec 94

[Acceptance speech by newly appointed Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar at swearing-in ceremony at Bratislava Palace—live relay]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed Mr. National Council, esteemed ladies, gentlemen, and guests:

The appointment of the government should put an end to the protracted internal political crisis. This is the key step toward stabilizing the domestic political situation. The citizens chose the government in free and democratic elections. The parties that emerged from these elections lent their backing to the government. Because the elections gave a mandate to reach an agreement, a chance to join the government was open to everyone who wanted to take upon himself the responsibility of executive power.

The government I am heading represents the four parties that were willing and able to take this responsibility upon themselves at this moment.

The work of the Slovak Republic Government, in its present composition, will not be an inward-looking task.

To be in the opposition is a natural part of democratic life. That is why this government offers cooperation to all parties (?even if they are abroad) who think their potential can help in stabilizing political life in our country.

The elections, the citizens' demands, and public meetings unequivocally indicate that what citizens want is political peace for their work. The foundations have been laid, and political conciliation is needed to build (?what citizens want).

The government's work will be aimed at reaching this objective, although we should not think that conciliation will begin tonight or tomorrow morning. There will still be a need to take (?certain measures).

But all institutions will have to work toward this end. This applies, above all, to the work of parliament, to the support of the president, and to the citizens' understanding and support.

The government presents itself to you not only as a representative of those citizens who voted for us, but also of the citizens whom it wants to serve as well, and these are all the citizens of this state.

We consider our priorities of foreign policy orientation to be the same as those that have been valid since 1990: We want to be a firm component of the uniting Europe, to continue preparing for entry into the European Union and NATO. The government, with its program, will try to reach an agreement on the conditions of its activity so that civic reconciliation in the state may take place.

We came to power in 1990. I am standing here now for the third time, and always after democratic elections. In 1990 we started building a democratic system; in 1992 [as heard] we started building an independent state. Now we will start to move history a bit further and to lead the country toward economic prosperity.

We want people to breathe freely, but we also want the chunk of bread that people have in their hands to be sufficiently large.

(?Regardless of) good intentions, time will test us personally, time will test the programs we are preparing as activity in the coming period.

I believe that (?they will be of use to all): a law-governed state, a democracy, a free market, guarantees of the safety of people—all of those things people are talking about and that they are justified in expecting from their government.

I thank you, Mr. President, for the fact that, by today's appointment of all of the members of the government as they were proposed, you have taken the first step for a civic reconciliation to be achieved. I extend my hand as a symbol of cooperation. Thank you.

President Addresses Swearing In

LD1312223894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1848 GMT 13 Dec 94

[Speech by President Michal Kovac at the swearing-in of the newly appointed government at Bratislava Palace—live relay]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ladies and gentlemen, we are meeting here today after days and weeks of complicated talks in order to confirm what the talks had indicated, in order to announce to Slovakia before Christmas that it has a government that is prepared to solemnly promise that it will do all it can to serve the interests and the needs of the citizens of the Slovak Republic and the strengthening of Slovak statehood. [passage omitted] We want to live in a prospering state that, by its economic results, will rank among the successful states of our continent. We can identify with the ambitions of the representatives of the newly created government coalition, establish sincere relations where millions and billions of korunas are being decided on, where property that belonged and belongs to all is being disposed of. [passage omitted]

I must stress that the situation in Slovak society is not as hopeless or desperate, morally or economically, as is often alleged. Numerous foreign observers and experts are surprised by many good economic indicators in Slovakia. Apocalyptic visions of the disintegration of the Slovak economy after the division of the federation and the birth of an independent Slovak Republic are not being fulfilled.

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Esteemed government members, you are taking up your posts and you are taking over responsibility for the activity and smooth running of the state in a situation that can be considered a crossroads on the current journey of our country to the 21st century. It will be up to you, too, where and how we proceed and where we end up. I believe and wish that the direction is favorable and the path toward tomorrow is optimal—a path of internal political stability and peaceful social climate. We need a stability that will contribute to further increasing our credibility in the world, to strengthening our international position. To achieve such stability and peace, we need political, national, and civic reconciliation, or at least understanding.

This means, among other things, good relations between all of the constitutional institutions, good relations between the members of the government coalition, and also good understanding between the coalition and the opposition. The coalition will accept initiatives from the opposition if they are useful for citizens, and the opposition will support all of the initiatives of the government grouping. It also means that the coalition and the opposition will respect, above all—that is, above their party and personal interests—the needs of all of the citizens of the Slovak Republic, and that the citizens, too, whatever their political attitudes, will duly respect the right of government and opposition officials to differing views.

If I asked the previous government not to understand its coming to power as starting from zero, I should also like to ask you to preserve the continuity of the government and the state, to be their guarantee, to be a government that wants not to destroy but to create, that wants to continue all the beneficial things the previous government accomplished. You should continue building the state that became a part of the community of modern states on 1 January 1993. You should continue in those transformation processes of the Slovak economy that have begun to show positive results. You should fully declare in foreign policy the integration of Slovakia into the European structures.

Allow me now to thank the current government for all it has done, with considerable effort, for the benefit of the citizens of Slovakia. I should like to wish, esteemed prime minister, esteemed government members of the Slovak Republic, at a time when you are taking up your demanding posts, that all of your pledges may become deeds that will give the citizens a feeling of security in the social and economic sphere. Slovakia needs peaceful and purposeful work, and, if it is within my possibilities and powers, I will fully support all that will make this peace and good living conditions possible.

I congratulate you on being appointed to your posts. I wish you good health, a peaceful climate, and much success in your responsible work.

New Cabinet Members Tell Kovac Their Objectives

LD1312200494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] President Michal Kovac, who will appoint a new cabinet tonight, has shown interest in meeting the new cabinet members whom he does not know personally.

In this connection, today he received Jan Mraz, who will be entrusted with the management of the so far nonexistent ministry that will deal with the construction sphere. The future minister said that his ministry's top priority was the continuation of the privatization of state enterprises and the completion of this privatization. Speaking about housing construction up to the year 2000, he said it was very unlikely that it would be carried out.

Michal Kovac then received Alexander Rezes, who will be entrusted with the management of the Ministry of Transport, Communications, and Public Works. He said that his ministry's main task was to build highways, railways, and airports and, in particular, to make use of Slovakia's strategic position in the eastward direction, which means toward Ukraine and Russia.

After meeting the president of the Republic, the new cabinet member Peter Bisak, who will be entrusted with management of the Privatization Ministry, told TASR more specifically that he would place emphasis on the purity of the privatization process and on law enforcement. Commenting on the coupon privatization problem, he said that it would be the new government that would bear responsibility for it and that that is why the government had both the right and the duty to analyze the real situation of coupon privatization.

Text of Agreement on Forming Government Coalition

AU1412082894 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 Dec p 2

["Text of the Agreement on Forming a Government Coalition Signed in Bratislava on 11 December 1994"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, represented by Chairman Vladimir Meciar, and the Association of Workers of Slovakia, represented by Chairman Jan Luptak, and the Slovak National Party, represented by Chairman Jan Slota, and the Farmers' Party of Slovakia, represented by Chairman Pavel Delinga, entered on 11 December 1994 into this Agreement on Forming a Government Coalition:

I.

1. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, the Association of Workers of Slovakia, the Slovak National Party, and the Farmers' Party of Slovakia (hereafter only "parties to the agreement") enter into an agreement on

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forming a coalition, on the basis of which they will cooperate at the level of the Government of the Slovak Republic.

2. In accordance with the outcome of the parliamentary elections of 30 September 1994 and 1 October 1994 and on the basis of mutual consent, the parties to the agreement will form a coalition Government of the Slovak Republic. The joint program of the coalition government, the interaction of the parties to the agreement in its implementation, and mutual cooperation at all levels will be oriented in the spirit of the Constitution and other Laws of the Slovak Republic toward:

—the prosperity of the Slovak Republic and its citizens, their cultural and spiritual development,

—the stabilization of the political system, legislative and executive powers,

—the fulfillment of civic principles, national and state interests of the Slovak Republic,

—the reinforcement of the external and internal security of the Slovak Republic and its sovereignty,

—the integration of the Slovak Republic into international institutions and relationships, particularly into the European and transatlantic integration groupings.

3. The parties to the agreement will jointly promote the development of pluralist democracy, the state based on the rule of law, the socially and environmentally oriented economy, the economic and social transformation, the guarantee and development of civic rights, including the rights of members of ethnic minorities and groups living on the territory of the Slovak Republic, and continuing peace cooperation with democratic countries.

4. The Slovak Government policy statement will be submitted to the National Council of the Slovak Republic upon approval by the parties to the agreement. The parties to the agreement promise to implement the policy statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic.

5. The Government of the Slovak Republic is bound with respect to the work of the parties to the agreement only by the policy statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic.

II.

1. The parties to the agreement promise within the framework and to the extent of the internal documents to promote the interaction and cooperation between their bodies and organizations at the central, regional, communal, and local levels.

2. The parties to the agreement will regularly, truthfully, and completely brief one another on the essential political, economic, social, cultural, and other problems.

3. Talks of the parties to the agreement will take place regularly once a week on the level of chairmen of the parties to the agreement. Each party to the agreement agrees to immediately attend coalition talks at the request of one of the parties to the agreement. The talks are to be attended by the chairmen of the parties to the agreement or the representatives they authorize.

4. Talks on the supreme political level of the parties to the agreement will take place at least once a month.

III.

1. On the basis of this agreement, the parties to the agreement will, after mutual consultations, arrange for personnel appointments at the level of ministers, state secretaries, office heads, and other important posts.

2. The parties to the agreement agreed to apportion the ministries of the Slovak Government so that the Association of Workers of Slovakia will fill the posts of one deputy prime minister, three ministers, and three state secretaries; the Slovak National Party will fill the posts of two ministers and two state secretaries; the Farmers' Party of Slovakia will fill the post of one state secretary; and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia will fill the posts of the prime minister, the remaining deputy prime ministers, members of the government, and state secretaries. The appointment of the heads of the ministerial offices will be proposed by the appropriate minister. The appointment of the head of the Government Office will be proposed by the prime minister.

IV.

1. The parties to the agreement promise to work together to prevent conflicts.

2. In the instance of a conflict emerging between the parties to the agreement, the chairmen are to discuss its settlement. If an immediate solution is not reached, the parties to the agreement will form groups of commissioned representatives of the parties to the agreement to deal with the conflicts, find a method of settling them, and prepare a decision for the chairmen of the parties to the agreement.

3. Until the final decision on the controversial issue is passed, the parties to the agreement will voluntarily abstain from any comments on, or explanations of, their stand or the position of another party to the agreement.

4. After the final decision is adopted, it is binding, beyond any question, also with respect to the public and the press. The agreed framework for informing the public on the controversial issue and the form of settlement is just as binding.

5. Minutes are to be taken at all individual coalition talks and consultations, and records of specific agreements and treaties are to be filed in archives.

6. The parties to the agreement will regularly jointly brief the public and the media on stands and intentions of the coalition.

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7. Each of the parties to the agreement has the right to report on its party intentions and stands, and to do so within the framework of this agreement on forming the coalition.

V.

1. The agreement on forming the government coalition is an open treaty that can be joined by another political party or movement if all of the parties to the agreement agree.

2. This agreement takes effect on the day of its signing by the chairmen of the parties to the agreement and expires on the first day of the parliamentary election campaign, unless the parties to the agreement decide otherwise.

Bratislava, 11 December 1994

Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia

Jan Luptak, chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia

Jan Slota, chairman of the Slovak National Party

Pavel Delinga, chairman of the Farmers' Party of Slovakia

Meciar on Law on Protection of Republic

AU1412072594 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Dec 94 pp 1-2

[Article by "bog, pt" on news conference given by SDL Chairman Peter Weiss and HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar after their talks in Bratislava on 7 December: "Vladimir Meciar Will Propose to the President a New Government Early Next Week; He Wants To Govern With a Provisional Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—[Passage omitted]

Three Risks of Instability According to Vladimir Meciar

According to Vladimir Meciar, he agreed with Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] representatives yesterday that "early elections are not a solution." The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] sees three main risks of instability in parliament: "First, there are 17 political entities in parliament, which, if they are to communicate, must create among themselves at least 130 communication channels. Second, some political parties have declared that they see the only safeguard of stability in the disintegration of parties that are to form the future government coalition. The present government coalition and future opposition cannot expect us to sit idly by and tolerate the defiance of the citizens' will and the distortion of parliamentary election results. The third risk of instability is the participation of Democratic Union [DU] deputies in parliament."

Change to the Electoral Law

The HZDS chairman confirmed that the HZDS would seek a compromise with the SDL on the law on conflict of interests. According to him, it is necessary to adopt new rules of procedure. "We have proposed that the SDL start working on changing the electoral law from the present system of proportional representation to a majority system. Right now, their attitude toward this is somewhat reserved, which is understandable. Their analyses have not been worked out as thoroughly as ours. We see, however, that joint work in this direction is possible," Vladimir Meciar said. According to him, the HZDS proposed to the SDL "the principle of refraining from the internationalization of internal, often petty or personal political quarrels. Internal matters should be treated as such in future." He denounced politicians who go abroad to "wail."

Asked by SME about the HZDS proposal to change the electoral system, the SDL chairman said that the SDL sees no reason for such a step. He added, however, that the SDL is ready to "consider, from the viewpoint of political science, a combined electoral system." Peter Weiss added, however, that "we will not be able to prevent what the majority in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] decides."

HZDS Will Help DU Leave the NRSR

Vladimir Meciar declared that DU deputies had obtained their seats in parliament by means of "fraud." In his opinion, there are several alternatives: "The most beautiful solution would be if they left parliament voluntary, which they are not going to do. Therefore, it will be necessary to help them. Several steps will have to be taken. We will deal with the question of their status as deputies—whether their mandates are valid or not. The second issue is what to do with the party. Does it have the right to set up its club of deputies in parliament? Does it have a right to compensation and the like? The commission of the NRSR Committee has not yet submitted its final decision, in which it could specify such recommendations. We do not consider it right, however, to confirm the status quo." Vladimir Meciar said that a constitutional majority was not needed to deal with the issue of DU deputies' mandates; some partial steps can be taken with a simple majority of votes. According to the HZDS chairman, this question will not be dealt with at the December NRSR meeting because the provisional commission of the NRSR Mandate and Immunity Committee has not yet drawn up its official report. He denied that members of that commission had provided him with information on their work. Replying to a question from SME, he stated: "The information I have comes from within DU."

SDL: Reallocation Would Be Absurd

Peter Weiss stated in this context that voters who had cast their votes for DU had decided freely, which has produced a certain alignment of forces in parliament.

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According to Weiss, this alignment of forces can be changed only by new early elections. "Reallocation of mandates would not be good and almost absurd," he added, stressing that an ex post facto change in the election results would trigger a stormy reaction abroad. "The question is to what extent the Slovak Republic would be able to cope with this reaction," Peter Weiss said.

According to Vladimir Meciar, it cannot be ruled out that the SDL will fill the post of fourth NRSR deputy chairman, provided the HZDS and the SDL conclude a "reasonable political agreement." [passage omitted]

Law on Protection of Republic

The HZDS chairman also replied to questions concerning the law on the protection of the Republic. He said that he would prefer if this law were not passed at all in the next four years but added that, should the situation require it, the law will have to be approved. "If there is the threat of a social, political, and ethnic conflict, it is our moral duty to pass the law on the protection of the Republic. Should political parties issue such calls, we will have to do so," Vladimir Meciar stated. The opposite view was presented by SDL Chairman Peter Weiss. The two leaders' views also differed with regard to the parliamentary commission set up to investigate the alleged constitutional crisis of March 1994. "One of the things on which we agreed was attitude toward the screening law. The sooner it disappears, the better," Meciar said at the close of the meeting with journalists.

New Name for Workers Forum-Workers Party

AU1412122794 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 12 Dec 94 p 2

[TASR report: "Workers Party of Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Workers Forum-Workers Party of Slovakia changed its name to Workers Party of Slovakia [Strana Robotnikov Slovenska] (SRS) as of Saturday, 10 December. The party's original name, Workers Forum [Forum Robotnikov], will not disappear because the Workers Forum will be transformed into a civic association. This was decided by the party's national congress in Bratislava on Saturday. The delegates expressed support for the party's incumbent committee, with party chairman Frantisek Lady at its head.

Slovene President Arrives on Official Visit

LD1412093394 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0900 GMT 14 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Milan Kucan, president of the Slovene Republic, accompanied by his wife Stefka Kucanova, arrived today in Bratislava on an official visit.

The Slovene president was welcomed at the airport by Dusan Rozbora, state secretary in the Foreign Ministry. Afterwards, Milan Kucan left for the Primates Palace, where he will have talks with President Michal Kovac.

Later he will meet Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and parliament speaker Ivan Gasparovic.

Armex Chief Views Prospects of Arms Recovery

AU1312175594 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Dec 94 p 12

[Article by Peter Sporer: "Vitazoslav Moric: I Want To Renew Arms Production"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Vitazoslav Moric, director general of Armex, whose shareholders are five ministries—defense, interior, economy, transportation, and finance—says that, since entering the trade register nine months ago, Armex has worked on about 30 arms export deals from Slovakia. Of those, Armex is now supposedly preparing about 10 deals, the largest of which, worth $120 million, involves the export of weapons, weapon systems, and ammunition to a certain African country. [passage omitted]

Mr. Moric counters the objection that, to this day, Armex has not concluded any major business deals as follows: "Everyone familiar with arms trade knows that sometimes it takes several years to prepare a deal. We have not been around that long. Besides, the goal of Armex is to deal conceptually with the development, production, and trade with arms in Slovakia—that is, not just with their sale."

In this context, he says that the founding of a joint Russian-Slovak company is being prepared that will deal in both countries' weapons, for trade at an operational level. The joint enterprise's consignment warehouses [konsignacne sklady] will be in Slovakia. "I want to renew arms production," Moric says. In the same breath, he adds that the Slovak T-72 tank could be "complemented with electronics, modernized, and its price raised to a maximum of $1.2 million." According to Mr. Moric, this is the maximum. He does not believe that the T-72, despite its solid armor plating, could get any closer to the price of a Leopard ($2-3 million). The problem is that, for the time being, owing to the competition of Polish and Russian tanks, the price of a tank is "interesting" only if it costs a maximum of $700-800 million. In northern Africa, or in Middle Eastern states to which exports are not barred by the UN Security Council, which are also target markets for Armex, you supposedly cannot get more for a T-72, even though, according to Mr. Moric, the whole world knows how excellently Slovak tanks acquitted themselves in Iraqi sand. [passage omitted]

Civilian goods now make up 90 percent of our arms factories' production. Of the more than 80,000 employees of the former Heavy Engineering Works economic production unit, only some 50,000 remain in its successor organizations. In 1988, the Slovak military

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industry produced goods worth almost 20 billion korunas, which, converted to present prices, would still represent about 20 percent of the GDP. Today Slovakia produces only spare parts. [passage omitted]

The arms factories have only one chance today—asserting themselves against Western competitors on "permitted" markets with the quality of their products and lower prices. To be able to compete, however, they would have to invest in development. [passage omitted] The Slovak Army does not have the funds to invest in the arms industry, and arms factories that, under socialism, surrendered their profits to the state, did not care about their future and are equally poor. Although the state has written off 4 billion korunas of state-owned companies' debts over the past few years and supported conversion programs with about another 2.5 billion in 1991-94, most arms factories are still threatened with bankruptcy. Moreover, the funds invested in conversion have not yielded immediate results, and who knows when they will. As a consequence, besides having to lay off employees, the arms factories are paying wages lower than the general Slovak average [passage omitted]

It is interesting that, like Armex, with Mr. Moric at its head, the state, too, still concedes the possibility that arms production will be revived. Apparently this is why idle single-purpose machinery has been kept in empty halls, although it adds to state companies' costs. Everything is ready for the production of special technology to be set in motion again, perhaps even at the same pace as five years ago, when it represented 60-70 percent of the Heavy Engineering Works economic production unit's output. Of course, no one can imagine what would have to happen for Slovakia to start churning out the same amounts again. Who would buy it all? [passage omitted]

At any rate, it would be more appropriate to keep one's feet on the ground and realize that, in this time of disarmament, even Western manufacturers are having problems with their arms-manufacturing capacity. [passage omitted]

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Horn, France's Balladur Discuss EU, NATO

LD1312204194 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] France, which will hold the presidency of the European Union [EU] next year, supports our country's integration. However, as far as our accession into NATO is concerned, France is afraid that Russia would consider this a step taken against it. This was the French stance which was outlined at the talks of Prime Minister Gyula Horn and Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs in Paris today. Katalin Borsodi reports.

[Borsodi] The European integration was the centerpiece of the talks between Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn and French Prime Minister Eduard Balladur this morning.

The French prime minister said that his country was ready to give technical support to Hungary and this could facilitate Hungary's accession into the EU. He cited as examples the reform of the tax system and the harmonization of economic regulations.

The French prime minister also stressed that before entering the EU, the East-Central European countries should sort out their border and minority problems. In this respect he was satisfied with the Hungarian stand, which he reckons to be in accord with the conditions of the European integration.

In contrast with articles in the Hungarian press, France supports our country's membership in the EU without objections or reservations. This was said by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe after meeting his Hungarian counterpart Laszlo Kovacs early this afternoon. He added that Paris wished to maintain the active dialogue between the continent's regions, which began at the Essen summit. This is demonstrated by the fact that next year six or seven ministerial meetings will be organized for the leaders of the eastern-central European countries.

Speaking of Hungary's joining NATO, he said that Moscow had to be prevented from considering the accession of countries from the region into NATO to be a step taken against it. [passage omitted]

Late in the afternoon Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs assessed the first day of the Hungarian prime minister's visit to Paris.

He said that France supported the East-Central European countries' accession into the EU and NATO. He added, however, that the French side put greater emphasis on the accession into the EU. There was some skepticism in the issue of the extension of NATO, particularly because of the Russian concerns. [passage omitted]

Kovacs Views NATO, Russia, Basic Treaties

AU1312184594 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 10 Dec 94 p 7

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Gabor Lambert; place and date not given: "NATO's Expansion Is Mainly a Prestige Issue for Moscow—Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs on Whether There Is Increased Diplomatic Room for Maneuver, the Tasks of the Working Group Jointly Established With the Defense Ministry, and When the Basic Agreements Will Be Signed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lambert] Over the past few years, strong domestic and foreign reactions were evoked every time we did not adjust ourselves to western diplomacy and did not follow it—like in the AWACS case. In the view of Hungarian diplomacy, do we have more room to maneuver for independent initiatives in the current international situation? Is this the reason for Gyula Horn's unexpected announcement that we wish to hold independent consultations with Moscow on the NATO issue?

[Kovacs] I believe that it is in our interest to coordinate our stance with the European Union [EU], NATO's line. However, this does not mean that Hungary cannot have independent initiatives because its interests, naturally, do not always coincide with those of the two interest alliances. Especially because Hungary is not a full member of either, and its geographic situation, conditions, and size are different. As for the prime minister's announcement on consultations with Moscow, this is not different from the North Atlantic attitude. The essence of NATO's stance is that the expansion should serve the security and stability of the Euroatlantic region and Central Europe that is to be included in NATO. The 1 December NATO foreign ministers conference clearly stated that NATO would not allow Russia or any other third country to interfere in its expansion, in other words, it cannot be prevented by these countries. At the same time, NATO also formulated the criteria that the expansion should not create new dividing lines or new divisions. It is also in NATO's interest that Russia should not feel isolated. It is striving to dispel Russia's worries, therefore, leaders of NATO and its member states reacted extremely favorably to the fact the Hungary also wants to contribute to this and they support this initiative.

Russian Arguments

[Lambert] Nevertheless, we had not coordinated this prior to the announcement through diplomatic channels.

[Kovacs] No, we had not, but there was no need for it either because, for some time, we have been able to observe the intentions of NATO and the United States to intensify the dialogue with Moscow parallel to preparing the expansion. (This is one of the reasons they urged signing the agreement with Russia on participation in

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the Partnership for Peace program which was finally rejected by Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev minutes before the planned signing.) Therefore, we are certain that this Hungarian initiative will not meet with negative reactions among NATO countries. As a matter of fact, I am convinced that consultations are unavoidable. It is impossible for NATO's expansion not to be mentioned at high-level Russian-Hungarian meetings. I do not think anyone believes that, when this issue is raised, the Hungarian leaders would leave the table or say that Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, and Mr. Foreign Minister, we are not willing to discuss this issue. It is not Hungary's goal to receive consent from Russia; the point is to hold consultations, exchange views, and discuss what effects NATO's expansion can have on Hungary's and Russia's security. Precisely the same happened at talks between Horn and Yeltsin, or Goncz and Yeltsin, and following this, during my talks with Kozyrev. The issue we discussed was the possible effects of NATO's expansion rather than Hungary's membership.

[Lambert] The fact that Kozyrev only spoke of anti-NATO feelings in general terms and that, according to some assessments, the tone of the Russian-Hungarian talks was milder than Yeltsin's speech the day after, might even create such impressions that Moscow is less antagonistic to Hungary's accession than to that of other central European countries. Is there a basis for this?

[Kovacs] Let us first see how the Russian leadership argues against expansion. The first argument is that as a result of expansion, NATO would come to Russia's borders. Hungary obviously does not have a border with Russia. The second: Expansion threatens Russia's security. Hungary's membership obviously will not change the strategic and military power conditions, therefore, this argument again does not affect Hungary. Third—and Kozyrev spoke in great detail about this during our meeting, and the Yeltsin speech the following day also alluded to it—NATO's expansion will have negative domestic political effects. I believe this to be the most important factor. I feel that the expansion is mainly an issue of political prestige for Moscow and a security problem only secondarily, if at all. Moscow's military nuclear strike power is much greater than any change in military power that might occur as a result of the accession of a few central European countries. Naturally, if someone looks at the map and size of the Central European countries, the size of their population, the history of their relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, and the emotional effects of this, it become obvious that the membership of the various countries has different effects on Moscow. There are or there will be countries whose NATO membership cause bigger problems and some countries' accession is almost unacceptable for Moscow, while the membership of others would not cause major problems. Let us look at the other side of this issue. If NATO takes this into consideration (and it obviously will not ignore it) it can make two kinds of decisions on the order of accession when this comes on the agenda. One: To accept those countries first that are strategically most important for NATO. The other possibility is to accept those countries that cause the least amount of problems, whose membership is most acceptable for Moscow. These are two opposing directions and NATO and Russia's goals are obviously diametrically opposed here.

The Order

[Lambert] This new situation also has, let us say, a sideline. If we take President Walesa's reaction as a basis, Horn's Warsaw announcement can also be seen as a last push toward Visegrad political-military cooperation. Not mentioning the fact that the prime minister's assessment of the situation, claiming that Hungary can join NATO and the EU among the first ones or first of all, sounds like an "open declaration of war" to the Czech propaganda of success.

[Kovacs] In my view, Horn's announcement on consultations to be held with Moscow does not violate Visegrad cooperation. All countries participating in it have already made some individual initiatives. It might be unfortunate, but we cannot talk about regular or continuous coordination between the four countries either in foreign policy or in international trade issues. Some coordination does exist but this does not reach a level that would be threatened by such an announcement. All four Visegrad countries have made it clear that, rather than some kind of Central European integration, their goal is the establishment of a cooperation that makes their accession to the EU easier but is not an alternative to this. I believe that centuries-old memories of Polish-Russian relations played a role in President Walesa's reaction. However, let me raise another problem: The cooperation of the four countries is characterized by the objective compulsion to cooperate on one hand and by rivalry on the other. It will be good for the former to suppress the latter. However, at the moment, this is a swaying process where the various elements take turns becoming stronger. Therefore, there is also a kind of race. I believe that it is in Hungary's interest to be able to enter NATO and the EU, or either of them, as soon as they are ready for expansion. This is what is in our interest, rather than having this done before a particular neighboring country can do it. Naturally, this does not mean that we would consider it good if Hungary had to wait for another country or if any other country have to wait for Hungary. However, it is in our interest for as many countries of this region to become suitable for membership and as quickly as possible.

[Lambert] In recent months, it has not been emphasized as among the ideas of Hungarian diplomacy that Hungary sees NATO membership as a possibility in the near future. However, Horn has recently said that accession might be possible within two to three years while our EU membership is hardly likely before the end of the century. Does this mean some kind of retuning of our foreign political tactics?

[Kovacs] The essence of Hungarian Government integration policy is to fit the country into the Euro-Atlantic

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community because neither our security, nor our economic and social modernization can be guaranteed without this. On the institutional side, this means that Hungary would like to join three organizations: The EU, the West European Union [WEU] which is the security policy dimension of the former, and NATO. The question of order, namely which one we would like to join first, does not even emerge for Hungary: We are observing them to see which is possible first. Naturally, we concentrate on the EU and NATO, although some ideas could also be heard suggesting that we first join the WEU. However, people suggesting this must not have read the Maastricht Treaty and do not know that full membership in the EU is a precondition of WEU membership. Therefore, the choice is between NATO and the EU. However, the question does not make sense for us this way because it will be decided by which door is first opened to us. This does not depend on us. Hungary can do two things. One, prepare for membership and to meet the requirements set for members. As a matter of fact, I am convinced that regardless of this step, it is in Hungary's interest to meet the requirements of conformity to Europe, to create a European-level economic structure, and to raise parliamentary democracy, the legal system, and the political culture to a European level from all points of view. The other is that Hungary argue for the expansion at all possible forums and try to gain support for its own intentions to join.

I believe that rather than consider the effects of expansion for NATO itself, NATO mainly considers the way the expansion will affect the new member countries, the ones remaining outside, and relations between outsiders and new members, and between outsiders and NATO. For this reason, we have less influence on the timing of our accession to NATO than to the EU. In the case of the latter, more depends on Hungary because the main question is to what extent it can meet the entry requirements. Once Hungary meets these, then it is very likely that it can join. While, in the case of NATO, even if we meet the entry requirements. NATO might decide not to expand or to start the expansion with other countries for strategic considerations. Therefore, we cannot assess which membership we will gain first. At the moment, it seems that Hungary could become a NATO member after two to three years at the earliest. According to the defined schedule, for a year, until December 1995, an internal debate will be conducted on the conditions and consequences of expansion. After this, they will start to examine which countries to admit and when. This means that they will begin to draw up a schedule at the end of 1995 or the beginning of 1996. By 1997, membership can follow. In the case of the EU, talks on accession can begin at the end of 1996 or beginning of 1997 at the earliest, and they will last at least two years if we take the former talks on accession as a guideline. Therefore, Hungary has a chance to join NATO, but not the EU, within two to three years. Nevertheless, I maintain what I have said about NATO's expansion and the role of strategic considerations. Therefore, the possibility of Hungary becoming a member of EU before NATO cannot be excluded after all.

Task Force

[Lambert] In any case, the fact that we can hardly influence NATO decisions does not reduce the need to have a relevant Hungarian program. (Like the government plans to submit its proposals on the acceleration of joining the EC to parliament next spring.) Does the government take this into account and will the government take into consideration NATO demands, namely better civilian control of the army in East Europe?

[Kovacs] The government takes this into account. A "task force" was set up at the initiative of the Foreign Ministry, a working group led by the administrative state secretary, with the participation of representatives of the Defense Ministry. This working group made up of the two ministries is examining Hungary's security policy orientation and the possibilities and conditions of joining the NATO and the EU, including our joining the WEU. Work has, therefore, begun. As for the second part of your question, Hungary is aware of the fact that civilian control over the army is one of the requirements for NATO acceptance. The Defense Ministry has already begun work in this direction. The Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry are equally aware of the importance of this issue, and the government regards this as a task to be carried out.

Inevitable Conditions

[Lambert] In view of the fact that the issue of integration is gaining increasing ground in the Hungarian foreign policy, how does this relate to the other Hungarian foreign policy priority, namely the good relations with our neighbors? Could a situation emerge in which our entire integration depends on the acceleration of good-neighborly relations and primarily on the signing of basic treaties?

[Kovacs] This is a justified question, because it will not be difficult to present the failure to sign such a basic treaty as the failure of our neighborhood policy. For the new government, the basic treaty issue emerged in the sense that we inherited a situation in which negotiations have already been under way on the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty for two and one half years, at Romanian initiative, and the Slovak side also initiated the signing of a basic treaty. Therefore, we did not examine whether Hungary has any interest in initiating a basic treaty; instead, we examined whether Hungary has any interest in rejecting the Romanian and Slovak initiatives. We came to the conclusion that Hungary has no interest in rejecting these initiatives, because the basic treaty could also be advantageous for us. In addition, we also came to the conclusion that the rejection of such a basic treaty or the continuation of the delaying tactics used by the previous government on this issue would only harm chances of improving relations with our neighbors and, subsequently, Hungary's international

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standing. Therefore, the government declared its readiness to negotiate the basic treaties. We also made it clear that we find two things inevitable in these basic treaties. One: Mutual recognition of the inviolability of existing borders and the subsequent declaration that the two sides have no territorial demands of each other. This is inevitable because both our neighbors regard this as an essential element of the basic treaty. Two: The recognition of national minority rights, including guarantees for their everyday implementation, in accordance with the relevant international and European documents and norms. This is inevitable because the implementation or violation of national minority rights affects security and stability in this region. This is not some unique Hungarian issue; instead, as the Yugoslav tragedy shows, this is a definitive element of this region, one that cannot be disregarded. Therefore, we made it clear what kind of treaty we want to sign. We also made it clear that we regard the basic treaty as a means, and not as a goal, very important, but not the only means of improving relations. Therefore, from the very beginning, we have been striving to advance in every possible area of bilateral relations while conducting coordination talks and carrying out the text coordination on the planned basic treaty, so that a possible delay in negotiations does not cause any stagnation in Hungarian-Romanian or Hungarian-Slovak relations. It is in the interest of Hungarian foreign policy to make its own good intentions, and its own intentions of coming to an agreement, clear. The decision-creating and decisionmaking factors of international politics everywhere know that settling relations or even the signing of a basic treaty depends on both sides, not only on one side. It is in our interest to make sure that Hungary cannot be blamed if there is no improvement in bilateral relations.

[Lambert] Does this mean that we are not so adamant about a certain deadline, like the Romanians for example, and we do not connect the finalizing of the basic treaty to the stabilization conference in Paris? What chance is there of including the EU in this whole goodneighborly process?

[Kovacs] We do not separate the basic treaty from the European stability agreement, from the European stability conference to be held in Paris on 20-21 March 1995; nor do we make the basic treaty totally dependent on this. During the CSCE summit, a foreign ministerial meeting was held with the participation of foreign ministers of countries affected by the European stability conference and agreement (namely the EU, the Central European region, and the Baltic countries). I mentioned here that Hungary is ready to accept any EU assistance for the signing of the Hungarian-Slovak and Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty. This does not necessarily mean direct mediation activity. Misinterpretations spread earlier, namely that Germany was allegedly trying to mediate in the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty negotiations. All that actually happened was that, as current EU chairman, Germany offered a tripartite exchange of views on Hungarian-Romanian relations at the expert level, including the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty, an exchange of views connected to the Vienna consultation dealing with the issue of the European stability agreement. This would only have been an exchange of views, and not a meeting of text coordination. We accepted this initiative at the time, and I think such an exchange of views would have been welcome, and I was sorry that the Romanian side rejected it, after initially accepting it, by interpreting it as some kind of interference. We are ready to accept a new and similar initiative any time, and we do not exclude mediation either, although we do not regard this as something inevitable.

Essen and Paris

[Lambert] Which conference is more important for Hungarian diplomacy: The EU summit in Essen or Gyula Horn's visit in Paris next week? What I mean here is, the extent to which we want to reassure Moscow that our NATO membership will not represent a danger for Russia; perhaps to the same extent it is in the interest of the Hungarian diplomacy to reassure Paris (the next EU chairman) that our EU membership will not represent an unlimited increase in German influence over Central Europe and within the union.

[Kovacs] I think that the prime ministerial and foreign ministerial meeting connected with the summit in Essen and the Hungarian prime minister's upcoming visit to Paris are essentially equally important, because they deal with the same issue from different sides, namely Hungary's EU membership. The summit in Essen (one that also deals with the broadening strategy connected with the joining of Central European countries, or the associate members) and the relevant talks provide an opportunity for Hungary to present its views to the 15 member states. However, given the fact that, in addition to Hungary, the other five associate members will also participate, details will obviously not be dealt with because time no longer permits this. However, the visit in Paris and meeting with the heads of a rather important and influential member state provides the opportunity to present a detailed position. Fortunately, Hungary does not have to reassure Paris. When I visited Paris on 20 October this year at the invitation of French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, we spoke in detail about Hungary's integration efforts, and this was the main subject of our talks. On this occasion, Alain Juppe firmly pointed out that Hungary should count on the same support from Paris as from Bonn for its integration efforts. All the more so because Paris and Bonn carefully coordinated their positions on this issue too.

Slow Progress in Slovak-Hungarian Treaty Talks

LD1312224594 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The second round of the experts' talks on the Hungarian-Slovak Basic Treaty ended in Bratislava today. However, we still cannot talk about a success. Ildiko Nagy reports.

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[Begin Nagy recording] Gyorgy (Szenasi), the head of the International Legal Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that today's talks were open, informal, and useful from a professional viewpoint. During the talks, progress has been made in understanding each other's position.

The official statement issued by the Slovak Foreign Ministry was also similar. At the same time, it has become clear for the Hungarian side that it is too early to talk about a common draft. The harmonization between the concepts of the two sides needs to be gradual. There is overlapping between the positions, but there are differences in the form, content, and emphasis, too.

The text proposed by the Hungarian side laid significant emphasis on the passage regarding the minorities, as well as the proposal on the abrogation of the 1968 Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. In the view of the Hungarian negotiating delegation, the harmonization of the draft texts of the Slovak-Hungarian Basic Treaty can be expected at a later date, which will be coordinated through diplomatic channels. [End Nagy recording]

Asked by Hungarian Radio correspondent Ildiko Nagy, Gyorgy Szenasi said that he could not discover any correlation between the Slovak domestic political changes and the experts' talks, and he did not expect that the change in the Slovak Government will negatively affect the results of the experts' work. Since the matters are very important, the process requires thorough consideration and work, for which both sides are ready, the head of the Hungarian experts' delegation said.

Privatization Official Assesses Impact of New Law

AU1312102894 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 7 Dec 94 p 10

[Interview with Janos Szabo Hatvani, State Property Agency executive director, by Sarolta Osvath; place and date not given: "More Than 100 Bids in Before End 1994—Why Has Privatization Slowed Down?—Hatvani on the Old and New Laws, Compensation Notes, and Custom-Made Invitations for Bids"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Osvath] Privatization has become slower, the State Property Agency's [AVU] board of directors is making very few actual decisions to do with privatization. In your view, what is the reason?

[Hatvani] Recently, the AVU has had many complaints about the slow privatization. Previously, the accusations were about the too rapid privatization. Then and now, our speed of work is dictated by the situation. It has to be acknowledged that the management of affairs did indeed slow down at the time the privatization bill was being prepared, it took longer to draw up the invitations for bids, and some decisions were also delayed. The obvious reason is that the apparatus was waiting for the new concept to see what the new law would include. Since this work ended, our activities have become more rapid.

[Osvath] What are the signs of this? The number of privatization decisions has not increased very much lately. In fact, considering the case of the HungarHotels [hotel chain], well, it is rather slow. The foreign press, namely THE FINANCIAL TIMES assumes political reasons behind the decision, claiming that the current government is hesitant about involving foreign capital.

[Hatvani] We have accepted a list that contains the names of enterprises whose privatization is to be announced before the end of the year. This list includes more than 110 enterprises. We will be drawing up the conditions for the privatization of these enterprises in the coming weeks. In connection with evaluating the bids, I can say that work has not been stopped at all and every time a suitable application is sent, a decision is also made. [passage omitted] Actually, it is simply untrue that there is an objection against foreign capital. No discrimination exists, and we are relying very much on foreign capital, especially since the new law, as is well known, gives preference to cash privatization. This, whichever way we look at it, offers wider possibilities to foreign capital because the domestic investors admittedly have a shortage of capital. According to our plans, we will advertise more than 50 percent of the enterprises that belong to the AVU by the end of January or mid-February, which means the advertising of some 200 enterprises. Due to the nature of the applications—the deadline is between 45 and 60 days, and the evaluation takes at least three months—the visible acceleration of privatizations can be expected within three to four months of sending out the invitations. [passage omitted]

[Osvath] The new privatization law is mainly criticized—by the interest representations of employees and employers, among others—for giving preference to cash privatization, claiming that this reduces the chances of domestic investors and especially workers to acquire assets. In connection with this, the fact that the E-loan ["existence" loan for small businesses] will be limited to a maximum of 50 million forints is also criticized. The old law did not have such a limit. In the period of transition, on the basis of what principle will you decide how much E-loan can be used for an application?

[Hatvani] The invitations for applications to be announced this year will continue to offer the same possibilities to the managers and employees, and the Employee Stock Ownership Program [MRP] organizations for buyouts. They can use E-loans, compensation notes, and the employees can also use the 10-percent preferential facility of acquiring assets. The limitation of the E-loans has not yet come into force. In the case of the recently announced privatization conditions, the E-loan has always exceeded 50 million forints. As a matter of fact, in my view, the new regulations will not reduce the chances of workers acquiring assets, the preferential conditions still exist, and more possibilities will be opened for the managers. [passage omitted]

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[Osvath] According to the plans, the AVU and the State Property Management Corporation [AV Rt] will be merged. Many people believe that this should be done as soon as possible to gain time. The renewal of the organization could be completed during the period of transition, it would not take extra time later, and preparations could already be made for the actual privatization tasks. Is there a chance of this?

[Hatvani] Legal regulation is required to merge the AVU and the AV Rt and to set up the State Privatization and Asset Management Corporation (APV Rt). In other words, the law has to be amended before the status of the two organizations and the system of supervising privatization can be changed. I do not consider it necessary to amend the law again before the new privatization law comes into force. The new privatization rules have been drawn up and the two organizations will operate as before until the new law comes into force. [passage omitted]

Election Statistics on Ethnic Minority Vote

AU1312194994 Paris AFP in English 1931 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Budapest, Dec 13 (AFP)—All but a handful of the 660 candidates put up by Hungary's 13 ethnic minorities in municipal elections on Sunday were successful, figures from the national election bureau revealed Tuesday [13 December].

A new electoral law made it possible for the first time for members of ethnic minorities to vote for candidates from their own ethnic group.

The minorities, of which the gypsies, Germans and Slovaks are the largest, account for about 10 percent of Hungary's 10 million inhabitants. In all 657 minority councillors were elected.

Minority candidates were elected in 171 towns and 299 villages. The Gipsies, the largest minority in the country with 600,000 members but only given the status of a minority three years ago, won the largest number of seats with 434 successful candidates.

All 105 candidates put up by the 200,000-strong German minority (the second largest) won.

The Slovaks (100,000) will have 31 municipal councillors, the Croats 42, the Serbs 18, and the Romanians 11. Armenians, Slovenes, Bulgarians, Greeks, Poles and Ruthenians will have between them 16 seats. Only the tiny Ukrainian minority, numbering a few hundred members, did not put forward a candidate.

No ethnic candidates stood for the office of mayor, for which elections were held simultaneously. The new minority councillors will be in charge of social and cultural matters relating to their community.

The elections were won by the socialist party of Premier Gyula Horn.

Agreement Reached; Railway Strike Called Off

LD1312181694 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Agreement has been reached; the rail strike has been called off. Levente Suekoesd reports.

[Suekoesd] The railway workers' trade unions have succeeded in reaching agreement with the management of the MAV [Hungarian State Railways] joint stock company, and on the basis of the agreement today, 13 December, the trade unions are withdrawing their strike call. Therefore, the rail strike in principle has ended as from now.

In practice, however, this means something different. Istvan Gasko, president of the Free Trade Union of Railway Workers, told our program: The railway workers will begin as of now to prepare the trains for operation. However, the first services can begin according to the original timetable at about 2200 only, and the railway traffic situation is expected to conform to the original timetable by tomorrow morning.

The agreement was reached after Transport Minister Karoly Lotz told the negotiating sides, a few hours ago, via his envoy at the talks, that he had consulted Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi and had decided to pledge the continued guarantee of a 2.5 percent wage increase—previously pledged by the government—in spite of the fact that the strike had already begun. This naturally constitutes part of the 6 percent wage increase.

The first point of the agreement says that the MAV joint stock company will endeavor to avoid, as much as possible, the closure of entire railway lines in 1995, and it will involve the trade unions in preparing decisions.

The agreement also says that the MAV joint stock company, together with the government, will guarantee a 10 percent pay increase: 6 percent of this will be wage increase and 4 percent will be performance-related bonus [teljesitmeny jutalom] which will be paid out to employees on 10 July next year, railway workers day.

Sandor Kalnoki Kis, chairman of the MAV joint stock company, pledged a personal, moral guarantee for the payment of a further 2 percent performance-related bonus—above the 10 percent—in December of next year.

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Foreign Minister on European Integration

WS1412081594 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 10 Dec 94 pp 1, 13

[Article by Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski: "Europe in the Eyes of the Foreign Affairs Minister: A Better History for the Continent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Europe is currently in a very unusual frame of mind—the continent wants to unite. Calls for an undivided Europe may be heard from all sides. We know that we cannot waste the opportunity of this unprecedented unanimity, yet we do not know how to take advantage of it. We are seeking a formula for uniting the continent without secluding the United States or isolating Russia. To meet the challenge, we require strategic imagination, the ability to plan in the long term, and a change in mentality.*

Over the past two centuries, Europe has undergone three huge rearrangements of the international order. In 1815 in Vienna, in 1919 in Versailles, and in 1945 in Yalta and Potsdam, the foundations were laid for a "European symphony" and an equilibrium of power. We remember both methods of preserving order in Europe. We also remember that each of them contained the seed of new conflicts.

What sets the current, fourth, reorganization apart is that it is not a consequence of an armed conflict. Thus, the end of the Cold War is not marked in spectacular form by one conference, where basic principles of international order are laid down. We have no simple dichotomy of the conqueror-the defeated, enemy-ally, loss-gain. The discussion takes place within one camp, the camp of democracy. Paradoxically, this renders the task more difficult.

Moreover, the debate is going on at a time when part of Europe is already united. The European Union [EU] and NATO—we must discuss both jointly if we desire a U.S. presence in Europe—are surprisingly successful international ventures. Founded during the Cold War, they were to guarantee member states protection against communist expansion and secure conditions for peaceful development. Since then, they have formed an astonishingly solid commonwealth of nations advocating the same values and implementing similar objectives. The commonwealth that was established to counterbalance the communist camp has outlived its downfall. Integration proved not only an effective and sure method of introducing order, but also an aim and value in itself.

This is a huge historical achievement of the states of West Europe and North America, especially the former, which were organized into fiercely competing and warring empires and principalities for entire centuries.

The West is thus already united. This is an undeniable fact. We have to take this into consideration when we construct an "undivided Europe". How? We could resort to the principle of a balance of powers, consolidate the "East" (once again), strengthen it, and eventually merge the two territories. This concept, deeply rooted in the Cold War, has supporters in Russia and in conservative circles in the West, which want to retain their exclusivity status. It also has the support of certain economic circles that miss either the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact or the "European formation" as systems in which it is easier to do business with "old pals," without fearing competition.

There is also the "concert of superpowers" method. It would consist of a strategic agreement between the United States, the EU, and Russia, providing for principles of mutual cooperation and conditions for other states to join within the Partnership for Peace, as associated partners, as convergent circles, and so forth. Or, as in a Soviet dream, one could try to break up the West and start building completely anew. The first concept has many followers within the EU, the second among "superpower" politicians in Russia, as well as in Poland, who see a chance of Poland's becoming a regional center or a bridge between Berlin and Moscow.

Finally, there is a third way—integration. Opening the well-established Western structures to accept new members and their gradual expansion to include all of Europe until, to use poetic language, the West becomes Europe and Europe becomes the West. Poland is a strong advocate of this method. It is the safest one (because it does not destruct well-established structures or pose any threat that antagonism, however temporary, might appear between them), the least expensive, the most pragmatic (well-established structures are expanded, verified models are applied, no time or money has to be spent forming new ones), and thus the easiest to implement.

Integration requires that two difficult steps be taken. On the one hand, the West has to redefine its institutions, which involves certain costs, institutional problems, and new ways of thinking, and, on the other, the remaining European nations have to adopt fundamental elements of the Western model, modifying their own solutions to match, giving up some of their identity and ambitions.

It is very difficult to redefine the existing institutions—the EU, NATO, the Western European Union—so that they meet new challenges. They should comply with processes of evolution that do not endanger unity or cause nations to seclude themselves because that would lead to isolationism. We understand the ongoing debate. We advocate a "deep" Europe, a Europe with defined values, principles, commitments, and mechanisms that are observed by all members with iron discipline. We see this as a key issue. If Europe is shallow, noncommitted, "a la carte," various standards will emerge, various groups will form, and unification will prove superficial. We fear, however, that the current focusing of attention on mechanisms of operations and internal procedures of the Union in the ongoing debate causes a neglect of the key issue—namely, that we have one Europe, which

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must be deepened and widened at the same time. We must seek practical answers to that challenge. One response is the inclusion of European Free Trade Association members in the Union. With that decision, we have taken a step in the right direction. It shows that apprehensions due to memory of the G-9's past and the Iron Curtain, which, as we well remember, ssigned a specific role to Finland and Austria in the European order, are diminishing. Expansion has already begun. Thus, tendencies to delay the admission of Poland and other Central European states to NATO and the EU are all the more dangerous. They are disappointing and discouraging. They threaten our reforms, undermine trust in a unified Europe, and provide an incentive to seek other solutions.

The other step, to adopt the Western model, is the more difficult to make the larger a nation is. Since gaining full sovereignty, the states of Central Europe—the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary—decided to adapt solutions and models applied in the West. This required deep reforms, which are currently bearing fruit both in terms of economic growth and extensive conformation (in economics and politics) to West European standards. As a consequence, those states can now apply for membership in the EU and NATO.

What about our Eastern neighbors? We attentively follow the changes that are taking place there, especially the establishment or, as some say, the reestablishment of tight relations between them. We cooperate very closely with them. In fact, we are the only postcommunist state that has signed treaties on "good-neighborly relations" with all of our neighboring countries. We can already feel the benefits. Among them I count the absence of conflicts pertaining to ethnic minorities; the fact that many new joint enterprises appear every day; the development of trade (for instance, with Russia; it has grown by 30 percent this year); the dynamic growth of cooperation between border regions, which is difficult to measure statistically; and, finally, the huge growth of human traffic. The latter is particularly satisfying: Every year 8 million tourists, traders, and seasonal workers from Belarus, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine come to Poland. They come to get to know our country, our people, and to make money. They come more and more often, which means they feel good in Poland. Similarly, Poles are increasingly visiting our Eastern neighbors. This is the most reliable indicator of good-neighborly relations.

We treat all our neighbors as fully independent and sovereign states. We support their attempts at establishing national identities, which does not imply we are against close bilateral relations between them, unless violence and disregard for democratic procedures are involved. We evaluate the process of integration within CIS in those categories. We attentively follow the debates and developments in CIS: National political and economic interests of the particular member states are being defined and rules of decisionmaking procedures are being laid down, especially membership conditions for smaller states. The scope and depth of political, economic, and military integration, as well as their proportions, are assessed. We trust that, as a result of this process, a balanced, stable, and effective commonwealth of truly independent states will emerge and that, instead of a closed, isolated community eying the rest of the world with distrust, there will appear a commonwealth open to Europe, constituting its integral part.

What can we do to make this happen? Set an example—join Central Europe with the West and the North. Make the idea of one Europe more credible. Demonstrate that the integration process really is open, that it might eventually even include those states. Introduce the idea of integration to them, so that they can feel it, so that it can become alluring.

It is a strategic challenge. The fate of a united Europe depends on whether that challenge is accepted. Also, our time is limited.

Such should be the paths leading us—the French, the Germans, the Poles—toward integration. Such should be the goals we are to attain, independently and together. Such is our joint responsibility. The Germans and the French must find an answer to the question of how quickly the EU and NATO can be expanded without harming their effectiveness and dynamics. The Poles must skillfully adapt to the requirements of both institutions and show that the entire Union can benefit from their membership. Together we must convince everyone that it is not only possible, but also necessary to unite Europe.

There has been no precedent of mutual cooperation of this type. There were instances in which the interests of Poland and France met, where projections were made for implementing joint policies between Poland and Saxony or Poland and Prussia, but not a single example of implementing joint policies between the three states. That lack reflects the evil history of our continent—the inability of particular states to reach understanding. Thus, the Weimar Triangle is a historical precedent. Our responsibility is therefore all the greater. The route on which our countries are located and that reaches beyond Poland was for centuries the most blood-soaked tract in Europe.

Review of Individual Partnership for Peace Plan

945P0013A Warsaw PRZEGLAD RZADOWY in Polish No 9, Sep 94 pp 38-40

[Individual PFP Program Accepted by NATO on 5 July 1994 and Remarks by Deputy Defense Minister Jerzy Milewski]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Individual Partnership for Peace [PFP] Program between the Polish Republic and NATO for 1994 was prepared on the basis of NATO*

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documents—the NATO Summit Declaration of 11 January 1994, the PFP Invitation and Framework Document, and the Presentation Document presented by the Polish Government on 25 April 1994.

* * *

Poland has declared that it intends to apply for full membership in the Alliance, and the ultimate purpose of its participation in the PFP program is to include the Polish armed forces in the integrated military structure of NATO. The Polish Government mentioned in its Presentation Document the steps it has already taken and those it is planning. That document also mentions measures that can be employed to translate the program into reality. The Polish Government emphasized the importance it attaches to achieving the interoperativeness and compatibility of the Polish Armed Forces and Civilian Defense and their infrastructures with the corresponding systems of NATO countries.

The Individual Partnership Program will be reviewed and updated each year; the related procedures are yet to be agreed upon. Next year, the implementation of the program will be evaluated. Some changes may be introduced. Upon the wish and recommendations of individual NATO members, for example, the list of detailed measures needed to commence implementing the program may be modified. The Coordinating Cell of the PFP will play a certain role, particularly in the measures undertaken by several partners jointly. Proposals for national (domestic) measures may also be included in the list.

The first part of the program deals with basic projects. The cooperation will concern, among other things, assistance in developing a modern air defense system in our country, one capable of cooperating with NATO in crisis situations. To this end, compatible air defense command systems will be needed. To assure close cooperation between Polish air traffic control and its counterparts in NATO countries, civilian air traffic control in our country has to be coordinated with military traffic control of the airspace. A major purpose of the PFP program is the joint participation of both civilian and military units of Poland and NATO in air and ground search and rescue operations, in the provision of humanitarian aid, and so forth. Hence, bilateral exercises of Polish units with partners from individual NATO countries in the recognition and identification of their aircraft, communications, and command have been planned.

Polish officers will take part in NATO exercises and seminars concerning the communications systems used in Poland. In time, once Poland switches entirely to the digital communications system and adapts its equipment to Western standards, both systems will be compatible.

Under the auspices of NATO's International Staff, Polish Civilian Defense will cooperate with similar services of other countries to protect the population against the consequences of natural and industrial disasters, and on environmental protection.

The reforms of the armed forces under way since 1989 are gaining the support of NATO experts, who will, among other things, help in introducing democratic procedures for the planning and scrutiny of the military budget. This will serve to complete the transformation of the structures of the Polish defense ministry and the armed forces high command and their adaptation to NATO standards. It is expected that the Polish defense-planning system as well as the system for the management of defense resources will be adapted to the standards of NATO countries. Likewise, the armaments at military installations, equipment, ports, and airfields, and also the defense infrastructure—e.g., pipelines—will be adapted to the parameters adopted in the Pact.

NATO terminology will be gradually introduced in Polish military training, and systems for training commanders, staffs, and troops will be unified. French and American officers will lecture at Polish military schools. Polish officer cadets will be able to travel for studies at Western schools.

Joint projects for the management of defense procurements and exchange of information on the management of national R&D programs are in the planning stage.

The Individual PFP Program provides for consultation on questions of defense policy and the organization of joint staff and troop training, exercises, and firing ranges. Peacekeeping exercises and operations, humanitarian actions, and so forth will be planned jointly. In time, a common technical base will arise.

Speech by Dr. Jerzy J. Milewski, secretary of state at the Ministry of National Defense, at the Forum of the NATO Council of Ambassadors, Brussels, 5 July 1994

Like the Polish society, its government, and its entire political representation, the Polish armed forces are also gratified to welcome the commencement of the implementation of the Individual PFP Program agreed upon with the North Atlantic Alliance. I wish to emphasize that we approach with due gravity the attendant objectives to be met by the Ministry of National Defense and the Polish military. Both the institutions of the Ministry of National Defense and of the General Staff of the Polish Army play a major role in working out the final shape of that program and fully support its provisions.

We realize the historic importance of the moment at which Poland and its armed forces are beginning practical and close military cooperation with the Alliance and with the countries associated with it. We understand that this moment is a turning point also for our partners and spectacular proof of the evolution that is also occurring within NATO.

We view Poland's participation in the PFP as a stage preparing us for complete integration with the structures of the Alliance. Consciously and with deep conviction,

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we support this political declaration of our government. The Polish military wants to become a regular element of NATO and its equal partner. We want to proceed on this road as soon as possible so that the inequality of security existing in Europe would shortly cease to exist and cease being a cause of destabilization in the region.

In this context, I would like to emphasize that our intended membership in NATO is not aimed against anyone. It is to serve the security and stabilization of our continent and to broaden the scope of the radiation of democratic values on which the North Atlantic Alliance is based. We desire a consolidation of the political map of Europe that arose following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. We desire maintenance of the status quo rather than its change. We desire the elimination of the "gray zone" of a limited feeling of security in which the Central-East European countries exist through the extension of the Euroatlantic security system to that zone.

In beginning to translate into reality the Individual Partnership Program we are aware of our limitations, especially the linguistic, procedural, and legislative ones. Hence, we view the implementation of the PFP as a means of and a convenient occasion for eliminating or reducing these limitations as a major stage on the road to Poland's membership in NATO.

During this period, our special interest will be focused on aspects of getting to know our partners and letting them get to know us, as broadly as possible, on cadre and military training, on the adaptation of the standards existing within the Polish military to those used within the Alliance. We also view as extremely important the solution of many legal problems, especially those concerning the conduct of military exercises and the attendant sojourn of military contingents on the territories of other countries.

We are convinced that, owing to practical cooperation with the military of the NATO member countries, we shall succeed in consolidating and perfecting such a priority domain to us as democratic and civilian control of the armed forces. We also count on achieving an objective unusually important from the military standpoint—namely, the interoperativeness and compatibility of our defense systems with those of the West. I refer here in particular to command systems and procedures, communications systems, and air defense systems.

As a result of the restructuring, we expect to develop modern and well-trained armed forces capable of both defending the nation and consolidating peace outside its borders by participating in international peacekeeping operations. We consider these two purposes of our armed forces as an integral part of the Polish national security doctrine. Hence, these two purposes are also suitably reflected in the detailed measures of the Individual Partnership Program.

I would rather not go into too much detail. That is not the point of our meeting. But we are aware that our cooperation has by now reached an advanced stage, at which details are becoming highly important. We expect that, in the course of the implementation of the Individual Partnership Program, many such details will be the subject of extensive analyses and practical studies by both parties.

We view our intentions, as spelled out in the Individual Partnership Program, as the first step on the road to broad and fruitful cooperation. The Polish military has a much greater potential than presented in the bid. We believe that the intensity and scope of our cooperation will steadily increase. We expect broad cooperation with the agency established to coordinate operations under Partnership for Peace (the Coordination Cell) during its implementation.

We hope that the potential of the Polish military in that respect will be explored and evaluated during the first PFP exercises, which will be held in Poland this September. We cordially invite all of the member and partner countries to participate in these exercises, whether by dispatching a participating troop subunit or a team of observers. This will be the first major undertaking under our Individual Partnership Program.

I hope this is the first step in our long and fruitful cooperation in this domain. The presence of NATO subunits in Poland and their conduct of joint exercises with Polish subunits is important to strengthening the strategic concept and bestowing on it a practical dimension. The Polish society is interested in such projects in our country and resolutely supports them.

Much work remains to be done by us. Our objective is clear, and we have the will to carry out the obligations undertaken by our country.

Newspaper Editor Appeals for Kuklinski Pardon

WS1312112694 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 Dec 94 p 1

[Appeal by GAZETA WYBORCZA editor in chief Adam Michnik: "Michnik's Appeal to the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] More than 10 years ago, the court of the Polish People's Republic sentenced Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski to death and deprived him of public rights for life. The sentence was compliant with the logic of the People's Republic system of administering justice. Today, however, it is surprising that, after more than five years since the downfall of communism and four years of Lech Walesa's term in office as president, the sentence remains in effect.

I wish to appeal to the president of the Republic of Poland to exercise his constitutional right and pardon Col. Kuklinski, enabling him to return to his homeland.

[Signed] Adam Michnik

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Opinion Poll Shows SLD Losing Support to PSL

WS1412112794 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 14 Dec 94 p 3

[Article by "knysz": "OBOP Poll: SLD Loses at PSL's Side"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] coalition, although torn by internal conflicts and attacked by President Walesa, continues to enjoy huge support.*

If parliamentary elections were held today, the SLD-PSL coalition could still count on a huge majority in the Sejm. It could jointly win 36 percent of all votes.

For the SLD, however, the partnership is clearly disadvantageous. Since July of this year, support for the party has fallen from 24 percent to 15 percent. The PSL has lost only 2 percent of its support in the same period (from 21 to 19 percent). Thus, the elections would today be won by the PSL, not by the SLD.

The leading force for the PSL is the prime minister. Although an anti-Pawlak opposition is becoming more visible, the prime minister receives more positive opinions (44 percent) than negative ones (39 percent). It is worth noting that, in October, Pawlak did better in the polls: He had 7 percent more supporters and 5 percent fewer critics.

Pawlak is supported primarily by farmers and poorly educated people. He is supported by both the central left and the extreme right constituency.

The poll carried out by the Center for Research on Public Opinion [OBOP] shows that the coalition does not have any political rivals at the moment. This is due primarily to the fact that the largest group of those people polled (41 percent) do not have any political preferences. Those who do have them approve of the current order (23 percent). Nearly one in 10 respondents would support a government of the liberal-democrat opposition. The same number of people would gladly delegate power to the rightist opposition and the president (9 percent each). Eight percent would gladly welcome rule by the leftist opposition.

The poll was conducted on 18-22 November on a random, nationwide group of 1,031 Poles over age 16.

Trade Minister Interviewed on Economic Issues

MM1312145594 Bialystok GAZETA WSPOLCZESNA in Polish 7 Dec 94 p 9

[Interview with Marek Pol, minister of industry and trade, by correspondent Stanislaw Blaszczyk; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Blaszczyk] Your predecessors left you a kind of last will: a document entitled "Basic Premises of Industrial Policy." Phrases like this have become sharply devalued in public perception. What does it mean for you today?

[Pol] Such phrases become devalued, in part, as a result of being repeated too often. It is possible that this particular expression was overused at the time of the debate on the economic reform. On the other hand, I do not believe that the idea itself, as an expression of the objective the state set itself in the most important sphere of its economy, could have become devalued. After all, at the time of the aforementioned discussion, the view or even the expectation prevailed that the state should map out the fundamental objectives of crucial importance for the country's future and identify the tools—that is, the methods—whereby these could be attained. This is the content of the document.

[Blaszczyk] Does this mean that we now finally know which branches of industry should be supported and developed and which should be done away with?

[Pol] I cannot imagine a government that could declare that such and such a branch of industry should be scrapped. It would surely indicate that the state administration still knows best. On the other hand, the government can indicate which branches of industry should be developed more quickly than others from the viewpoint of the national interest. Thus, the government assumes the role of participator in the campaign designed to promote development of such sectors as, say, the so-called strategic branches of industry, which decide the degree of state security—for example, the power industry and the fuels industry. Moreover, the point here is not just to aim for dynamic growth of production, as the old phrase went. We must map out clear-cut rules of the game for these sectors for many years to come so that they can function securely and in stable conditions. Of course, there are also branches of industry whose role in the economy will decrease, and there is nothing we can do about that. The "Basic Premises" document also lists individual branches and sectors that in the future will in all probability decide Poland's ranking in the modern world in terms of attainments of civilization. There are 20 of them. Some are in good shape, others are in lamentable condition. We will support them in terms of financing and logistics. This is because the government is convinced that all of them will eventually attain a high level of technology and that their products will be both competitive in world markets and ecologically acceptable.

[Blaszczyk] A politician assessing the achievements of the members of the present government has stated that you qualify for dismissal because you have failed to prepare a reform program for the state sector. Would such a program still have a future?

[Pol] I believe that, at present, there is no justification for the creation of such a program. The philosophy of the operation of the industry, its branches, and its sectors was formulated in the 1980's. It followed from the decisions made at that time on separation of the state

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budget from enterprises' finances. In this way, the fate of the then still hypothetical commercial operation of state enterprises was settled. Consequently, the philosophy of the government formed by the present—and, I believe, not only the present—coalition is reduced to the setting of equal rules of the game for all of the sectors currently present in our market and ensuring that these rules are observed, regardless of their ownership status. I am against creating reform programs for the state sector. I believe that the economic entities operating in that sector must work out for themselves how to fight the competition in the market. Moreover, if we were to prepare such a program, we would also have to prepare a parallel one for private enterprises because they, too, encounter problems.

[Blaszczyk] What do you think of the opinions of certain politicians who would want to see Poland a country with an agricultural as well as an industrial profile?

[Pol] If it turns out that Polish agriculture, ranging from crop production to produce processing, constitutes a fundamental sphere of the economy within free market conditions, I will also favor such a view. For the time being, however, I am against making this question a matter of an official decree, especially because at the moment industry and trade constitute 52 percent of the GNP in our country. Let me also remind you that, in the most developed countries, agriculture is by no means the most economically effective branch of the economy.

[Blaszczyk] Did you receive a sufficient allocation of funds in the draft budget for 1995?

[Pol] It usually happens that, in a discussion on the draft budget, each and every minister maintains that he has not been given enough. I say it, too. However, I always look at the budget not only from the viewpoint of the needs of the industry and trade minister—after all, these are but a fragment of a greater whole—but as a combination of resources that can have a positive or a negative influence on the branches of industry concentrated within the sector. The first type prevails, and that pleases me very much.

[Blaszczyk] So far, I have not seen you take an active role as trade minister. Could it be that you have nothing to do in that domain of your department?

[Pol] I admit that the proportional weight of the respective problems in the areas of industry and trade makes it much easier to run the trade sector. This is first and foremost because the trade sector is already 90 percent privatized. This, among other things, is the reason I maintain that the principal task for the sector is to work out better legislative solutions—that is, solutions that accommodate the realities of the market economy. To this end, we are currently working on, among other things, a consumer protection act and a State Trade Inspectorate act. So we have concentrated on the legislative sphere, which by the very nature of things is not particularly spectacular.

[Blaszczyk] For some time now, the government has proposed to liquidate the department you head and set up in its place a new "superdepartment": the ministry of the economy. You support this proposal. Why? After all, you cannot be certain that you will be placed at its head.

[Pol] Of course I cannot. I could even lose my position. But this is not the important thing here. I am simply convinced that the administrative center of the economy must be restructured in the best interests of the efficiency of economic management and the good of the country. This is because the present mechanism is obsolete. We, the ministers, discharge administrative and supervisory briefs. This is still a combination of functions we have inherited from the era of the centrally steered economy. Things have even reached a paradoxical situation here. A good example is the Privatization Ministry, which by definition was originally intended as a regulatory department. However, probably as a result of a practical joke played upon us by history, the function it now discharges is primarily that of supervision. Another current development that probably also should be put down to history's sense of humor is the special role played by the finance minister in respect to his regulatory functions in the economy. The finance department ought to concentrate on steering the economy with the help of the tools that are, after all, at the state's disposal: taxes, import limits, customs and excise tariffs, and so on. Consequently, I believe that not all of these tools should be placed within the reach of that particular department whose main brief is to take care of the state coffers and create mechanisms whereby they can be replenished. Consequently, if only for that reason, it has now become imperative that a transformation of the economic administrative center is put into effect as soon as possible.

Swedish-Polish Trade Turnover Examined

95EP0020A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA (Special supplement Sweden-Poland) in Polish No 44, 29 Oct 94 p IV

[Article by Bronislaw Sulimierski: "Trade Across the Baltic: European Integration Favors Growth of Trade Turnover With Sweden"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Polish-Swedish trade turnover in 1993 came to $741.5 million, which is a decline of 6.4 percent compared to the previous year, according to the Swedish Central Statistical Office. Polish export to the Swedish market declined by 23.3 percent, with a value of $318.8 million. Poland bought $422.7 million of Swedish goods, 12.3 percent. Our negative balane of trade was $103.9 million. Last year, we had a $39.2 million surplus in our trade with Sweden.

Goods imported from Poland were 0.7 percent of total Swedish imports in 1993, while Poland's share in Swedish exports was 0.8 percent. The Central Office of Statistics (GUS) estimates Poland's export to Sweden at $311 million and imports at $415 million. Data from the

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first half of this year show that exports to Sweden are at $194 million and imports at $265 million.

Finished and processed goods, machines, equipment, and means of transportation dominated in Polish exports in 1993. We imported from Sweden mostly machines and appliances, with processed goods making up the remainder (55 percent of export total).

From 1991 to 1993, the demand for imported goods has declined in Sweden—by 5.4 percent, 2.9 percent, and 2.4 percent in successive years. An increase in demand for imports of 7.7 percent is forecast for 1994, with a similar level the following year.

What Can Be Sold?

It is expected that the share in export of the largest category, various finished goods, will stay at their present level of about one-quarter of the value of our exports. However, structure of this export can be expected to change, in part because of a declining demand for imported furniture and clothing. The sale of such goods as shoes, plastic products, measuring devices, and artistic jewelry should grow significantly.

The share of machines, equipment, and means of transportation is constantly growing. The main items here are transformers, generating equipment, electric machines and equipment, and parts and accessories. There is a chance for all of these to experience continued growth in export to Sweden.

There is a strong possibility of increasing the sale of coal and regaining Poland's former position on the market in Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. It cannot be expected, however, that the export of petrochemical articles will increase.

The share of agricultural and food products in our export to Sweden will probably remain at about its present level—approximately 12 percent. The greatest possibilities for increased exports are with vegetables, fruits, molasses, and sugar.

It is expected that raw materials will increase their share (currently 10 percent) in Polish export to Sweden. The sale of mineral fertilizers, partially processed wood, charcoal, steel scrap, and noniron metal scrap are most likely to increase.

Competitors

The implementation of the agreement on a free trade zone with the EFTA [European Free Trade Accociation] countries, as well as the bilateral agreement on trade in agricultural and food products, should bring about an increase in Polish exports to Sweden, as has already been seen in the statistics for the first half of this year. From the beginning of 1995—that is, as Sweden joins the European Union—those agreements will be replaced by the European Pact.

However, the growing competition from the Baltic countries is a factor slowing the development of Polish export to Sweden. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are a priority area for Sweden in the areas of trade and economic assistance. In 1993, Swedish imports from these countries increased by one-third. The Baltic countries form a free-trade zone with Sweden and receive preferential credits to finance their exports to Sweden. Poland is experiencing strong competition from those countries in the area of agricultural and food products, furniture, clothing, and coal and other fuels.

The Swedes Invest

Sweden's share in foreign investments in Poland—1.9 percent—is close to its share in trade. In mid-1994, investments already completed came to $71 million, which puts Sweden in 10th place. Pledged investments ($104 million) put Sweden in seventh place, with 2.2 percent of the total.

There were eight Swedish firms on the list of the 225 largest investors in Poland in June 1994. That group is led by IKEA, which has invested $29 million in furniture factories in Lubawa Babimost and Zbaszyn and has pledged a further $11 million. Second is the S. Lewandowski firm: $19 million in the production of furniture, plastic packaging, and cosmetics. In third place is Intercellulos AB ($10 million invested plus $22.5 million pledged), which has a 43-percent share in the Intercell joint venture, created jointly with the Ostroleka Cellulose-Paper Factory.

Next, Bildspedition has invested $8 million in automobile transport. Ericsson has invested $2 million in the production of military communication equipment, jointly with Unimor-Gdansk, and has pledged a further $15 million. Trebruk AB has pledged to invest $55 million in the Cellulose-Paper Factory in Kostrzyn. Kemir Kemwater has invested $1.5 million in the production of drainage-cleaning chemicals with the Police Chemical Factory. Finally, Esab has invested $1 million in a joint venture with the Ferrum Works in Katowice.

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Newspaper Views 'Importance' of Resita Protest

AU1312140694 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 10 Dec 94 p 1

[Editorial by Ion Cristoiu: "The Largest Protest Action Under Left-Wing Rule"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Vacaroiu government celebrated its second anniversary with a hectoliter of big words. However, in politics big words are like bad wine: You wake up the following day with a splitting headache. For the Vacaroiu government, this headache was the protest rally at Prefecture Square in Resita. Through its origin, quality, scope, and significance, this is the largest protest action in the two years of left-wing rule and one of the most resounding demonstrations, after the December 1989 events. That this is the case is proved primarily by the fact that President Ion Iliescu felt the need to come out of his princely ambiguity and make a passionate appeal to the protesters to "understand the difficulties we are going through now."

This gesture contains many novel things: It is the first time since he won his second presidential mandate that Ion Iliescu has addressed a protest demonstration. Second, one should note the new tone of his address. Usually, Iliescu is antagonistic in such instances, ready to quarrel and give lessons, and particularly ready to discover all sorts of destabilizing plots behind such actions. But now the president is conciliatory, even warm: "I follow with concern the evolution of events," he says; "I sincerely appeal" or "I am on the side of the people of Resita." Last but not least, we must note with amazement that the president is no longer defending Nicolae Vacaroiu. In the past, such provocations against the executive branch usually roused the president to rally to its defense. This time, the presidential text makes no mention of the poor government. It no longer tries to find attenuating circumstances for the Vacaroiu cabinet, as has been the practice in the past. Moreover, the fact that the president addresses himself to the protesters, through his appeal, over the prime minister's head—in an attempt to prove that he is one of them, not one of those from Victoria Palace [government headquarters]—can also be interpreted as a censure of the current cabinet.

Under the impact of this presidential attitude, the Vacaroiu government adopted a totally different attitude toward the Resita protesters, unlike the attitude it had toward similar movements in the past. The government's communiques avoided insults against the protesters. The general line was that of readiness to conduct a dialogue. Only one man in the current power structure and in the country as a whole deemed it necessary to condemn the Resita protest. Of course, I am referring to Corneliu Vadim Tudor, leader of the Greater Romania Party [PRM]. Once again proving again his increasingly pronounced mental decline, the owner of land, luxurious headquarters, and the latest-model Mercedes termed the protest of those starving people a plot orchestrated by foreign intelligence agencies. Corneliu Vadim Tudor's diatribe is not only an irresponsible outburst but also an insult to the workers of Resita. If the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], which is the PRM's ally, does not dissociate itself from such a stance, it means that the PDSR's ambition to call itself a left-wing party is nothing but pure demagoguery.

We cannot be sure of all the ins and outs of this surprising presidential change of attitude. It is possible that Iliescu has reached the conclusion that there should be some major adjustments to the Vacaroiu government. It is equally possible that the president has realized that his role in the state implies that he should keep some distance between himself and any government, even one led by the much-beloved Nicolae Vacaroiu. However, one can surely say that the novelty of Iliescu's move lies in the fact that he has intuitively realized the true scope of the crisis. Thanks to the information obtained from the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] and thanks to his political intuition, the president realized that he is not only dealing with a sincere revolt of desperate people from Resita but with a symbol of protest of Romania's employees.

The extraordinary importance of the Resita protest is proved by other elements as well. It is the first time since September 1992 that a protest movement started spontaneously, without the trade unions playing any part in it at all. It was only afterward that the trade unions, realizing that something was happening, claimed the movement for themselves and took it over. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the protest in Prefecture Square has no prominent leaders. Or, if they exist, they avoid coming forward and playing a conspicuous role, as has been their practice in the past. This is also the first time since September 1992 [date of last general elections] that a protest like the one in Resita has exceeded the boundaries of a mere labor conflict. The people's despair is much greater and more profound than the anguish caused by not having received their wages for two months. There is a despair caused by the lack of any future hope. If the delay in receiving their wages had been a simple accident, the people would have calmed down the moment the money was sent to them. But the people in Resita know that the money sent by the government to cover their back-pay for two months was only a temporary measure, to shut their mouths. Therefore, they also know that if they leave the square, nobody can guarantee that such a generous solution will be repeated later. After a while, they will again fail to receive their salaries due. It is, then, hard to say whether or not they will again have the guts to rally in Prefecture Square.

This would not be the first time the government would have dealt with a protest movement in such a way. There have been many instances of the government's returning to its proverbial indifference toward the dramatic problems of the employees in a given area of the country after the storm has passed. On the other hand, experience to

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date has shown that nobody takes notice of you in this country unless you go out into the streets, raise hell, and start using cudjels. You can starve to death and nobody gives a damn. The rulers will go on having their cotillions! After all, the government has known about the situation in Resita for two months, and nobody got worried or slept badly at the thought that a number of people who have worked hard to earn their living will not receive their wages and that the families of a city of Resita's size risk not having enough money for even their daily bread.

The papers sent in by the previous enquiry commission are lying somewhere in Octav Cozmanca's [government secretary] files. Nobody bothered to search for the papers and nobody deemed it necessary to ask for them. The government started moving only when the conflict broke out in Resita. Although it claims to be social-democratic, the government did not do this out of love for the workers, but out of fear. Therefore, who is going to guarantee the Resita inhabitants that, once the protest is over, the situation will not be repeated?

However, the hopelessness of the inhabitants of Resita also exceeds the framework of the failure to have their wages paid on time. It is now the hopelessness that is currently afflicting the country's entire population. For the people of Resita, the future appears pretty somber. There is no clear policy at the governmental level regarding the fate of this city's industry—or, if such a policy does exist, nobody has bothered to tell the inhabitants of Resita about it. The people there, like the population throughout the country, have not been told what is going to happen to their jobs tomorrow or the day after; therefore, the Resita protest has an intensity that has disconcerted everyone. Consequently, that protest is not only being enacted by the employees of a certain enterprise but has also been joined by the rest of the city's population. That is why Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu must go to Resita. He is the only one capable of giving an answer to the disquieting questions of the people of Resita about their future.

Union Leaders Declare Resita Conflict 'Closed'

AU1412131194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 14 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu and the governmental delegation accompanying him left Resita a few hours ago and are currently on their way to the Otelul Rosu industrial platform.

At Caransabes, the prime minister held brief talks with the leadership of the Mocard furniture factory, focusing on their possibilities for increased exports. In that same town, the prime minister met with Emilian Birtasu, the bishop of Caransebes.

In the morning, Vacaroiu met with the managers of the Resita Iron and Steel Plant. The talks focused on the investments intended to modernize the plant and the production equipment over the next weeks. The managers assessed that the government's pledges to invest $35 million in the erection of an electric furnace will allow them to double production. They also discussed possibilities of cooperation with partners abroad.

In the morning, the trade union leaders presented the thousands of Resita protesters with the protocol worked out last night during the marathon negotiations between the government delegation led by Prime Minister Vacaroiu and representatives of the Resita machine-building plant and the iron and steel plant. The most important stipulations of the protocol refer to the aforementioned $35-million loan to be granted to the iron and steel plant, to ensuring contracts worth 60 billion lei for the employees of the machine-building plant, to ensuring of markets in the country and abroad, and to resuming production of merchandise already in stock, the value of which amounts to over 19 billion lei.

The protocol also provides for solving certain social problems—such as ensuring drinking water supplies and erecting social buildings and living quarters.

The employees will make up for the nine days during which production was halted owing to the protest rally, and will therefore be given full salaries.

A ROMPRES correspondent reports that the rally was officially declared closed, as the demands have been met, but some of the people attending the rally—namely the members of the 1771 Resita Trade Union headed by their leader, Adrian Ciofu—went from the city's central square to the cultural center, in front of which they are continuing their protest demanding that Ioan Tudora, general manager of the Resita machine-building plant, be fired.

Metal Workers Hold Protest Rally in Deva 13 Dec

AU1312132994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The rally that began this morning in front of the Office of the Hunedoara County Prefect and was attended mainly by metal workers from Hunedoara Combine and representatives of a number of trade unions in the sphere of mining, construction, and the chemical industry, concluded at around 1115 [0915 GMT].

Our correspondent Dorin Corpade has informed us that the organizers read out the reasons for this trade union action, some of them of a general nature regarding the country's socioeconomic life and others specific to the metal sector. They show that many employees have a very poor material situation and that there are a number of problems of a social-civic nature with which residents are greatly dissatisfied, especially in Hunedoara Municipality. Our correspondent mentioned that the list containing the reasons for the protest action had been submitted to the Hunedoara prefect, Engineer George

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Raican, one day before the protest began, so that he could communicate it to the government.

During the rally that took place in Deva today, the prefect of Hunedoara County, who initially was invited to address the protesters, was booed and hooted. Anti-government slogans were chanted and the resignation of Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu was demanded. Slogans of solidarity with the protesters of Resita were also chanted. During the rally, a new round of discussion took place between the Hunedoara prefect and trade union leaders.

Our correspondent Dorin Corpade has informed us that at the end of the rally, the trade union leaders invited the participants to go to the Trade Union House in Deva in order to, together, establish future trade union actions.

Industrial Unrest Said Spreading Through Romania

LD1412142294 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 14 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the Romanian prime minister has signed an agreement with Resita's metalworkers—who have continued lengthy demonstrations—the mood in Romania has not yet calmed down. Tibor Bogdan reports.

[Bogdan] Despite the agreement, even this morning several thousand people were gathering in the center of Resita waiting for the confirmation of the results of the talks by trade union leaders.

However, the Resita discontent is spreading. As of today demonstrations and strikes will be held all over the country. The oil workers of Pitesti in [southern Romania] are to hold a warning strike today, and their example will be followed, tomorrow, by their colleagues in Braila [eastern Romania] and Zemes [Tazlau De Sus—central Romania] tomorrow. In Arad [Transylvania], the power-lathe manufacturers—and in Deva and Hunedoara [Transylvania] the metalworkers—are organizing protest rallies. Tomorrow the railway workers will go on a two-hour strike in Bucharest. Workers of Timisoara [Transylvania] have called for a three-day series of demonstrations from today.

PUNR Chairman Asks Outlawing of UDMR

AU1412131894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 14 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A declaration faxed to our editorial board by PUNR [National Romanian Unity Party] Chairman Gheorghe Funar points out that this political party wishes to draw attention to what it calls the intensifying of UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] actions directed against the constitutional order and the interests of the Romanian nation, a fact of which the PUNR offers proof by citing recent declarations and appeals issued by the UDMR leadership in Cluj-Napoca, as well as their decision to set up the parliament of the ethnic Hungarians following the elections that are to take place in the first half of 1995.

After mentioning President Ion Iliescu's statement according to which the territorial autonomy claimed by the UDMR clearly violates Romania's Constitution, Mr. Funar terms regrettable the fact that the other political parties that are members of the Democratic Convention of Romania have not publicly announced their position as regards the policy and goals pursued by the UDMR but rather remained, quote, the vassals of that ethnic party, unquote.

The final part of the declaration says that, quote, considering the policy, actions, and goals pursued by the UDMR ever since it was set up on 21 December 1989, the PUNR asks Romania's prosecutor general, as well as the General Prosecution, to begin legal procedures to find the persons guilty of having violated Romania's Constitution and the laws of the Romanian state, and to outlaw the UDMR, unquote.

Delegation's Visit Causes Political Dispute

AU1312180194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] headed by the chairman of that party, Senator Bela Marko—which has been visiting the Republic of Moldova since yesterday at the invitation of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova [PDAM]—was today received by Petru Lucinschi, the speaker of the Chisinau parliament.

Our Chisinau correspondent Stefan Daraban reports that during their meeting—which was also attended by the deputy speaker of parliament, Dumitru Mostan—they covered aspects of relations between the two countries and their parliaments, interethnic relations, and the situation of the ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Moldova.

In connection with his talks with the UDMR delegation, Petre Sornikov, one of the leaders of the Socialist Unity Faction, told a BASAPRESS correspondent that they had broached issues of joint interest, such as the situation of the ethnic minorities in both countries. Asked why they had invited the UDMR representatives, Sornikov replied, quote, the other Romanian political parties declared the unification with Bessarabia as a goal of theirs, whereas the UDMR fully recognizes the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova, unquote.

The parliamentary faction of the Christian-Democratic Popular Alliance of Moldova refused to meet the UDMR representatives. In connection with that refusal, Valentin Dolganiuc, leader of the alliance, explained, quote, the UDMR was set up on the basis of ethnic criteria and their visit has a political nature that is unfavorable for

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the Romanian people living on both banks of the Prut River, unquote. Dolganiuc also assessed that not only is the UDMR a political ally of the PDAM but it also supports the idea of establishing a greater Moldova [through unification with the Moldovan region in Romania], which in the long run might lead to the federalization of Romania.

Chechen Conflict Said Russian 'Internal Affair'

AU1412125794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 14 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the situation in Chechnya, Mircea Geoana, spokesman of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared that, in the opinion of that ministry, this represents an internal affair of the Russian Federation, as they have to deal with a secessionist movement.

Romania favors a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Chechnya, considering that military solutions are inappropriate.

Army Chief on Kiev Military Cooperation Talks

AU1412115894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 13 Dec 94

[Statement by Colonel General Dumitru Cioflina, head of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff, upon returning from a visit to Ukraine; made in Bucharest on 14 December 94—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] My visit to Ukraine was made at the invitation of my Ukrainian counterpart, Colonel General Anatoliy Lopata. We managed to successfully resolve all the issues on the agenda.

First let me mention my talks there. I held talks with Colonel General Lopata, and a separate one with the defense minister [Valeriy Mikolayevich Shmarov], who is a civilian political personality and also vice prime minister of the government. I also held interesting talks at the headquarters of the National Defense and Security Committee of the Ukrainian parliament, the Rada.

Second, we examined our joint activities scheduled over 1994—as well as the prospects for cooperation with the Ukrainian Armed Forces within the Partnership for Peace program—and made our proposals for 1995.

Third, we put the finishing touches on the protocol on cooperation between the two armed forces in the domain of military communications, and I also made a documentation visit to an institution training personnel in the field of communications.

On the whole, the results are as follows: The year 1994 was a good one as regards our relations with Ukraine's Armed Forces, and it peaked with my visit there and the results I already mentioned.

An interesting aspect is the fact that the Ukrainian side displayed readiness to further bilateral military relations. Furthermore, their defense minister—who is aware of the dimensions, volume, and nature of the military relations between Romania and Hungary—has suggested that they also wish to amplify relations with us to attain the level of the Romanian-Hungarian relations, so that the political forces in Ukraine would realize that they also have to reconsider Romanian-Ukrainian political relations. This idea was reiterated by everyone to whom I spoke, especially at the National Defense and Security Committee.

Another important thing is that they wish to further military relations with Romania on the basis of the principle of good neighborliness. Our geographic situation implies that we should engage in broad activities, in full openness and on the basis of mutual advantages in our relations. As a concrete example I will tell you that they were extremely satisfied with the draft cooperation accord that we elaborated and left on the table of the Ukrainian side for examination. The document refers to the principles underlying measures to strengthen and increase mutual confidence and security between the two armed forces. This draft accord is based on the stipulations of the 1992 Vienna documents. After the Ukrainian decision-makers, especially from the ministry of foreign affairs, examine the draft accord—and this will probably happen in January next year, since they cannot do so now because this year is nearing its end—I hope to receive the Ukrainian side's points of view on the accord.

Our activities scheduled for next year are established by the protocols we have just concluded in the domain of air force and antiaircraft defense. Visits are also scheduled in both countries. There is also cooperation in the domain of topography and land measurement, with activities both in Romania and Ukraine. Similarly, the accord we signed on cooperation in military communications becomes effective as of today.

Hungarian Delegation Says Positions Clarified

AU1412113594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A Hungarian delegation headed by Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary in the cabinet of Hungary's prime minister, paid a visit to Bucharest today.

Following his talks with Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Melescanu, the Hungarian guest made the following statement to our correspondent Eugen Baboi, a statement that has been translated by Ana Hart of the editorial staff of our Foreign Broadcasts Department:

[Tabajdi] Our talks concentrated on the aspects of Romanian-Hungarian cooperation that are most complex, sensitive, and complicated, which therefore need to be handled with the utmost care.

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As is known, I was received today by Oliviu Gherman, speaker of the Senate and chairman of the ruling party; by Viorel Hrebenciuc, secretary general of the government and head of the council for ethnic minority issues; and by Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Melescanu.

I believe that the mere fact that we managed to tackle such delicate issues is significant in itself. In my opinion, one of the most important conclusions of our talks is that not the problems of form but rather the ones pertaining to content are essential. Our future progress will show whether today's talks were really significant. I think no one expected today's talks to lead to any remarkable shift in the most complicated aspect of Romanian-Hungarian relations: namely, the issue of the ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, our talks still represent an important step forward, which will be followed by others, as they promised that Mr. Hrebenciuc will visit Budapest in January and that, at a certain point during the negotiations, they will also be joined by a delegation from the Democratic Union of Romanians in Hungary, as well as by representatives of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania].

Thus, one can say that there has been a certain amount of progress made on this plane as well. We very concretely raised the current problems of the ethnic minorities. We mutually cleared up our positions, and now we have a clearer understanding of each other's points of view, and I believe that today represents a significant phase in the process of improving Romanian-Hungarian relations.

Ethnic Hungarian Official Views Minority Issue

AU1412073094 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 10 Dec 94 p 3

[Interview with UDMR executive chairman Csaba Takacs by "Udvardy"; place and date not given: "Iliescu Has Every Reason To Be Satisfied"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Returning from the CSCE summit, Romanian President Ion Iliescu said he does not see any possibility for the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] to even participate in preparing the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty.

[Udvardy] Do you see any connection between the CSCE summit in Budapest and the anti-UDMR attitude that has clearly become stronger in Iliescu's rhetoric?

[Takacs] The CSCE processes clearly supported the Romanian domestic and foreign policy attitude. Compared with the Copenhagen declaration, a step backward occurred here, as regards national minority rights. One can note the return of pre-1989 views in domestic policy and Romanian-Hungarian relations. The same applies to CSCE efficiency in dealing with crises. In discussing the crisis in Bosnia, what mattered was who made what statement, rather than what is happening in the area. Hungary should avoid falling into the same trap! There was a time, not so long ago, when bilateral relations were flourishing on the level of statements, and the situation of national minorities was declared adequate....

[Udvardy] Does that mean that you see no essential changes or progress as regards the national minorities situation?

[Takacs] I do see changes! We constantly experience changes: Our situation is deteriorating by the day, while new statements are published on the good relations between the two countries, and we do not even know where to look among the latest discriminatory measures of the government in Bucharest—like the recent decision against the Hungarian class of the school in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures]; the displacements in Kolozsvar [Cluj]; or the abuses of local government in the Partium, which violate national minority rights. And I have not mentioned the deployment of armed forces or the forced change in the ethnic balance [in the Szeklerland communities]. As for foreign policy changes, Foreign Minister Theodor Melescanu does not negotiate with us even at the level of our parliamentary representation. The government even avoids the appearance of legitimizing the collective representation of national minorities here. Therefore, I understand the optimism inherent in President Iliescu's statements. He has every reason to be optimistic.

Polish Prime Minister Concludes Bucharest Visit

AU1312200594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] At about 1830 today, Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak concluded his official visit to Bucharest. The guest was seen off at Otopeni Airport by Minister of State Dan Mircea Popescu, the minister of labor and social protection, Minister of Tourism Dan Matei Agaton, Adrian Dohotaru, the state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as other Romanian officials.

Spokesman Discusses Hungarian Autonomy Demands

LD1312133194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The demand for automony by the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] is antidemocratic and contrary to the European spirit. This was said at a briefing by the spokesman for the Romanian president. Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest:

[Bogdan] The only position President Ion Iliescu can adopt in connection with the HDUR's automony demands is to reject them, since they are contrary to the Romanian Constitution and it is the president's duty to defend constitutional order. All this was said by Traian Chebeleu, spokesman of the Romanian president, at his press briefing in connection with what was said at the weekend meeting of the council of the representatives of

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the HDUR in Cluj- Napoca. He recalled that Iliescu had cautioned on more than one occasion against the anti-democratic and anti-European nature of demands of this kind, taking as his starting point the conviction that the future belongs not to ethnic automony nor to bantustanization but to a democratic life based on the observation of minority rights laid down in international documents.

Iliescu Discusses NATO Integration Issues

AU1312192894 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 8 Dec 94 p 1

[Interview with President Ion Iliescu by Rodica Ciobanu; place and date not given: "Romania Wishes Only To Ensure a Natural Framework for Security"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ciobanu] Mr. President, I would like to ask you to briefly comment on the positions expressed in Budapest by the presidents of the United States and of Russia regarding NATO's expansion NATO toward the East.

[Iliescu] Russia's sensitivity are understandable but so are the concerns of Romania and the other East European countries as well, regarding a new framework for ensuring equal security. Taking into account the new circumstances that have been created on the European continent and the new elements of a legal and political nature, I believe that appropriate answers will be found to this sensitivity. There is no note of aggressiveness in our wish to integrate in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. On the contrary, as a country with a geostrategic position, we only wish to ensure a natural framework for security and integration in European processes. I believe that this dialogue will continue and a constructive solution will be found.

[Ciobanu] Thus, the tension between Moscow and Washington will not block the process of integration in NATO?

[Iliescu] I do not believe so. Russia expresses its own positions, but I hope that all ambiguity regarding the situation and the wish expressed by our country and by other countries to join this body is over.

[Ciobanu] Do you believe that Romania has fulfilled the conditions to enter the NATO?

[Iliescu] The process is not simple. Until now we have had a defense strategy, a sort of technical-material basis of the armed forces integrated in a certain structure on the continent. But things have changed and with them the nature of the problem has also changed. The process of integration into NATO is connected with the other processes taking place in the domestic arena, namely, the consolidation of internal stability as a decisive factor, the economic consolidation of the ownership structures, and the consolidation of the legal bases and institutions of the state. Economic integration in the Western European Union, on the road of which we have embarked, is a precondition for admission into all the other European structures.

Official on Russian Reaction to NATO Expansion

AU1312133294 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 7 Dec 94 p 3

[Report by Ralu Filip on statement by Ioan Mircea Pascu, state secretary in the Ministry of National Defense; place and date not given: "Russia's Position Seems To Be Firmly Rooted in the Blocs and Cold War Way of Reasoning"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We turned to Mr. Ioan Mircea Pascu, secretary of state with the Ministry of National Defense, to ask him to share with us his opinion regarding the different opinions of the United States and of Russia regarding NATO expansion and how the attitude of the two powers affect the prospects of Romania's association with the North Atlantic Pact.

Indeed, one can say that the security issue on which the European continent's attention is currently focusing is the NATO decision to include former Warsaw Pact states among its ranks and Russia's opposition to this decision. Nobody can deny that it is a crucial decision for Europe's future. That is also the reason for the rigidity with which each side is defending its position. It is just that, from this viewpoint, I believe that the NATO allies display a greater flexibility. On the one hand, because their views are closer to the requirements of a systematic approach to the European security issues, and on the other hand, through the formula of the "Partnership for Peace," they have already proven that they are ready to protect Russia's interests. And all this after the signal opening this whole issue was not given by the NATO, but by President Yeltsin himself when he stated—during his visit to Warsaw last year—that, in principle, Russia does not oppose the association of Poland and other countries in the area to the North Atlantic Alliance?! The fact that later, the words of the Russian president were re-interpreted, is another issue.

Meanwhile, Russia's position seems to be firmly rooted in the blocs and the Cold War way of reasoning. I said "seems" because, in no other way can one understand its refusal to see the transformation that has taken place regarding NATO, which, through the "Partnership" has become both an "Alliance" for the initial members, as well as an "organization of security" for "partners." Moreover, I would dare to state that behind the arguments on security invoked by Russia against the NATO expansion—in fact, nobody, neither the current allies, but even less the future ones, intend to assault Russia in any way?!—there are, in reality, mainly political interests, derived from the wish to maintain its sphere of influence in Central and East Europe.

In all this political-military "game" with such high stakes, I believe that sometimes precisely those who

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constitute the subject of the "competition"—namely the "candidates" for association with NATO—are overlooked. They are overlooked by NATO when the initial schemes are applied in a discriminatory way (see the tendency of some allies to take only the countries of the "Visegrad group" into consideration) and are overlooked when Russia is the one that opposes expansion. However, I believe that, nevertheless, the Russian decision-makers should take into account the wish of the respective countries to join NATO. Moreover, it would be far more pragmatic of these factors to try to offer the respective countries as solid arguments against the association as those in favor of it. But, unfortunately, apart from the old policy of those in power—and that in rather simple forms—we get nothing. Moreover, the practical examples—like what is currently happening in Chechnya—are not encouraging either. On the contrary. In other words, if we are being offered security from the West, we are being offered more insecurity from the East. And in such conditions, it seems to me that the final result will compel Russia to make concessions, as already happened in the case of Germany's reunification and of the military statute of the former GDR [German Democratic Republic].

Army 'Prepared' in Case of Aggression From East

AU1212195194 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 8 Dec 94 p 16

["Note" by Ana Maria Vintan and Dorina Baesu: "Romania Is Prepared in Case of an Aggression From the East"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Defense, Public Order, and National Security Commission heard yesterday the answers prepared by Gheorghe Tinca, minister of national defense, to the questions forwarded to him by the commission two weeks ago.

To everybody's surprise, Gheorghe Tinca came accompanied by the chief of staff, Colonel General Dumitru Cioflina, the de facto head of the Army. At the request of Mihai Nica and Valentin Vasilescu, deputies of the Romanian Ecology Party [PER], the press was admitted to the hearing under the condition stipulated by Severin Baciu, vice chairman of the Commission, that when Dumitru Cioflina and Gheorghe Tinca point out that they are going to divulge military secrets, the press pledges not to publish them. Here are some of the answers offered by the two officials:

"Military aviation can cope with a military aggression, but it all depends on the aggressor. For instance, our pilots undergo some 50 hours of flying per year, while in Turkey they fly 220 hours and NATO pilots fly 150 hours. There are states around us that we cannot stand up to even if our pilots underwent 180 hours of flying. The aviation accidents of other countries are not made public, as they represent 'state secrets.'" (Gheorghe Tinca)

"I do not wish to comment on the statement made by a Commission member to the extent that Romania may become an enclave itself. However, I assure you that Romania has prepared steps in case of an aggression from the east. The average wage ratio in the Army varies between 1.2 and 5.6, the latter belonging to the chief of staff. If you can find a former Communist Party activist in a leading position in the Army, I will eat him." (Dumitru Cioflina)

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5th Corps Managing To 'Consolidate' Lines

AU1312192594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Dec 94

[Report by Nada al-Isa]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We have just learned from the 5th Corps Headquarters in Bihac that the general attack on Bihac, Kladusa, Debeljaca Hill, and the suburbs of Zegar and Klokot have been going on all day, and continue this evening. As usual, the aggressor is mostly attacking from the so called RSK [republic of Serb Krajina] in Croatia. Both infantry and artillery attacks are heavy. As we have said, this is a general attack.

The fighting is of somewhat lesser intensity around Bosanska Krupa and the Grmusa-Srbljani plateau, although, of course, it is far from being insignificant.

The shelling of Bihac itself also lasted all day. According to initial reports, 10 people have been either killed or wounded. This evening, a shell landed in front of a department store in the center of Bihac, wounding several children. One child of pre-school age was unfortunately killed by the shrapnel.

The attacks continue on other fronts. As we have already said, the Bihac suburb of Klokot, Izacic, and [word indistinct] have also been subjected to attacks all day. The aggressor's tanks have entered the village of Bugar and are fiercely shelling Bihac from there. [passage omitted]

The 5th Corps stresses in particular that even though the attacks are very fierce and there is a general offensive, they are being repelled, the aggressor is being pushed back, and the 5th Corps is managing to consolidate its lines despite the impossible conditions.

Abdic Forces Begin 'Decisive Battle'

LD1412110094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1005 GMT 14 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Petrovac, 14 Dec (TANJUG)—Units of the people's defense of western Bosnia have begun the decisive battle against the extremists belonging to Izetbegovic's 5th Corps, Radio Velkaton reports.

According to the same source, the fiercest clashes over the last 24 hours took place in the Velika Kladusa area, where Abdic's forces achieved more significant gains. [passage omitted]

Taking into account that the supreme command has been showing restraint and has been allowing the soldiers of the 5th Corps to join the liberation forces, the command is of the opinion that now is the right time to launch an energetic operation to liberate the territory held by the 5th Corps forces.

Rift Reportedly Develops Among 5th Corps Officers

LD1312183394 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In the western Krajina theater of war aggression against the Serb land by the regular units of the Croatian Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] continues. We have a report from Slavisa Sabljic:

[Sabljic] The army of the Srpska republic, which on the Bihac-Krupa front is under the command of Colonel General Manojlo Milovanovic, has scored new successes on the Grmusa-Grabez plateau in the region of Klokot and Mostobran near Krupa-na-Uni [Bosanska Krupa].

A rift caused by the squabbling over prestige among the Muslim commanders, especially between Atif Dudakovic, the 5th Corps commander, and Izet Nanic, commander of the 505th Muslim brigade, is still going on. Gen. Dudakovic has deliberately neglected the Kurpa section of the front to compromise Commander Nanic and to blame his incompetence for the lack of military success and in this way to eliminate him as rival and successor. In brief, Gen. Dudakovic has left Krupa to be defended by the units from Krupa alone although they have no capacity to defend it against the far superior Srpska republic army.

24 Killed in Fighting on Livno-Glamoc Battlefield

LD1312200294 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The political department of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna has reported that yet another attempt on the Livno-Glamoc battlefield by [Croatian Serb leader Milan] Martic's men from Knin to take the exceptionally important Troglav heights failed today. It is obvious that Martic's men are fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina together with Karadzic's army against HVO [Croatian Defense Council] units. In addition, it was precisely on Troglav that the Serb forces suffered fresh heavy losses which can be seen on this film. Nineteen dead Serb fighters have been found on Troglav so far. The HVO units have pushed the front line on Mt. Dinara north from Troglav toward Bosansko Grahovo. Five HVO members lost their lives for freedom in heavy fighting and two were wounded, the political department of the defense ministry of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna has reported.

Powerless to do anything else, the Serbs today pounded Livno and a general alert, which is still in force, was sounded.

Here in Livno a session of the presidential council of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna was held today, attended by the leaders of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union]

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of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They discussed the political and security situation in the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna.

Special tribute was paid to the HVO units at the session—which was not held here in Livno by accident—for great successes in the liberation of Croat areas in the Livno and Kupres municipalities. The Washington agreements were also discussed.

[Begin Herceg-Bosna President Kresimir Zubak recording, identified by caption] We can say and confirm once again publicly that the Washington agreement and all other agreements with representatives of the Bosniak-Muslim nation are the basis on which we will build the policy of the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We will adhere to that strictly and honestly. [end recording]

It was especially stressed at the session that until both the federation and the confederation with Croatia are fully established, the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna will maintain all its functions, as a guarantee that all Croat interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be safeguarded.

Assembly Secretary Discusses Session Delay

AU1312205694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Dec 94

[Report by Mladen Bosnjak]

[FBIS Translated Text] Avdo Campara, secretary general of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, held a brief news conference this afternoon at which he informed journalists on the current course of the work of the working groups of the Republic and Federation Assemblies. Mladen Bosnjak reports from Zenica:

[Bosnjak] Some Assembly working groups have been in session yesterday and today. These are the Legal-Legislative Commission, the Commission for Constitutional Matters, and the Commission for Relations with Other Countries. The deputy caucuses have also met. As Mr. Campara stressed, the agenda of the Federation Assembly will have some 30 draft bills, of which the most important are those in the fields of customs, finance, trade, and the legislature. An exceptionally important point on the agenda of the Federation Assembly will be the criteria for setting up new municipalities and local self-management. These topics require serious discussion and, to judge from what the secretary general of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly said, 11 December was supposed to deal with something like this anyway.

Mr. Campara stressed that the first point on the agenda of the Republican Assembly's session would be a debate on the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina with special emphasis on the course of the peace process. Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, is expected to make the introductory speech in this debate.

Answering journalists' questions, Assembly Secretary General Campara said that the deputy caucus of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] had agreed to Zenica as the venue and 12 December as the date for the beginning of the Federal Assembly session. He said that he had not received any information from the HDZ regarding the non-arrival of that party's representatives on time, but that Federation Assembly Chairman Mariofil Ljubic is returning this evening from Livno, where the HDZ deputies held a meeting today, and that he would then be able to obtain more information on their arrival in Zenica.

Regarding the Republic Assembly session, Mr. Campara said he was sure that it would be held. As regards the Federal Assembly session, this would depend on the number of ethnic Croatian representatives who come to Zenica, but he hoped that the Federal Assembly session would begin tomorrow.

Further on Croat Boycott

LD1312214794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1946 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, 13 Dec (TANJUG)—Croat deputies boycotted the constitutive Muslim-Croat Federal Assembly session in Zenica on Monday [12 December], Muslim Radio Sarajevo said Tuesday. The radio said only Muslim delegates had arrived in Zenica, central Bosnia, for the session.

Deputies of the Croatian Democratic Union, the leading national party of Bosnian Croats, and the presidential council of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, the local Croat state, met in Croat-controlled Livno in western Bosnia on Tuesday, the radio said.

Cro [as received] radio commentator warned that the latest developments would damage the renown and (?importance) of federal parliament and that such actions would bring much political damage to Muslim-Croat relations. The federal parliament session was to have considered key bills for the begining of the functioning of the Muslim-Croat federation—the law on the return of refugees and displaced persons, on customs, finances, legislature, and others.

The session was postponed also on Nov. 30, anda at the request of the Croatian Democratic Union, its venue was changed from Sarajevo to Zenica.

Radio Herzeg-Bosna said Tuesday evening that Bosnian Croat officials had decided at the meeting in Livno that the institutions of that state and the Croatian Defense Council (the Bosnian Croat force) would retain their functions in full.

Herzeg-Bosna radio said the Bosnian Croat state remained a guarantee for the realization of the political and other goals of (?Bosnian) Croats until the [words indistinct] constitution was definitely and fully implemented and a confederation with Croatia established.

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Muslims and Croats, who fought heavily all of last year over territories with mixed populations, signed an agreement on a binational federation in Washington in March under strong pressure from the United States.

The agreement also calls for the establishment of confederal relations with Croatia.

The federation, however, has not even begun to function. Muslims and Croats accused each other of obstructing the realization of the agreement.

Parties Discuss Problems

LD1312230694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] While waiting for the deputies of the Croat Democratic Union [HDZ], who attended the meeting of the HDZ main committee in Livno, the deputies of the Party of Democratic Action [Stranka Demokratske Akcije] and other political parties worked in their clubs on the coordination of proposed draft laws and on [word indistinct] of their stances to find a way out of the political deadlock caused by certain anomalies between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Muslim-Croat federation.

In addition to passing some laws, the deputies of the Federal and Republic Assemblies will try to solve a backlog of problems in the implementation of the Federation's Constitution. Most deputies give impression that they all agree that now is the time to remove causes of problems, rather than to discuss the consequences of misunderstandings and political rivalries.

The Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will adopt a clear stance on the ineffectiveness of the bureaucratic apparatus of the United Nations and the European powers—Great Britain, France, and Russia—who, with their policies, are adding fuel to the fire blazing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite certain differences, they all agree that this session is in many respects crucial for the the Federation's future.

Croat Officials on Postponement

LD1312230794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Mariofil Ljubic, president of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Deputy Perica Jukic, of the Croat Democratic Union [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] [HDZ], have spoken to SLOBODNA DALMACIJA about why the assembly session was postponed.

The constituent assembly was not held because of the failure by the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the HDZ to coordinate stands on a number of important political issues. The main reason for not holding the assembly session yesterday was the desire to avoid a conflict situation since the HDZ insisted on full harmony on political issues. Croat deputies insist on the need to coordinate stands on the main laws: on defense, police, the Central Bank and ownership transformation, and the draft trade law, to ensure that these laws are adopted without need for amdendments, Ljubic said.

Deputy Jukic said that if the HDZ and the SDA failed to coordinate their stands the result would be a parliamentary crisis of unpredictable consequences.

Croat Council on Importance of Washington Accord

LD1312224294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A joint session was held in Livno today of the presidential council of the so-called Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and the presidium of the Croat Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A number of topical issues concerning the functioning of some authorities in Herceg-Bosna and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina were discussed.

In a statement issued after the session emphasis was placed on the importance of the Washington agreements as the political foundation for fulfilling overall Croatian interests.

All officials representing the Croat people have the obligation to pursue the policy as defined in this way, the statement stresses. A conclusion was reached that until the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was fully and comprehensively implemented and confederal relations with the Republic of Croatia established, all institutions of the so-called republic of Herceg-Bosna and the Croat Defense Council would continue to function as normal as a guarantee that all political and other goals of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be fulfilled.

At the session the work of Croat officials in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was assessed in positive terms and described as being conducive to the setting up of the federation.

Before the constituent assembly in Zenica representatives of the Croat Democratic Union and the Muslim Party of Democratic Action will meet to resolve outstanding issues that come within the competence of the constituent assembly of the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is said in conclusion.

Government, Parties Issue Declaration on Genocide

AU1312212794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] At their session in Zenica last night, the representatives of the parliamentary parties, together with the heads of the deputy caucuses and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, decided to send a Declaration on the Prevention of the

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Genocide of the Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the members of parliament of all member countries of the United Nations. The declaration reads as follows:

It will soon be 1,000 days since the start of the brutal aggression on the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an internationally recognized country and member of the United Nations. The aggression was started by the army of the former Yugoslavia. The war against our country is being organized and waged by Serbia and Montenegro, using, in addition to their own troops, extremist separatist organizations of the Bosnian Serbs.

About a month ago, the aggression was expanded as the rebel Serbs from the UNPAs [UN Protection Areas] in Croatia crossed the Bosnia-Herzegovinian border and attacked the unprotected area of Bihac with aircraft, tanks, infantry, and all other available weapons.

This is no ordinary war. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the aggressor is waging a war against civilians, thus committing the crime of genocide against the Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats, and all citizens loyal to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbian aggressor has publicly declared its aim of totally annihilating the Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats in the areas that it has occupied. In order to accomplish this aim, they are killing unprotected civilians, women, children, and the elderly en masse.

Concentrations camps have also been organized. Pictures of these shocked the civilized world, so the large concentrations camps have been replaced in the meantime with some 130 smaller prisons in which Bosniaks and Croats are being brutally killed every day.

The aggressor has been holding Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, the Bihac region, and other places under siege for almost 1,000 days. There are more than 600,000 Bosniaks and Croats living in these places. The people in the besieged zones have not received food, water, electricity, medicine, or other necessary items for months. Hundreds of convoys carrying humanitarian aid are being turned back by the aggressor or robbed in front of the UN forces present here.

The besieged areas are being daily subjected to artillery shelling, whose only purpose is to kill as many Bosniaks and Croats as possible. The Bosniaks and Croats in the besieged zones are deliberately subjected to conditions that would lead to their total annihilation.

The genocide that the television cameras have shown throughout the world is taking place here. For that reason, we cite the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and are appealing for help to all member countries of the United Nations.

In order to prevent further genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina we expect from all democratic countries

—urgently to provide help in food and medicine and to use their influence for this help to be sent to the population in the besieged towns and areas;

—that their parliaments express moral and political condemnation of the genocide of the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats;

—to immediately send to Bosnia-Herzegovina independent experts to establish the facts about the genocide and offer help in preventing and punishing the crime of genocide;

—to facilitate the public presentation of the facts on genocide through the press, radio, and television;

—to contribute toward the creation of the conditions necessary for the efficient work of the international court for war crimes;

—to support the call for the prevention of genocide that the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will send to the United Nations in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention of Preventing and Punishing the Crime of Genocide;

—to withdraw all help from those commiting this genocide and their accomplices, and to break all forms of cooperation with them.

We appeal to you to help people who are being killed only because they are Bosniaks or Bosnian Croats. If the crime of genocide is not stopped and punished now, this will mean the legalization of genocide as a means of accomplishing political aims and the total failure of all norms of international law.

This was stated at the end of the Declaration on the Prevention of the Genocide of Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serb Firing Squads Execute Bosniak Civilians

AU1312193194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian aggressor soldiers are increasingly often venting their bitterness for their failures and for suffering major losses on the Bihac front on innocent Bosniak civilians who have stayed in the temporarily occupied regions.

According to information from the Army Press Center, 19 Bosniaks were executed by firing squad in the village of Kamengrad near Sanski Most. In the Bosanski Novi municipality, the chetniks executed 48 Bosniaks by firing squad. All these executions, which have been carried out over the last few days, occurred after the aggressor soldiers had returned from the fighting against the fighters of the 5th Corps.

Serbs Want UN Declaration on Croat Aggression

LD1312174994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1644 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 13 Dec (TANJUG)—The main headquarters of the Srpska republic army today

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sent a letter to Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy for the former Yugoslavia, and to Generals Bertrand de Lapresle and Michael Rose, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] commanders for the former Yugoslavia and the former Bosnia-Herzegovina [respectively], requesting that UNPROFOR and the United Nations should make public their official stance on "the open aggression of the Republic of Croatia Army against the Srpska republic."

The letter states that the aggression by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia against the Srpska republic is continuing, while the international institutions "have not only failed to take effective measures to stop the aggression, but have not even publicly condemned it."

After saying that official UNPROFOR representatives were expected to inform international institutions and the international public about the Croatian aggression against the Srpska republic and take steps and measures which would confirm the equal treatment of all parties to the conflict, the letter stresses that these reactions have failed to appear.

"Instead of that, your official representative in Zagreb is justifying the presence of the regular Army of the State of Croatia on our country's territory, and hence the aggression too," the letter states, and adds that this is very dangerous for peace and security.

SPRS Urges World Condemnation of Croat Army

AU1312155394 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Concerning the current military and political situation in the Srpska republic, the Socialist Party of the Srpska republic [SPRS] has today issued a statement in Banja Luka, condemning in the strongest terms the aggression by the regular Army of the Republic of Croatia on the southwestern parts of the Srpska republic.

The statement supports the initiative by the group of people's deputies to meet Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, which is seen as a very wise and constructive move toward seeking a solution within the peace process.

The statement by the SPRS stresses the demand that the international community condemn the act of the Croatian state, and demand its army's immediate withdrawal from the occupied territories in the southwestern parts of the Srpska republic. We believe that this represents a serious blow to the negotiating process on the normalization of relations between Croatia and the republic of Serbian Krajina, and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], particularly as the Croatian Army has demonstrated brutality toward the civilian population, and destroyed entire villages, thus continuing in the tradition of the Independent State of Croatia [Croatian state during World War II], remembered for its evil by the Serbian nation. We warn the international community and all peaceful forces that, if Croatia is not condemned, this will suit war lobbies that have been promoting the escalation of war throughout the region for their own interests, the statement reads.

We support the initiative by the group of people's deputies to meet President Milosevic as a very wise and constructive move toward seeking a solution within the peace process. We condemn all the individuals and groups that used this meeting to attack both the people's deputies and President Milosevic, and the official policy of Serbia and the FRY, and have thus been instigating a rift among the Serbian people and obstructing the establishment of peace.

We are encouraged by the attitude of the international community toward the need for a balanced treatment of the sides to the conflict as a precondition to the continuation of the peace process. We believe that the right to a confederal or some other form of ties between the Srpska republic and the FRY, and that our army remaining at the present positions until the final territorial demarcation and the defining of the relations with the Muslim- Croatian Federation, present a good basis for the continuation of negotiations. The SPRS demands that the people's assembly of the Srpska republic should urgently discuss and accept the improved peace plan, and authorize the negotiating team to continue the negotiations in coordination with the FRY until final peace is reached. We warn about the difficult situation in the economy and social security, which can be overcome by lifting the blockade on both the Drina and against the FRY, which is now benefiting only war profiteers. This is yet another reason why the peace plan should be accepted as soon as possible and the negotiations continued.

Sides Said To Negotiate Territorial Exchanges

AU1312202794 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 7 Dec 94 p 11

[Unattributed report: "Croats Are Leaving Orasje, Serbs Are Widening the Corridor To Make Up for Ceded Kupres"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Well-informed sources from the Srpska republic claim that these days Croatian citizens are collectively departing Orasje, a township in northern Bosnia (under the control of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]). It is claimed that this township in Posavina has been exchanged for Kupres, which recently, without much fighting, fell from Serbian hands into those of the Croatian-Muslim coalition. In that way, according to our sources, the Serbian corridor in Posavina would be considerably widened and strategically deepened enough to make sure that nobody would endanger it, which is one of the Serbian conditions for acceptance of the peace plan.

However, when speaking of a further exchange of territories between Serbs and Croats, the Serbian side insists on access to the sea at Neum (12 km long piece of the

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Adriatic coast) and that Croats, in that case, also relinquish the corridor near Dubrovnik. The second alternative is that they relinquish the part of the coast from Prevlaka to Molunat and Popovic, that is, Konavle.

The Serbian and the Muslim side have been negotiating the exchange of territories for a longer time as well. The Serbs insist on the partition of Sarajevo, 50-50, along the Miljacka valley. TELEGRAF's sources point out that maps of such a division exist in the building of the presidency in Pale, showing some parts of Sarajevo currently controlled by Izetbegovic's government as part of Serbian territory. In fact, they would like to exchange the Muslim controlled Sarajevo districts of Bistrik and Sedrenik, which the map shows as a Serbian territory, for Gorazde and Srebrenica. The Muslims, however, demand Ilijas (one of Sarajevo's 10 pre-war municipalities) in exchange for Gorazde, because they intend to connect Sarajevo via Ilijas with central Bosnia, that is, Zenica.

Even though the Serbian side is not willing to accept this Muslim offer, it still further insists on open negotiations on the exchange of territories. Well-informed sources claim that the opinion of Srpska republic officials is that such negotiations would be more likely to succeed if the Muslim delegation was led, rather than by Izetbegovic, by a more pragmatic politician, say, Haris Silajdzic. The Main Board of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] made an initiative several days ago for general and presidential elections to be announced throughout the Muslim-Croatian Federation, suggesting also the possibility of Silajdzic's breaking with Izetbegovic and forming a new party composed predominantly of younger Muslim intellectuals.

The Serbian side is ready to accept the territorial division of 49 (for Serbs) to 50 percent [as published] (for the Muslim-Croatian Federation) under the condition that the Srpska republic receives solid territory. The Srpska republic army has halted its firm offensive in the Bihac area, because, according to our sources, it received signals from the West and Russia that the Contact Group's plan would change. However, the leadership of the Srpska republic now feels betrayed because the new proposal by the Contact Group does not meet their demands at all, so a new tightening of the Serbian noose around Bihac is soon expected to take place.

Akashi, General Condemn 'Flagrant' Attack on UN

AU1312215794 Paris AFP in English 2142 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 13 (AFP)—The UN special envoy to the former Yugoslavia and head of UN forces there condemned Tuesday [13 December] an attack in Bihac, northwest Bosnia, that killed a Bangladeshi peacekeeper.

Yasushi Akashi and General Bertrand de Lapresle said in a statement issued at UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] headquarters in Zagreb that the attack "one of the most flagrant, deliberate and calculated assaults on UNPROFOR to have taken place in the history of the peacekeeping mission." They added that they were "greatly saddened" by the attack, which took place Monday.

There was no confirmation of who was responsible, but "all indications are" that it was carried out by forces of dissident Bosnian Moslem leader Fikret Abdic or by the army of the separatist Serbs of Croatia, the statement said.

UNPROFOR sent "strong protests" to the Croatian Serbs and to Abdic's forces.

Five Bangladeshi troops were wounded in the attack on their armoured vehicle as they left the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) base at Velika Kladusa in the north of the Bihac enclave.

One of two critically wounded soldiers died of his wounds Tuesday in Zagreb.

Serbs, UNPROFOR's Rose Discuss Differences

LD1312180394 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Srpska republic, and parliament speaker Momcilo Krajisnik received in Pale British General Michael Rose, commander of the UN peacekeeping forces for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Viktor Andreyev, head of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] civilian sector. The meeting was also attended by Generals Milan Gvero and Zdravko Tolimir, deputy commanders of the main headquarters of the Srpska republic army.

The talks centerd on relations between the Srpska republic and UNPROFOR following NATO's air strikes in the Bihac area and on freedom of movement for UNPROFOR convoys on the territory of the Srpska republic.

After the meeting Gen. Michael Rose said: I hope we have accomplished what the majority of the people in these parts want; we are trying to create conditions for finding a peaceful resolution. This can only be done with the approval of all sides in the conflict.

Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Srpska republic, commented on the meeting:

[Begin Koljevic recording] Today we discussed how to improve our relations with UNPROFOR following the crisis resulting from well-known reasons. We have no intention or desire to drive UNPROFOR out, but we do demand correct conduct on both sides. Our military representatives attending the meeting, headed by Gen. Gvero, actively participated in this and we managed to

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reach some very concrete conclusions of a technical nature, concerning everyday matters, convoys, and so forth. [end recording]

Gen. Gvero said after the meeting that relations between UNPROFOR and Srpska republic authorities had nosedived after NATO's air strikes in the Bihac area, authorized by the United Nations, stressing that part of the problem was of a technical nature.

According to him, Serb representatives demanded that the United Nations regularly submit a list of the needs of the peacekeeping forces stationed in the so-called protected zones, in order to dispell all suspicions that part of their logistical support was ending up in the hands of enemy units. Gen. Gvero stressed that Sarajevo airport would remain closed until further notice, and scheduled the next meeting with top-level representatives of the peacekeeping forces in former Bosnia-Herzegovina for 16 December.

Karadzic Seeks Equal 'Linguistic' Status in Talks

LD1312200694 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Radovan Karadzic, the Srpska republic president, has held talks in Pale with Serbian Democratic Party President Zoran Djindjic about the priority issues of resolving the conflict in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. At a news conference after the meeting Karadzic stressed that peace could be concluded only by the parties at war providing they were given equal status.

[Begin Karadzic recording] Speaking about equal status, it is clear that since the outbreak of the war—even before—the Serb side was not given an equal status. Although we have been afforded an equal status as a party to the conflict we refuse to accept linguistic differences in the treatment of the Muslims and Serbs; for example, as they are being referred to as the government and we as the Serb side or sometimes even as Serb rebels.

In diplomatic meetings we have the status of a party to the conflict, a fully equal status. As I say, although we are being given equal status, this is not being observed and generally everything that happened was directed against the Serbs and that is why no solution was possible. [end recording]

Srpska's Buha Restates Conditions for Peace

BR1212150994 Paris LIBERATION in French 12 Dec 94 pp 12, 13

[Interview with Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the Srpska republic, by Jean Hatzfeld in Pale; date not given: "Aleksa Buha: 'We Are the Strongest Fighters'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Pale—While Serb President Slobodan Milosevic is slightly easing the embargo on the Bosnian Serbs, Aleksa Buha, the "foreign minister," a professor of philosophy, reiterated to LIBERATION his demands to have this self-proclaimed republic established over 70 percent of Bosnian territory recognized as a state, with the Blue Helmets as a buffer force which would ratify the fait accompli of conquest and the policy of expulsion by terror of the Muslim and Croatian populations which he discreetly prefers to call "more or less spontaneous exchanges of population."*

[Hatzfeld] Do you think that you have now won the war?

[Buha] Yes, in a way. We have shown that we are the strongest fighters. If the Muslims are reasonable, we can end this war. Now, nobody knows how many cities will have to be destroyed and how many people killed before the so-called international community accepts this idea.

[Hatzfeld] Why have you not invaded Bihac?

[Buha] Bihac is in Muslim territory. The Serbs do not want to occupy land which is not part of Serbian history and culture. That is why we have only formed an alliance with Fikret Abdic.

[Hatzfeld] Does this military victory change the conditions of peace, especially with regard to the drawing of borders?

[Buha] It is a positive thing to be stronger on the ground. But our principles are inviolable. Before any discussion we are demanding: first, a peace treaty over the whole territory for an indefinite period and not a temporary cease-fire which would only have the purpose of facilitating the rearmament of the Armed Forces; second, the recognition of the Srpska republic as interlocutor on an equal footing with the Croatian-Muslim Federation of Sarajevo; only then will we discuss the drawing of borders on the basis of the Stoltenberg-Owen plan which we accepted in August 1993 and which gives us around 54 percent of the territory.

[Hatzfeld] How will you manage to persuade Serbian refugees, from Tuzla for instance, to abandon the idea of recapturing their city by force?

[Buha] It is a fait accompli on which it is impossible to go back. They will have to understand that this is the law of war. For two and a half years, we have obtained, more or less spontaneously, the exchanges of population which we wanted to homogenize the territories on historical, ethnic, and cultural bases. These exchanges of population are irreversible.

[Hatzfeld] Do you think that the international community can accept that?

[Buha] The international community, which hurriedly accepted the independence of ethnic and cultural states in the former Yugoslavia, must accept the independence of ethnic and cultural states in the former Bosnia. The latter no longer exists and must be divided into two or three nations, according to the duration of the Croatian-Muslim Federation. To halt the war, the international community must accept the historical and cultural reasons which sparked it off.

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[Hatzfeld] Are the Western diplomats' hints of acceptance for a Serbian Confederation a step toward this recognition?

[Buha] It is for the Serbs of Serbia and Bosnia alone to decide their future relationship. But there is no doubt that we can see in the statements by Mr. Juppe and Mr. Hurd a step in the right direction, for a more comprehensive and realistic negotiation of a peace plan.

[Hatzfeld] Last week, in the wake of a parliamentary delegation, you met with President Slobodan Milosevic for the first time in three months. What was your aim?

[Buha] For three months we were physically prevented from having contact with any leader from the outside world. For those three months, President Milosevic received many visits and we heard mention of a development of the idea and a new interpretation of the peace plan. We therefore contacted President Milosevic to find out more.

[Hatzfeld] Your military domination and the current political deadlock raise the question of the presence of the Blue Helmets in Bosnia. Are you in favor of their withdrawal?

[Buha] If Blue Helmets wish to leave Bosnian territory, we will allow them to leave provided they take with them all their arms and equipment. Without leaving anything for the enemy. However, although we accuse them of partisanship toward the Muslims, we want them to act as a buffer between the armies on the front lines. A withdrawal of the Blue Helmets would mean that the war had taken an extremist turn.

Silajdzic Warns of Consequences of UN Withdrawal

MM1412114694 London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 12 Dec 94 p3

[Report on interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by As'ad Taha in Sarajevo on 11 December: "Silajdzic: Croatia Did Not Come to Our Aid; No UN Withdrawal Before Two Months"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said yesterday, Sunday, that his government had officially asked the Croatian Government to intervene in the war raging in Bihac. But he added, in an interview with AL-HAYAH, that the Croatian Government had retracted from honoring its pledges "for several political reasons."

Silajdzic affirmed that the Bosnian Army has become a strong military factor despite the events in Bihac. He criticized the role played by the UN forces in his country and accused its command of lacking the political will to implement the tasks entrusted to it by the United Nations. He expressed his belief that the UN forces will not withdraw for at least two months.

Silajdzic did not show much optimism about the forthcoming Islamic summit conference due to be held in Casablanca unless it decides to offer aid to the Bosnians who are "defending the Islamic entity" in the former Yugoslavia region. Missiles were falling all around the headquarters of the Bosnian Presidential Council during the interview with the Bosnian prime minister, who expressed his belief that the UN forces are not serious about the withdrawal decision, adding that "even if they were to do so, it would not be before two months."

Despite his government's opposition to the withdrawal of the UN forces from Bosnia, Silajdzic affirmed that it will cooperate with the UN forces to facilitate their withdrawal "because we are a member of the United Nations and these forces are UN forces. If the governments of the UN forces, particularly Britain and France, insist on withdrawing, we will naturally provide them with the necessary support in this respect." But he added that "forces from other countries which support the peace process and which seek to protect civilians should replace the withdrawing forces."

The Bosnian prime minister warned that the withdrawal of the UN forces will lead to a further worsening of living conditions because the withdrawal of the forces will lead to a total cessation of all aid convoys, adding that the demilitarized zones of Zepa and Srebrenica will be the most harmed by the withdrawal of the UN forces. He severely attacked the UN forces and urged their command, which lacks the political will, to carry out the humanitarian missions entrusted to them. He said: "The UN forces should be implementing the UN resolutions, but these forces are either unable to do so or their command is not agreeable or willing to do so."

Silajdzic denied that the international community had promised to launch effective air strikes against Serbian positions or to lift the arms embargo on the Muslims in return for the withdrawal of the UN forces, adding: "Some things are beyond our comprehension: The Serbian enemy has been daily launching total annihilation operations against the Muslims and world television networks have been reporting this, yet some Western governments insist on preventing the Muslims from arming themselves despite the fact that they are the victims of the aggression and of the fascist ideology." He spoke of violations of the most fundamental human principles and the encouragement of fascism, which sends a message to the whole world that international peace and order have been lost particularly in regard to the small countries which do not possess the ability to protect themselves.

On Croatia's intervention in the central region and its refusal to intervene in the Bihac region, Silajdzic said that in addition to numerous political considerations, "our problem with Croatia is that it has a strong right-wing political current anxious to create a Greater Croatia at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They hold the political view that trading with the Serbs at the expense

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of the Bosnian territory could save the Serbian-occupied territories in Croatia itself."

Silajdzic refuted the Croatian defense minister's allegations that the Bosnian Government had refused to officially ask Zagreb to intervene militarily to prevent the Serbs of Croatia from attacking Bihac, saying: "This is not true. I have told them, during a meeting with (Croatian President) Tudjman in the presence of his defense minister, that such a request should come from the Bosnian Presidential Council. Within a few hours, the Croatian Government received an official request from the Presidential Council for military intervention. But they did nothing and now they are trying to justify their inaction by all sorts of excuses."

On the U.S. attitude toward Bosnia, Silajdzic said: "It is better than that of many of the Western governments. However, at some stages, it has adopted attitudes which we could not comprehend."

Asked about the forthcoming Islamic summit conference, Silajdzic said: "We are defending our homeland, our people, the Islamic entity in Bosnia, and democracy. Our demands are well known to all who want to do something about them. Some Muslim governments have been fulfilling their duties while others have been busy with their own problems. Anyway, we welcome all those who wish to help us."

On his future expectations, Silajdzic said: "We will not enter into any new negotiations until the Serbs accept the peace plan drawn up by the International Contact Group, which we have accepted."

He ruled out any possibility of a revival of the old Yugoslav Federation whether through a confederation which would combine Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia (as has been reported). [sentence as published]

The Bosnian prime minister concluded his interview by saying: "I am very optimistic. We have passed through more difficult stages than the present and have proved our existence as a legitimate and democratic government that respects human rights and religious freedom. We have become a strong military factor, with almighty God's support and the help of some of our friends, despite the events in Bihac at which we have proved our ability to stand up to and halt the Serbian enemy. Anyway, things are now moving in our favor; we advance two steps and stop for a while and then advance two more steps. Despite the green light given to the Serbs, this state will survive and its people will live."

UNHCR Resumes Aid Convoys To Srebrenica

LD1312180894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1504 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zvornik, 13 Dec (TANJUG)—The UNHCR resumed delivering humanitarian aid to Srebrenica via Srpska republic territory, TANJUG has learned from the command of the Srpska republic army's Zvornik garrison.

According to the same source, after the usual control in Zvornik, UNHCR sent 10 trucks carrying 70 tonnes of food. [passage omitted]

Commentary on U.S. Concessions to Serb 'Fascism'

AU1312175294 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 8 Dec 94 p 2

[Commentary by Gojko Beric: "Confederal Poison"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Having destroyed, with the help of the international community, all values and pride, the war in Bosnia has finally revealed the form that the grand finale will take, as conceived by the great powers. Their idea is for the disappearance of Bosnia as a country, if not now, then at least in the near future. The media throughout the world, and in the United States in particular, are claiming that the battle for Bihac has led to a sensational political turn-around, while it is actually a preconceived variant of a clandestine diplomatic chess game. At the Brussels Contact Group meeting, the United States made more concessions to the Serbs and this came as a great surprise. But has Clinton ever really managed to cope with the problem of the Bosnian war and peace?

Five ministers in Geneva seemed to heave sighs of relief at no longer having to hide their feelings after U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry had said two days earlier that "the outcome of the war is beginning to take shape in Bosnia." In other words, the Bosnians have lost. Even if Perry's statement did reflect Washington's official views, it would not be crucial for Clinton's change of heart in his tactics over Bosnia. If he has betrayed Bosnia, as many think, the hesitant Bill is only confirming his consistently inconsistent policy toward this war. He dreads a possible rift in NATO more than anything in the world and hence has opted for a gesture of reconciliation by siding with the European allies. Since NATO cannot be used for any good purpose, let us at least make it look as if it were absolutely necessary!

However, that very motto can easily short-circuit both principles and paradoxes. For nothing was as encouraging for Radovan Karadzic as NATO being reduced to mere existence. Consequently, he now does whatever he pleases: He torches villages, murders people in Bosnia, forces the last of non-Serbian population into exile, plunders humanitarian convoys, and takes peacekeepers hostage. He is more arrogant and brutal than Milosevic when he was at odds with the rest of the world. And still Akashi goes to rehabilitate him and brings him back onto the diplomatic scene. This happened at the height of the Serbian offensive against Bihac, where the situation was reported as being on the brink of disaster for days. As the Serbs were advancing, the major powers could not agree on what should be done. And when Bihac became a hell on earth, they decided to offer concessions to Karadzic.

Their main carrot was the U.S. blessing for a confederal alliance between Karadzic's parastate and Serbia. However, this offer comes as no surprise. Every serious

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analyst realizes that this was the trump card that the great powers had up their sleeves all along. They were only waiting for a chance to play it. That is why the offer was received calmly in Pale. In the meantime, Karadzic has come up with new terms and it is hard to predict where he will stop. And why should he stop, since the West has decided to bury its principles in Bosnia and give up supporting justice? The West has not done this because it no longer believes in justice, but because it has neither the will nor the courage to oppose Serbian fascism. Perhaps they will get some when they realize that the Serbs will never stop humiliating them.

The confederal carrot for Karadzic is actually a lethal dose of poison injected in the body of Bosnia. No less lethal is the possible confederation between the Bosniak-Croat Federation and Zagreb. This formula, regardless of international guarantees and political and legal interpretations, is actually a formula for the disappearance of an internationally recognized country. Sooner or later, the Serbs would join Serbia and the Croats would join Croatia. The ethnic unravelling of Bosnia has effectively been completed. Now the final act of agony is in the offing: exchanging "towns and provinces" within a framework of territorial division in keeping with the Contact Group plan. This is supposed to be at the top of the agenda of the next meeting between Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic in Geneva or Budapest.

Every "improvement" to the peace plan of the international community so far has separated the Bosniaks from their own country even further. Its latest variant is designed to leave them in the biggest lurch ever. That means that there will be no peace and that the war in Bosnia will go on. The outcome of the war is uncertain, but the outcome of an unjust peace is absolutely certain.

2d Corps Officers View Military Successes

AU1312173094 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 8 Dec 94 p 5

[Report on interview with Sead Delic, Bosnia-Herzegovina 2d Corps commander, and officers Andjelko Makar and Ramiz Suvalic by V. Jahic; place and date not given: "Border at the Sava and Drina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The destiny of our country will be decided in the 2d Corps' theater of operations. Bosnia's historical and natural borders are the Sava and Drina. Our units have to reach those borders," said 2d Corps Commander Sead Delic in a conversation about the situation on the ground in this theater.

The Significance of the Liberation of Lisaca

[Delic] The military and political situation in this area is very stable. All our forces are helping our brothers in the Cazin Krajina and Bihac. In response to attacks by the Serb-Montenegrin aggressor, we have carried out several successful operations, liberated new areas and elevations. The liberation of Lisaca, an extremely well guarded elevation on Mt. Majevica, in which we captured several dozen aggressor soldiers and seized several hundred small arms, as well as other equipment and ammunition, is our most important victory. We are going through and making an inventory of everything that was captured and we will have a complete list in a couple of days.

[Jahic] There are 2d Corps units fighting at Vozuca. Very little is known about this.

[Delic] We have come to the conclusion that we do not need a media campaign. It is more important to work and realize our goals. Our Supreme Headquarters is informed about everything. [end Delic]

Andjelko Makar and Ramiz Suvalic said more about Vozuca.

[Makar] We have not released much information. But I can tell you now that we have liberated three times the area that we managed at Vijenac. We have liberated all areas in our theater of operations and have now entered that of the 3d Corps. Those who needed to know that (our headquarters) know it.

Good Cooperation With the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]

Ramiz Suvalic expounded on the significance of these liberated areas on the Vozuca front.

[Suvalic] Our units have liberated one of the most important elevations—Bracin—and now control Ribnica and several other villages, as well as certain other less important elevations. We are holding the Banovici-Ribnica-Olovo communications line and it will soon take less time to travel between Tuzla and Zenica. Furthermore, we will be able to avoid the dangerous Milankovici Pass. This will help us a great deal and the liberated areas around Vozuca are extremely important. On this occasion I would like to commend the units of the 6th Operative Group for their accomplishments.

[Jahic] Tell us about the cooperation with the HVO around Orasje. Is there an HVO battalion "Soli" to be formed in Tuzla?

[Suvalic] The Croats make up 12.5 percent of the 2d Corps. A political agreement provides for the reinforcement of the 108th HVO Infantry Brigade in Brcko and this is now under way. Principles of military organization do not allow any exterritoriality of command. Consequently, any Croats who want to join the HVO can join the 108th Infantry Brigade and it will then be decided whether other battalions need to be formed. In this area, neither the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army nor the HVO have ever had ethnically homogenous units. The unity of the Bosniaks and the Croats has been preserved here. Regarding our cooperation with the Orasje HVO, it has existed since the beginning of the aggression. I am pleased that local units are composed both of Croats and of Bosniaks. They come under our theater of operations

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and, though we are physically separated, we find ways to communicate and coordinate our activities on a daily basis.

Commander Sead Delic, talking about the reorganization of units, said that there would only be minor changes. He denied stories that a Podrinje Corps will soon be founded, as the necessary requirements have not yet been met.

Repelled Chetnik Offensives

Asked about the role of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in the 2d Corps theater of operations, Delic said that they mostly act as observers rather than protectors of the people. Furthermore, units of this corps have occasionally even protected UNPROFOR soldiers from the Serb-Montenegrin aggressor. He said that the role of UNPROFOR was mostly positive and that the bad impression that stems from their involvement in certain areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a result of political goals of some governments, primarily those of France and Great Britain.

[Jahic] The public has recently had the impression that the 2d Corps "is lying low." Is this true?

[Delic] Our successes have not been widely publicized. The 2d Corps is the strongest formation of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, both in terms of the number of soldiers and the equipment at its disposal. The areas of the "Posavina corridor," Olovo, Zvornik, and Tesanj have seen the fiercest chetnik offensives. All of these were crushed. We successfully repelled all of them and liberated new areas at the same time. We have been liberating new areas from the beginning of Serb-Montenegrin aggression.

[Jahic] You have recently been appointed commander of the 2d Corps. Will there be any changes?

[Delic] My appointment will not result in any major changes. The corps has a well devised system of command and defense operations. I am just an infusion of new blood and will try to improve the foundations for fighting a defensive war and eliminate weaknesses. I believe that we will succeed in this, for I have capable associates who do their jobs very well.

EU Administrator Views Situation in Mostar

AU1412102094 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 4 Dec 94 pp 10-11

[Interview with Hans Koschnick, European Union administrator of Mostar, by Mario Marusic; place and date not given: "The World Just Looks On and That Upsets Me"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"New trust is emerging—more slowly than I would like it to, but I am still an optimist," says the European administrator of Mostar, Hans Koschnick, four months after he arrived in the town on the Neretva. His basic task during his two-year European Union [EU] administration is, as he says himself, to reconnect the people living in this town and create the platform for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.*

[Marusic] In your opinion, what are the causes for the war between the Croats and Muslims in Mostar and Bosnia-Herzegovina? In a recent interview for a Croatian weekly you accused the Croats of Herzegovina, that is, the leadership in Zagreb, of being the cause. Is this really so, and how would you then interpret your close associate Winterstein's thesis, stated in Tuzla recently ("the cause of the war in Mostar are the Muslim refugees from eastern Herzegovina who arrived in Mostar")?

[Koschnick] I answered literally: Those who were directly involved in the war should be asked that question. I did not do what Winterstein did, which was to give an interpretation. I know the history of these areas well, and I am not one of those who like to waste words on interpreting things. I only encouraged that reporter to talk to his friends and clarify the issue. I am on the outside.

[Marusic] Would you then agree with what Mr. Winterstein said?

[Koschnick] No, because in this a very important issue was neglected, which lies in the history of this region—it is the issue of hope in Greater Croatia, of hope for Greater Serbia, and, since 1943, the issue of a Greater Islamic Republic. Whoever reaches out for parts of the explanation of one or the other side must just as readily experience one or both sides always being against them. I therefore prefer all three sides to be against me, as in that case I feel right.

Mostar as an Indicator

[Marusic] Since you have mentioned Greater Croatia, could it be concluded that the Croats, just like the Serbs, entered this war with the aim of creating Greater Croatia at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Koschnick] You may also conclude that the Serb aggression against Croatia has undeniable connections with the hope for Greater Serbia. It is a well-known fact that it was the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts that led to the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. In the history of Croatia the hope emerged several times that the Croats would live in their own state, with the fact that the defense from the German and Italian aggression after 1941 was accompanied by internal conflicts, where the issues of Greater Serbia, Greater Croatia, and then the Islamic state, played a role.

Now the politics has become discernible that, unfortunately, has not contributed to peace in Europe very much, but rather flared up nationalist passions. However, they are understandable, taking into account the pressure the people who wanted to have their own nation were living under. This is why it is not possible to say

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whether someone is guilty or innocent, whether something is left or right, but instead you have to ask about people's feelings. Should I now tell a Croat that he belongs to those who want Greater Croatia? Should I tell others that they are wrong to have supported Yugoslavia? Even Croatian Bishop Strossmayer supported the idea of Yugoslavia—naturally, that was a response against the union. However, a person who knows history knows how many currents there were that ran through the family.

I only talk about the present and the future, and I am sure that one day the people in this region will keep a part of their history.

[Marusic] Mostar is seen as the "crystallizing point of the Federation". Is this the right order—whatever happens in Mostar will happen in the Federation, or should the opposite direction be taken, starting from some towns in which the wounds are not as deep as in Mostar?

[Koschnick] This is difficult to answer. It would certainly have been easier in the towns in which the wounds are not as deep. The Croat and the Bosniak leadership, like the EU and the United States, hoped that if Mostar made coexistence possible again then the Federation could really work. If this is not the case in Mostar, then there will be great worries that everything will fall through. We can build bridges, but the people in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation have to walk across them. There are two great movements on both sides, the HDZ and the SDA, and I can only hope that among their people they will support coexistence. However, this will last longer than many thought it would.

[Marusic] You are probably aware of the slogan 'Mostar to the People of Mostar.' How would you compare it to the 'Bosnia to the Bosnians,' or 'Yugoslavia to the Yugoslavs'? It seems that it has caused much uneasiness about denying the cultural, ethnic, and other identities?

[Koschnick] If we were to get the old people of Mostar here, we would have a much easier time finding the way out of this situation. Nearly 40 percent of them have left Mostar, and the Croat and Bosniak leaderships have been asking me to have the ones who went to Western and Central Europe return, because professionals are crucial here now. They say that this offer holds for the Serb side also. This would be the return of the people of Mostar, and I am sure of that. I feel I am a person from Bremen, and the people of Mostar feel the same about Mostar. The issue of ethnic identity is a completely different matter.

The European management fully supports the protection of the ethnic identity of the people who live in Mostar, so that they can all live their own identity, and foster and be involved in their culture and language, because otherwise everything will fall apart. I know that they had to live without their identity for some 40 or 50 years. If someone thinks that I could participate in building peace here without the protection of ethnic identity, they do not understand the world at all.

The Key Issue

[Marusic] We have touched the issue of the return of the people of Mostar who were expelled. How should this be implemented, and what is to be done with the several thousand Muslims expelled from eastern Herzegovina, who are now in Mostar, and who have disturbed the former demographic picture? Can the people of Mostar return before these people leave, that is, return to their homes?

[Koschnick] I cannot bring the people of Mostar back to this destroyed town unless I can first return these people—and not only Muslims have been expelled; there are also Croats—to their towns. This is the key issue both for me and the Federation.

[Marusic] You emphasize that it is necessary to establish "the former situation" in companies, schools, institutions.... Therefore, the Serbs living in the town should also be involved in this. Is this possible with other Serbs bombing the town from the neighboring hills?

[Koschnick] I am suffering from the Serb aggression just as you are, and my reaction following the attack on the cathedral is widely known. However, the desire that all the three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina live together again is the desire of the Croat and Bosnian leadership. This is what they demanded from me, and this should be borne in mind. The Croat side claims, and I have no reason to dispute that, that in the western part of the town 3,000 Serbs live with the same civil rights as everyone else. It will be possible to resolve this issue only if there is a true solution for Mostar. We are working on it along with the leaderships in Mostar, Sarajevo, and Zagreb. No one dares say whether we will succeed. However, if I did not believe that the Federation makes sense and that the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be the ones to say how they want to organize their life, then I would not be able to work here.

[Marusic] Mostar is at present a demilitarized area and a zone under the EU management. However, the Serbs have their own way of understanding demilitarization. You have announced a sharp reaction of Europe following the murder of the girls at the cathedral, but only a few days later ambassador Metscher confirmed that you only have political appeals at your disposal.

[Koschnick] Apart from political means, the EU has no other means at its disposal, and they did not anticipate the wish of the Croat and Bosniak peoples. However, your question could also be interpreted as the question whether this is the only answer on the part of the EU. The member countries of the EU are member countries of the UN. The answers that we Europeans find to certain problems here will be the answers that were found within the Security Council and the UN Assembly. However, we will not be able to resolve

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problems properly with idle protests. I have another concept that was presented to the European defense ministers at the conference in the Netherlands and before the NATO parliamentarians in Washington, and it is also known to the governments in Zagreb and Sarajevo. They were grateful to me for what I expressed clearly.

Help Should Be Earned

[Marusic] Some 150 million German marks have been approved for the restoration of Mostar in 1995, but it was emphasized that this money was not an "unconditional gift of Europe to the people of Mostar, and it has to be earned." What are the people of Mostar to do?

[Koschnick] Cooperate. They ask me in West Europe how I came upon the idea to ask for so much money for the reconstruction of Mostar while the war is still on. I replied: The people need help. Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic said that more important than weapons was that Europe start providing concrete help in reconstruction for instance, for the restoration of the Ploce- Sarajevo railroad, Dr. Tudjman said: "Ploce is a free port, you can come to Ploce and establish an office." It will turn out that the Croats support progress in the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The plans for the reconstruction and repair of the war damage in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia should be implemented now.

I Pointed to the Bihac Issue

[Marusic] Naturally, in Washington and Brussels there was talk about the Serb attacks on the Bihac safe area?

[Koschnick] I was optimistic when I said there was a solution for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and thus for Mostar, and that, at the moment, Mostar was not at all important—Bihac was. I pointed out that unless changes occurred around Bihac, then the people there would be faced with a terrible end. No international force may say they did not know about this. I am talking about the issues of helping the people. Military issues should be discussed by someone cleverer, but what is happening is really horrible. The world just looks on, and that upsets me.

[Marusic] In the past few weeks the situation in Mostar is quite specific (state of emergency in the eastern part, curfew in the western, Serb bombing....). A common person must ask themselves where the competence of the EU is in all this, and who manages the town.

[Koschnick] The contractual partners of the Memorandum on Understanding are the Bosniak and Croat leadership. The Serb leadership did not take part, and we have been reproached for this. However, Karadzic was not part of the leadership in Sarajevo—not the republic or the federal one. The European management has a civilian task, and this is the reason the federal chancellor sent me to Mostar; otherwise he would have had to send a general.

[Marusic] Were you informed of the Croat and Muslim measures, and could it be said that you support them, taking into account the situation?

[Koschnick] I was not previously informed; they made their own decisions. However, I consider them absolutely right. If you have reason to fear that the town will be attacked again, then you have to ask your citizens not to gather in great numbers unless there is a particular need to do so.

[Marusic] The establishment of joint Croat, Muslim, and EU police patrols was announced for December. Is this realistic at this moment?

[Koschnick] No one can guarantee that everything will go as planned, but certain courageous moves must be made. President Tudjman did exactly that by signing the joint patrols of the Croatian policemen, Serb policemen from the Krajina, and UNPROFOR. I think that I have a good model here, and I would like to continue this way. Not against the will of the participants, though, and if it does not work in December, perhaps it will work in January or February. There were periods when you had the impression there was a standstill in the police issues, but at the same time we were resolving the issues of water, electricity, and education successfully.

Mostar—One Town

[Marusic] How do you see Mostar in the future?

[Koschnick] I would not like to prejudice things. I agree with all my associates from Mostar—it will be one town. However, my starting point is that a great part of the administration will be maintained in tiny parts. We will have to have several central points. If you listen to what different sides said about this topic, my conclusion is that there are no great differences. We will certainly engage a task force with all the representatives to take care of this and find the right way. I come from a city that has many such small local administrations, and I think that it is clever of all the sides to want this—the only thing they yet have to agree upon are details. I asked everyone not to talk about where the borders of the municipalities are supposed to be for the time being. We need not discuss 1994, let it mature until 1996. Meanwhile we will work together and search for a solution together.

[Box, p 11]

The New Old Bridge in 1996

[Marusic] The issue of the Mostar bridges is one of those in which it will perhaps best be seen what you have done in Mostar when you leave. Why did you start by reconstructing Tito's Bridge, which caused rather stormy reactions at the time, and could you say how many bridges Mostar will have in July 1996, (not) including the most famous one, the Old Bridge?

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[Koschnick] The excitement that was present when the first bridge was constructed in place of Tito's Bridge, about the heavier machines and construction material and equipment being transferred to eastern Mostar, took place three days after the attack on me with the antitank rocket. The media, for instance, television, established that the removing of the barricades was conditional upon the building of the bridge. However, they showed the bridge with the positive remarks, and, naturally, the explanation that I always gave—the first real, firm bridge, will be the customs one, on one side of which the Croats will stand, and Muslims on the other. The order has been issued that the bridge also be constructed at Potoci, which practically connects the two Croat sides.

Therefore, three bridges will have been built, and the construction of the Old Bridge will have started by July 1996 when I leave—four, counting Tito's Bridge. I want this bridge to be constructed under the UNESCO flag, so that the civilized world can see that not only new differences concerning the past or the future are emerging. I am sure that many countries will make significant contributions toward its construction.

Tuzla Mayor Criticizes Cantonal Authorities

AU1412073494 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 8 Dec 94 p 9

[Interview with Tuzla Mayor Selim Beslagic by Vehid Jahic; place and date not given: "Rights to the Canton, Obligations to the People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Many say that the canton of Tuzla and Podrinje has accomplished the most regarding the implementation of the Federation Constitution in areas controlled by the Bosnia- Herzegovina Government. Hence, good and bad sides of cantonal organization are here most easily noticed. The region of Tuzla is unique in that a coalition—Union of Bosnian Social Democrats, Party of Democratic Changes, and the liberals—is in power in Tuzla, while the SDA [Social Democratic Action] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] rule the Canton. We asked Tuzla Mayor Selim Beslagic about the functioning of the local authorities and relations with cantonal authorities.

[Jahic] How are relations currently between the local and cantonal authorities of Tuzla?

[Beslagic] It is still too early to evaluate. Cantonal authorities are still at the consolidation stage. Considering our past experiences, I can say we have good cooperation, although we do not hold the same views on some practical choices.

[Jahic] Can you give us an example?

[Beslagic] For the moment, the most obvious and most interesting indication of differing views are personnel choices in the Canton. Of the 15 ministers they have in the canton, only one—Ibrahim Morankic—is a native of Tuzla.

[Jahic] Is that a problem?

[Beslagic] No, not formally. We will not complain as long as those ministers are doing a good job in their departments. We have still not gathered all the information on the basis of which we could come up with a realistic evaluation of ministers, but Tuzla is the center of the canton and we have the greatest number of professional people and experts, so I think they could have selected a few of those prominent persons, instead of opting for some who have not proven themselves yet.

All Power in the Canton

[Jahic] What is your main objection to the personnel structure?

[Beslagic] You see, the ruling party appoints the personnel. That is only logical, as the ruling party is held responsible for government operations. I, therefore, think that they should be looking for experts, especially as the SDA has some, too. I think that their primary criterion, in selecting ministers and their deputies, was party concessions and rating. Town authorities did not do that. Our bodies and organizations are also composed of expert people who are not members of our coalition.

[Jahic] Could you give us an example of such a personnel blunder in the canton?

[Beslagic] It is too early to address that. Time will take care of that.

[Jahic] What is the position of the town in the cantonal organization?

[Beslagic] It is inadequate in many aspects.

[Jahic] In your opinion, how should the problem be solved?

[Beslagic] Zenica, Tuzla, Mostar, Sarajevo, as well as some other centers like Travnik should have been given town status, for those centers all have their own unique value that should have been encouraged in order to promote and develop other potentials. Moreover, most of those towns are multiethnic and new municipalities will probably be founded in keeping with the Federation Constitution in order to ensure full national emancipation of minorities in cantons. Therefore, every town in every canton should have been given a special place. By "special" I do not mean exclusive position or more rights, but circumstances for speedy development and reconstruction of towns. I do not care what others think, but the post-war development of our country and its integration depends on the brains and economic potential of the towns.

[Jahic] What is the relationship between towns and villages in this cantonal organization?

[Beslagic] It seems to me that a political climate is being created so as to put the two on the same level. I have already talked about that.

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[Jahic] Does that make sense?

[Beslagic] No. Towns and villages are different in many ways, but, I repeat, they should have equal political rights, not only between villages and towns but also between towns. However, we must make allowances for different cultural approaches. Towns are forward-looking, progressive communities and it is only logical that the parameters spread toward the country, and not vice-versa. That is a social dimension we call unique and it should be taken into account and stimulated for the sake of development. For instance, Tuzla will never be as engrossed in the question of farming as Kalesija, Zivnice, Brcko, or other municipalities that have obvious preconditions for developing this branch. On the other hand, Tuzla must pay special attention to the development of chemical, machine, metal-working, and other industries and the development of the university, specialized branches of medicine, etc.

[Jahic] Although the experience with the functioning of cantonal authorities in this region is limited, could you tell us to what degree do those cantonal authorities allow for specific dimensions regarding towns and villages?

[Beslagic] Let us not forget that there is a war going on and that aggression makes it impossible for certain things to function as planned. However, there are indications that those cantonal authorities repeat the old mistakes—concentrate political power in the center of the canton. A high concentration of ministries in Tuzla is a case in point. Why should the Ministry of Forestry not have its seat in Kladanj, Ministry of Power Industry in Banovici, etc. and improve road communications to Tuzla? If we want to develop quickly following liberation, we have to put the personnel, even industrial plants, close to resources. It seems to me that some intend to decentralize republic-federal authorities whereas those in cantonal authorities are inclined toward centralization.

[Jahic] What is the relationship between local and cantonal Tuzla authorities like?

[Beslagic] Generally good. We want to cooperate and do so to the extent they want and demand our cooperation.

Autonomy—Nonsense

[Jahic] Some say the Tuzla town government has autonomous tendencies. Why is that?

[Beslagic] That is nonsense. Some local SDA representatives have insinuated that. The aggressor also makes similar insinuations. What a coincidence! We showed who and what we are before and during the aggression. We thwarted the aggressor in Tuzla and those allegations are perhaps their way of getting back at us, an act of retaliation for their political collapse in the town. I believe some SDA members are also trying to denigrate us, trying to make us toe the line. That is not beneficial for the development of democracy. You must realize that, according to the Federation Constitution, the canton has legislative, judicial, and executive power, whereas we do not. Considering the circumstances, it is easy to see which level of government is more likely to exceed constitutional instruments.

[Jahic] You opposed some of the canton's proposals and solutions. Why?

[Beslagic] We support and will continue to support cantonal authorities whenever it is their prerogative to make decisions. However, every time we suspect their decisions collide with federal organization, we demand and will continue to demand explanations from the top. We want to be an honest partner and, if necessary, we will act as a corrective element of cantonal authorities with the sole intention of seeing that their decisions do not collide with constitutional solutions of the Federation. We will do that until the rights and obligations of the canton toward the Federation and municipalities in the canton are defined in detail. I think it is no exaggeration to say that Tuzla is the most Bosnian town of all. We proved that before and during the Serb-Montenegrin aggression.

[Jahic] Can you substantiate that?

[Beslagic] At the beginning of the aggression, we confiscated about 17,000 bullets of different calibers, plenty of ammunition, equipment, destroyed their military convoy, and eliminated and captured many aggressor soldiers on 15 May, 1992. We chased them as far as Majevica. We helped our neighboring municipalities to liberate themselves. During this defensive war, 70 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army soldiers from Tuzla units were killed on battlefields at Gradacac, Brcko, Doboj, Gracanica, Olovo, Kladanj.... We took in hundreds of thousands of refugees and there are about 70,000 refugees in our municipality at present. How can anyone say we did not do our best and accuse us of lack of patriotism? Let me emphasize that, regardless of everything that happened, the spirit of tolerance and good-neighborly relations has prevailed in Tuzla.

[Jahic] What about the town's economy?

[Beslagic] Long-lasting isolation as a result of the aggression has had terrible consequences. Still, the industrial potentials of Tuzla remained more or less intact. During the defensive war—especially during the blockade—many firms started producing medical supplies and defense equipment. We have been appealing to international humanitarian organizations to help us develop projects instead of sending us aid for immediate consumption. There have been some results with regard to that. Since the spring, those organizations have accepted some projects the value of which is about 20 million German marks. At a recent meeting discussing local democracy, we presented some 50 development projects for the reconstruction of our town to foreign investors. They are bound to accept some of them. Moreover, 30 projects for other Bosnia-Herzegovina towns were also presented at the meeting. There are some results with

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regard to that as well. I think we will be ready for speedy recovery and reconstruction when peace comes.

[Jahic] What is your message in conclusion?

[Beslagic] Regarding the relationship between municipal, and especially town and cantonal authorities, it seems to me that the canton is very efficient in exercising the rights accorded by the Federation Constitution. I would like to see equal efficiency regarding the obligations those rights entail, for in democratic political systems, obligations must be equal to rights. I fear that some may continue behaving in the old, Bolshevik way, when higher- ups had all the rights, while "worker-managers," i.e. those who did not have any rights, had the most obligations.

[Box, p 9]

Town and Country

[Jahic] I have already expounded on the personnel problem. Another, even greater handicap is political representation. At the Cantonal Assembly, each municipality is represented by five deputies. This is one of the most important preconditions for periphery being able to impose its political logic to the center. Tuzla, a town with about 100,000 inhabitants, has five deputies, as do municipalities with as little as couple of thousand inhabitants. Furthermore, half the population of Brcko is in exile or has left the town, and only soldiers and work units are left in some peripheral municipalities. Moreover, let us not forget that about 70,000 refugees came to Tuzla. The same holds for Zenica, even Sarajevo, partly also for Mostar. There are many refugees in every town, and towns are centers of economic, medical, scientific, educational, and other potentials. In all fairness, the town has different problems and commonplace events, but they were reduced to the same level as passive and much smaller municipalities.

Commentary Analyzes Six Serbian Goals

AU1312205294 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 8 Dec 94 p 11

[Commentary by Manojlo Tomic: "Bihac—the Turning Point of the War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The architects and executors of the project usually called "Greater Serbia" think that this is a historic chance finally to make it happen. They expect that, following the possible destruction or neutralization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps, they will soon resolve "the Bosnian question" in the manner that most suits them. The Bosniaks should not underestimate this assessment, or rather desire of theirs, as we have done once too often in the past. Naturally, we should not underestimate or overestimate them, nor should we despair or contemplate surrender.

The Serbs are pressed for time for many reasons. They are trying to destroy the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps at all costs, for they think it would be a turning point in this war and that they would soon be able to capitalize on their military victory on the political scene. Their line of thinking is obvious from a message that Lieutenant-General Manojlo Milovanovic, head of the supreme headquarters of the army of the so-called Srpska republic, sent to units participating in the fighting around Bihac. Here are some excerpts:

A Race Against Time

"This is the worst defeat of the converts to Islam in all the Serbian Republic and every soldier and Serbian patriot must realize that this is a historic opportunity and a strategic task to deliver the coup de grace to these converts, unite the Srpska republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK], and turn the Cazin Krajina into a unified Serbian Krajina. We do not have time to hesitate or have second thoughts. That would enable the 5th Corps to consolidate its forces with the help of its international patrons. Our main goal is to defeat the converts' 5th Corps."

The terminology ("converts to Islam") of the above quotation notwithstanding, the present and long-term military and political goals of the Serbs are blindingly obvious. Most urgently and at all costs, they are trying to destroy the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps. This military operation involves all the forces that they could muster at the moment. And this is why they are working against the clock, for if they do not break the Bihac defenses, the myth of Serb military supremacy and invincibility that they themselves have created, and which the international community also accepts as a fact, will collapse like a house of cards. There is no doubt that both the UN and NATO, as well as all the world's military powers, know about the involvement of the army of the so called RSK, and also that of the army of the "FRY" in the offensive against Bihac (some sources report that the operation is controlled not by officers from Mladic's headquarters, but by officers from the Supreme Headquarters in Belgrade), but those world potentates suppress this information, allowing the Serbs to "finish the job" and thus end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their primary concern is to contain the war, prevent it from spreading further in the region, and prevent the full involvement of Serbia and Croatia. They do not care about a just outcome of the war. Indeed, history will most probably prove that some countries, such as Russia, Great Britain, and France, for instance, did everything to help the war end in victory for the Serbs. Only they expected the Serbs to achieve this in as little as a couple of months, but since that was too much to ask for, they are now effectively helping the Serbs to "finish the job."

Key to the War

The Serbs are in a hurry to take Bihac in the hope that this would finally tip the balance in favor of their military victory. However, in the event that they fail to

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achieve this goal, it would be difficult to assemble such a force for another major operation. Although our propaganda is very often naive if not ridiculous, information about the lack of motivation, the desertions, and even of the total collapse of Mladic's army over the past couple of months is not completely without foundation. The message of General Milovanovic that we managed to get hold of speaks of "obstructions and instances of unorganized activities, disobeying orders, poor fortifications of lines and the spreading of panic" in the Serbian ranks. According to the same information, in the 2d Krajina Corps of the army of the so-called Srpska republic alone, "charges have been brought against many officers and about 400 soldiers."

Owing to this state of affairs in their army, the Serbian propaganda machine has done everything to motivate their own soldiers and nation for a crucial battle, trying to convince them of Serbian military might, promising an easy military victory that would result in peace and a Serbian state in Bosnia- Herzegovina. Karadzic has been talking about this for months, but he is unfortunately not often taken seriously in Sarajevo. It is not enough just to declare him a war criminal and close the case. Of course, Karadzic's threats were primarily aimed at the Serbs, as part of the propaganda laying the groundwork for "the battle of all battles," but our political and military strategists should have drawn some conclusions. However, they unfortunately failed to do so, and the situation around Bihac is a case in point.

And this brings us to the key question: Whether a serious Bosnia-Herzegovina military and political strategy, or even tactics, exists at all. It is not enough just to say that the goal is "to preserve the integrity of the internationally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multicultural and multiethnic community." We must have other options, one for every possible outcome. Naturally, these options must be based on realistic possibilities, not only ours but also those of the enemy.

On the possibilities of a Greater Serbia, in order to realize their ambitions, the Serbs have set the largest forces in their history into motion. At the stage of mere fighting for survival, the Bosniaks could indeed have had nothing on their minds but their own survival, but today, when Bosnia-Herzegovina is a state in its own right (not "internationally recognized," but as a reality on whatever territory it now has), when it has its own army (the key question of this military and political Bosnian strategy depends on how powerful it really is and how powerful, in given international circumstances, it can be tomorrow), it must devise a plan to capitalize on its present position, its present military power and weaknesses.

Of course, we must not relinquish fighting for our unitary and "internationally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina," we must not succumb to defeatism or sign whatever solution is offered; rather, we should try to see our own potentials. And the potentials of our enemy, too. The political and military leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina has hitherto not thought along these lines. Crucial decisions (for example those on "protected areas") were made with a knife at our throats and we now see that this made it possible for the enemy to stab us in the back. All things indicate that we still do not have a proper strategic concept. After all, we agreed to demilitarization of Bihac as if that would prevent the Serbs from going further and demanding more tomorrow.

Six Serbian Goals

A realistic strategy must be based on the intentions of our enemy as well as its own and our own potentials. It does not suffice to state merely that the enemy wants to create "a Greater Serbia." We must also know something about how the enemy intends to realize these goals. Bihac is one of our enemy's current attempts. Furthermore, we must also consider other topical goals as defined by Momcilo Krajisnik—and in that order—of which the political and military leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina seems unaware. Their first goal is to round off the territory and connect the two so called Serbian states (the goal of the Bihac operation); the second is political recognition for these western Serbian states from the international community (which is quite probable, according to some Western potentates, if Bihac should fall—William Perry: "The Serbs are the victors. The Muslims cannot regain 70 percent of the territory."). The third Serbian goal, according to Krajisnik, is the division of Sarajevo, which they have effectively already achieved; the fourth is to conquer the area around the Drina (they are having trouble with Gorazde and Srebrenica and they will probably try to seize that area in the next period); the fifth is to gain access to the left bank of the Neretva; and the sixth is to gain access to the sea.

The Serbs have realized most of these goals and the outcome of the battle for Bihac will show whether they will realize the rest. Consequently, Atif Dudakovic's [5th Corps commander] soldiers are now defending not only Bihac but all of Bosnia, thus determining the outcome of the war in this region. However, that does not mean that we should only sit and wait to see whether Bihac will fall or manage to defend itself. Even if it does fall, we should not succumb to defeatism and start believing that the Serbs have succeeded. This would definitely not be the end of the war, but we should have a clear-cut strategy to hand and a plan as to what to do should they launch an offensive on Sarajevo or Tuzla in the near future. And if Bihac does not fall, which is more likely, the Serbs will not relinquish their goals. Of course, they would only be harder to realize. However, in that case, both our army and political leadership should have a well-defined strategy and react so as to prevent Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa, or Tuzla from meeting the fate of Bihac. The worst decisions are made with a knife at one's throat. It is even more difficult to think clearly when one has been stabbed in the back.

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In other words: The Serbs will do everything, as they are already doing, to create a Greater Serbia. They are presently at a military advantage and are also being helped by the international community. The Bosniaks, first of all, cannot give up and accept such an outcome, but must see what is it they can really do. No one should relinquish Bosnia-Herzegovina within its historical borders, but we must now save the Bosniaks and what little territory is left. Therefore, let us not succumb to capitulation and pessimism, but we should not make empty promises of victory over the enemy either. We will win eventually, in terms of history, if not in terms of military supremacy, even if it takes three generations, but in order to have this third generation, the previous two generations of Bosniaks and Bosnians must survive.

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UN Spokesman: Army Supporting HVO in Bosnia

AU1312180694 Paris AFP in English 1753 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 13 (AFP)—The regular Croatian Army has units in western Bosnia actively supporting Bosnian Croat forces [Croatian Defense Force, HVO] battling Bosnian Serbs, UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman Paul Risley said here Tuesday [13 December].

The Croatian Army "has a continued presence" in a region running along the Bosnian border, northwest of the Bosnian Croat-held town of Livno, Risley said. UNPROFOR said Monday that Croatian Army units had been seen returning from Bosnia to Croatia. "At the same time we have reports of other Croatian units entering into the area," Risley added Tuesday.

He said the fighting in the region disputed by the Bosnian Croats and Serbs was at a "very minimal intensity," and that the eight to 10-kilometre (five to six-mile) gains made by the Croats in early December had not been modified since.

The Croatian Army was invited into Bosnia by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic under a treaty signed by Sarajevo and Zagreb in July 1992. The treaty, signed by Izetbegovic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, provides for mutual military assistance in the face of "Serb aggression."

West Preventing Army Intervention in Bihac

AU1312155494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Dec 94

[Report by Nada al-Isa]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 5th Corps says that the aggressor has not conquered anything significant. This is why it is halting the humanitarian convoys heading for Bihac. The humanitarian situation in the town is indeed dramatic, people in Bihac warn. There is indeed nothing in the town, especially in the Bihac hospital: There is no medicine; there is no food. The hospital [word indistinct] is empty. Some 500 seriously wounded patients are lying in the cold hospital halls on the concrete floor. The head of the hospital, Dr. (?Zekir Tasic) said that the patients are indeed already dying in the hospital owing to the lack of medicine and food.

In view of this alarming news from Bihac, in the Republic of Croatia, from whose occupied parts the fiercest attacks are in fact being launched, [words indistinct] one and only question: Should Croatia have already intervened militarily? The opposition says yes. The leadership is saying that the world is not (?allowing) it to intervene. A well informed general in the Croatian Army, Martin Spegelj, [words indistinct] says: Croatia will not intervene. The general claims that he became clear about this after, as he says, President Tudjman said that the West will allegedly help Croatia to reintegrate (?peacefully) its occupied areas if it does not interfere in the Bihac fighting. Gen. Spegelj says: I can trust only those [words indistinct].

Tudjman Receives Albanian Defense Minister

LD1312160394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a public statement from Jozo Curic, the secretary of President Tudjman's public relations office.

Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, has received Safet Zhulali, the defense minister of the Republic of Albania, who conveyed President Berisha's greetings and his best wishes for the successful development of Albanian-Croatian relations.

Minister Zhulali informed President Tudjman about relations with Croatia, and Albania's keen interest in long-term cooperation in all spheres. Special emphasis was placed on the situation in the region. President Tudjman sent his cordial greetings to President Berisha and the Albanian people.

The meeting was also attended by Deputy Defense Minister Josip Juras; Corps General Anton Tus, the president's chief military advisor; Colonel Gen. Zvonimir Cervenko, head of the president's military office; the Croatian ambassador to Brussels, Janko Vranicani-Dobrinovic; minister Zhulali's defense advisor Alfred Moisiu; and Franko Kroqi, the Albanian ambassador to Croatia.

Defense Agreement Signed

AU1412113794 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A cooperation agreement in the field of defense between the Republics of Albania and Croatia was signed at the Croatian Defense Ministry today. The agreement will be influencial in strengthening cooperation between Albania and Croatia. It is not directed against a third country; on the contrary it serves to reinforce measures of confidence, security, peace, and stability in the Balkan region.

After signing the agreement, Albanian Defense Minister Safet Zhulali was received by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in a special meeting. At the meeting, President Tudjman greeted the signing of the agreement and assured Mr. Zhulali of his support for strengthening bilateral cooperation in the field of defense.

The high-ranking Albanian delegation has left Croatia and is conducting a visit to Slovenia.

Report Views Power Struggle in Krajina

AU1312205794 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 7 Dec 94 p 12

[Report by Milan Markovic: "Mikelic's Assassination Was Being Planned Because He Halted the Unification of the Srpska Republic and the Republic of Serbian Krajina"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Three months ago, in front of the house where Borislav Mikelic, prime minister of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], resides, his security guard disarmed and arrested two men in uniform at the time Mikelic was supposed to return from a cabinet meeting. The two men were Stojan Zupljanin, interior affairs adviser to Srpska republic President Radovan Karadzic, and a member of the military police in Knin.

The reason they prepared an ambush for Mikelic was not disclosed to the public (nor was the fact that the ambush was being prepared at all). Some well-informed sources, close to the military leadership of RSK, disclosed to TELEGRAF that the assassination of Krajina's prime minister had been prepared ever since he had obstructed the proclamation of of the unification of the Serbian republic and RSK at the assembly in Plitvice.

According to our sources, this is the most drastic consequence of the conflict between the political groups clustered around RSK President Milan Martic on one side, and Milan Babic and Mikelic on the other side, in which, apparently, anything goes. Recently the Krajina special units headed by Neso Maric, bodyguard of Milan Martic, broke into the building of the Knin Municipal Assembly and destroyed the premises, which had been justified with their revolt because of the suspension of Ilija Prijic, interior minister and Martic's man.

Today, when Martic no longer enjoys the support of Belgrade, Babic's and Mikelic's men are gradually assuming power little by little, installing their people in the most important institutions of Krajina. The RSK constitution suits them, because it gives broad authority to the RSK assembly. This was demonstrated at the latest meeting of parliament when minister Prijic was ousted with almost no objections by the assembly, even though Martic personally took his side. Since the departure of Martic's man from the office of interior minister, for Babic and the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] of Krajina it is more important than ever that now they are in the position to appoint their own man to the office and thereby completely change the power structure in the Supreme Council of Defense (after the parliament the most important institution in Krajina). The relation was heretofore four to one to Martic's advantage, whereas now it is three to two to Mikelic's advantage. At the moment it is only Major General Milan Celeketic, commander of the general staff of the RSK army, who has remained by Martic's side, while Mikelic, as expected, in addition to his own vote, will also be able to count on the votes of the prospective interior minister and Rade Tanjga, defense minister, who, under pressure from Babic's majority in the parliament, seems already to have changed sides.

Many shifts in the RSK interior ministry [MUP] in the past year are being put in direct connection with dozens of murders that have still not been resolved. It is thought that precisely the people who already composed files on those murders, or were about to do so, have left the MUP. In Lika alone in the past three years there have been some 40 murders predominantly of Serbs, still not resolved to this day.

Those who are more familiar with the circumstances in Krajina point out that those most responsible for Martic's cadre shifts and political failures are his permanent advisers, former RSK President Zdravko Zecevic, David Rastovic—former chairman of Donji Lapac municipality, Rade Cubrilo—commander of the nonexistent "Petar Mrkonjic" chetnik regiment, Nebojsa Mandic, and retired Colonel Nedjo Bubalo—believed to have been added to Martic's cabinet upon Vojislav Seselj's [chairman of the Serbian Radical Party] instructions. Even though he is not an assembly deputy, it is precisely Bubalo who carried out the main assault against Gen. Milo Novakovic at the assembly meeting in Beli Manastir. Stating a series of falsehoods according to Seselj's orders, he prepared the ground for Novakovic's removal from the position of commander of the general staff of the Krajina Army.

Martic's advisers are considered responsible also for freezing relations with Belgrade. Nobody understands why Martic needed to go to Drvar in the Srpska republic, to cast his vote before journalists and TV cameras, and publicly declare himself against the peace plan. That is, against the plan that Belgrade had already endorsed. People view Martic's decision to demand the immediate unification of the RSK with the Srpska republic at the extraordinary assembly meeting in Plitvice in the same context, as a sign of support for Karadzic in his conflict with Belgrade. Martic thereby opened a new question: Has he actually fallen under Karadzic's influence, and did he actually become a tool used by the Pale leadership in squaring accounts with Belgrade?

Martic's recent though secret fetching to Knin of Karadzic's interior affairs adviser Zupljanin and a group of his aides led by a Sredo Vucenovic is viewed in the same light. There is nothing much yet to be said with certainty about Zupljanin's role in Knin, but it may be expected that his role in the police forces of Krajina will be considerable.

What may be expected to happen next is the opening to the question regarding the situation in the army. As early as at the next parliamentary session a debate on Martic's decision to appoint the commander of the general staff without the consent of the assembly may be initiated. The SDS lawyers of Krajina continually point out that only the parliament is authorized to appoint generals, and that Martic has violated the constitution with his decision.

It is known that with Martic's rise to the office of state president and general Milan Celeketic's appointment as commander of the general staff of the Krajina Army, severe shifts in the army and police cadre came about. So, for instance, the commanders of all the six corps of the RSK army were replaced. Generals Mile Novakovic

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and Borivoje Djukic, Admiral Dusan Rakic, a great number of colonels, majors and other officers were also removed.

New people have been brought in, whose resumes might serve Martic's opponents quite well. For instance, the commander of the Drnis brigade is Lieutenant Colonel Davidovic, against whom legal proceedings have been initiated in the FRY, on a charge that he took part in the surrender of the Yugoslav People's Army Varazdin Corps. The chief of staff of this brigade is Lt. Col. Mate Juras, who is a Croat (!?), while the chief of the general staff is Col. Dusan Loncar, whose parents live near Daruvar, and whose brother is still working as police inspector with the Croatian Interior Ministry Department in Bjelovar.

Martic has also formed a commission for the development of a new concept for the organization of the RSK army, called "Krajisnik." An officers' revolt has been provoked by the fact that Lt. Col. Milos Markovic heads the commission, even though not so long ago he was suspended as commander of the 11th Brigade because of incompetency. Captain Dragan, who is believed to be capable of leading a unit, but in no way of conceptualizing an army, is also a member of the commission. The third member of the commission is David Rastovic, an electrician and reservist, of whom Martic believes that he will also contribute to the quality of a new concept for the Krajina army.

Croatia Takes Part in OIC Summit in Casablanca

AU1412073394 Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 8 Dec 94 p 7

[Commentary by Aleksandar Milosevic: "What Is Casablanca Bringing About?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Why are the Islamic countries not undertaking resolute political and diplomatic action regarding the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina? This question has been repeatedly raised by the European and world public in recent days and weeks. Obviously, the prevailing belief has been that precisely the Islamic countries can make a good use of their extensive participation in the United Nations, the Nonaligned Movement, and other international institutions, support it with their economic strength and force the international community to take more effective steps. However, one forgets that the Islamic countries are not unified either politically or regarding their interests, so it is hard to take quick and effective action. True, they are associated in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), but the differences among them are frequently greater and stronger than their desire and capacity to take unified action.

Response to the Russians

Still, in recent days the OIC has launched political-diplomatic action, the end result of which remains to be seen. The Geneva conference of the 11-member contact group of OIC at the level of ministers was just an introduction to the summit of the organization at the highest level, which will take place next week in Casablanca, Morocco. At the meeting, just as in Geneva, Croatia will be present as an observer, in response to the OIC invitation. For the Geneva meeting it is remarkable that its participants, after a longer time, stated their stance regarding the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and expressed possible directions for future actions. True, in the conclusions made in Geneva there are neither more significant novelties, nor deviations from the already stated attitudes of the OIC, but the attention of analysts is drawn by the explicit readiness of Islamic countries to send additional UN troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina if the British and French UN troops, as well as those of some other countries announcing such a possibility, withdraw. However, one should be aware that there are almost no realistic chances of such a development, even if the British, French and other UN troops do withdraw. The international community, starting with the United Nations, the OSCE (the former CSCE) to NATO, simply would not accept the additional military involvement of the Islamic countries in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such a possibility has already been rejected with the explanation that it would mean transforming the war into a religious conflict. Regardless of how well-founded such considerations are, they are well-known to the OIC. Therefore its conclusions from Geneva may be, and probably are, the answer to the open Russian support for Belgrade, Pale and Knin, shown by the veto in the UN Security Council, and later on by the refusal to accept the documents at the CSCE summit in Budapest.

The West in a Scrape

A different development is also possible, in which troops from Islamic countries come to Bosnia-Herzegovina after the withdrawal of the existing ones, upon invitation by the Sarajevo government, despite international reluctance for such a solution. Undoubtedly, it would induce Bosnian Serbs as well as Belgrade to demand open military support by Russia and other countries, for instance Greece. In short, in that scenario the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina would evolve into open military conflict on a greater international scale. The West would be in a big scrape. Because of its economic interests it would be expected to support the Islamic countries, while its geo-strategic interests would prescribe its avoiding any open conflict with Russia. Furthermore, in such a scenario open conflict between Turkey and Greece, two NATO member states, would break out. Given the current crisis shaking this organization, a military engagement of two member states on different sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the least desirable course of events.

Still, it is to be expected that at the summit in Casablanca the OIC, despite differences among member states, will persevere in encouraging the international community to apply political and military pressure on

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Belgrade and Pale, using the possibility of its own military engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina as its strongest card, which the world, particularly the West, must take into account.

For Croatia and its international position it is important that the OIC note the support that official Zagreb is giving to Bosnia-Herzegovina and esteem Croatian efforts in the implementation of the Washington agreement. A political or any other partnership with an international organization such as OIC, regardless of the variety of interests within it, is important for Croatia and its future development. In such a context one should view the participation of the Croatian delegation led by Prime Minister Nikica Valentic at the summit in Casablanca. This summit might speed up the development of events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which Croatia is extremely interested. Not only because of the position and destiny of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also because of the settlement of the problem of the occupied regions in Croatia. Those two issues are very much interrelated, and the settlement of one of them involves the settlement of the other.

Future Economic Relations With Turkey Assessed

AU1312192794 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 6 Dec 94 p 11

[Report by Davor Drezga: "Link Between Croatian and Turkish Firms"]

[FBIS-Translated Text] Zagreb—Setting the scene for closer economic ties between Croatia and Turkey, a meeting was held at the HGK [Croatian Chamber of Commerce]—attended by many Croatian businessmen, representatives of the Croatian Ministry of Economics, Foreign Ministry, and of the HGK—to discuss a proposal for the establishment of Croatian-Turkish Economic Council (chamber). Participants in the meeting wholeheartedly supported the initiative. Hidajet Biscevic, Croatian ambassador to the Republic of Turkey, and Yuksel Soylemez, Turkish ambassador to the Republic of Croatia, actively participated in the discussion between Croatian businessmen and politicians.

On the reasons for establishing the council, which is supposed to function with in the framework of the HGK, Vjekoslav Tomasic, member of HGK Board of Directors, emphasized that the council would establish closer ties between Turkish and Croatian firms, give information on markets in Turkey and Croatia, organize visits for Croatian economic delegations to Turkey, arrange for Turkish businessmen to stay in Croatia.... A similar economic council (chamber) is expected to be established in Turkey as well.

Political Framework of Cooperation

Referring to the established relations between Croatia and Turkey, Hidajet Biscevic emphasized that bilateral political relations provide the framework for future closer cooperation between the two countries. Those bilateral relations are very good and must be evaluated in economic terms. He added that the two countries have had many political contacts and that Turkey is among the five or six countries in the world Croatia can rely upon.

Regarding economic cooperation, Biscevic said that Turkey insisted that this network for economic cooperation be institutionalized. Especially as Turkish businessmen take keen interest in doing business with Croatia. Biscevic pointed out that, at the Croatian Embassy in Ankara, large Turkish firms showed interest in economic cooperation with Croatia. As many as 25 Turkish firms would like to take part in the future economic council (chamber).

Biscevic also talked about projects in the making that were of interest to both Croatia and Turkey. Regarding the loan of Turkish Ex-Im Bank to Croatia which was approved at one point, this line of credit is being cleared and will amount to more than $100 million. Also, all the necessary groundwork for implementing the decision of the Government of the Republic of Croatia to open a consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, that would concentrate on developing economic relations between the two countries—is being accomplished at the moment. Furthermore, Biscevic emphasized, Croatia should do more to appeal to the Kazakhstan market, whose economic potentials are said to be the gold mine of 21st century. Some 40 countries have already opened their consulates in that country and Turkey could help Croatia access that market as well as the markets of Russia and several other Middle-Asian countries.

$20 Million Worth of Exports to Turkey

Since Turkish businessmen want to learn more about Croatian firms, Croatia should, warned Biscevic, present the potentials of Croatian economy to Turkey. Furthermore, he said that the HGK must establish closer ties with the Turkish Chamber of Commerce in Ankara.

Emphasizing that there are considerable potentials in both Turkey and Croatia for closer economic cooperation, Yuksel Soylemez said that Turkey imports $20 million worth of products from Croatia and exports to Croatia amount to $8.5 million. Yuksel Soylemez said that, by the year 2000, Turkey will have a thriving economy.

[Box, p 11]

$30 Million Investment

At the extremely well-attended meeting of businessmen at the HGK that supported the initiative for the establishment of the Croat-Turkish Economic Council (chamber), there was interesting information about some of Turkey's development plans by the year 2000. Around $30 million will be invested in Anatolia in the construction of hydroelectric power plants, irrigation systems,

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and various other projects. Turkey is interested in contracting Croatian firms for that large project. It is expected that agriculture and various branches of industry connected to the sector will boom. Croatian firms have acquired considerable experience in that field, so Croatia could be a part of that economic boom.

Commentary Views Zagreb-Krajina Agreement

AU1212134394 Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA (Supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 3-4 Dec 94 p I

[Commentary by Srdjan Radulovic: "The Final Move on the 'Checkered' Board—Z 4"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "We must not burn all our bridges behind us," the deceased leader of the Dalmatian Serbs, Jovan Raskovic, used to instruct, while the spark of the fuse was approaching the Balkan powder keg. Looking for an alibi for "red" sins, politicians and petty politicians had greater-national dreams extending to the Drina, the Kupa and other rivers whose banks were linked by bridges called "Brotherhood and Unity," refusing that anybody else replaces them while on war duty. Of course, Raskovic did not refer to those and such bridges, but rather to the bridges that must guarantee to the Dalmatian and Krajina Serbs their independence in the full historic and national meaning of that message.

By accepting the Agreement on Economic Relations with Croatia, the Krajina assembly has definitely accepted the political "pontoon" surrogate. Instead of making a choice by themselves, on the eve of the third anniversary of the proclamation of Serbian Krajina (19 December) the Krajina Serbs have accepted, given Belgrade's prompting, the international (co)scenario of their own AVNOJ-ization [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia]. To make the irony of the symbolism even greater, the Krajina government has accepted the Draft of the Agreement on Economic Relations with Croatia on 30 November, whereas the Croatian side, as opposed to the Krajina assembly, has refused to sign the agreement on 1 December, considering that date to be too pro-Yugoslav and irritating for Croatian statehood.

The assertions by the Krajina officials that the aforementioned agreement is deprived of any political connotation whatsoever are not only all too flimsy to pass an analytical checkout of the document (the "AVNOJ-ization" of the traffic in Krajina and other industrial capacities)—it will also become clear soon that they are the foundation laid precisely for the upcoming period of settling political relations through the mechanism of international arbitration in the first place, that will make a final decision in the case that the relevant sides are not able to reach an agreement through a consensus. What does this mean for the future status of Krajina (as a whole or piece by piece)? It is enough to recall that the international community, in this case, has taken a right to act as if it had been an equal signatory of the decisions made in Jajce [when AVNOJ was founded]. Whereas the final move on the "checkered" board [reference to the Croatian flag] might be—Z 4.

Of course, the question is whether Knin has a reserve possibility. Certain analysts of the local circumstances are likely to claim that the chance for the unification with the Serbian republic (and Serbia) has been missed, although such opinions contradict official reassuring of the celestial Serbian public that the policy is principled. However, in the meantime this policy has come to face two significant challenges: first, the lifting of the sanctions, which is conditioned by the recognition of the republic of Croatia (and Bosnia-Herzegovina), and second, the blockade of the Srpska republic, given the possibility of a similar measure to be implemented against Krajina in the case of its disobedience.

Krajina's relying upon the Srpska republic does not have a long-run perspective as well. From the political point of view, the American turn (the conditional tolerance of the confederation between the Srpska republic and the FRY) represents a serious temptation for Pale to accept the Contact Group's peace plan. Particularly in view of additional European guarantees and the possibility that, if they accept the 49 to 51 formula, relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina may be gradually settled, especially if the exchange of territories is tolerated and if the Serbian forces are not required to withdraw promptly. This, probably the last concession to Pale, announces the transfer of the Drina virus to the Una River basin, which is confirmed not only by the background motives of the political test-balloon regarding the return of the Serbs into the Croatian Constitution, but also by principled reactions of the official Belgrade to the international restatement, as they put it, of guarantees for the confederation between the Srpska republic and the FRY.

The Krajina Serbs have politically and militarily performed the all-Serbian task. Politically, which means by tipping the scale at the American consent to a limited greater Serbia, as Warren Christopher said, forgetting to underline that this does not mean the American consent to the annexation of the territories under the Serbian control in Croatia. Militarily, meaning by supporting the brethren across the Una River in the fighting around Bihac, by which they have, true, neutralized the realistic danger of a Muslim assault from the back, but on the other hand, they have also made possible for the NATO to legalize its intervention in Croatia, which may also mean its intervention in a possible Krajina-Croatian conflict on the side of Zagreb (in compliance with the part of the Washington agreement referring to the military cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Croatia).

So, Krajina seems to be the last bit of stone in the all-Serbian mosaic. The agreement on economic relations is a pontoon bridge to that goal. The agreement brings about to Krajina a temporary verification of cooperativeness, but in that respect far more points have been scored by President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic,

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after his meetings with international political and peacemaking experimentalists in Karadjordjevo and Belgrade. However, a pontoon is just a temporary bridge.

The question is: How is a real bridge to be built between Krajina and Croatia, without using only perishable materials that hold in power the Belgrade and Zagreb regimes?

Commentary Views U.S.-Croat Defense Agreement

AU1212120194 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 28 Nov 94 p 2

[Commentary by Frane Plancic: "Path to 'Partnership for Peace'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tomorrow's meeting of delegations of Croatia and the United States in Washington will mark a turning point in their relations. A "Memorandum" on bilateral cooperation regarding military and defense matters signed by Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak and U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry will be at the top of the agenda.

The content of the document is of paramount importance for the Republic of Croatia; in the near and more distant future it will also be important for our wider geopolitical surroundings and hence also for the vital strategic interests of the United States. The content of the document will not be revealed until it is signed, but everything that preceded it points to the fact that it will have both military and political significance.

Let us just remember a series of successful meetings between Susak and Perry—each qualified as productive and serving mutual interests—and public comments that the two ministers have established very friendly relations. Moreover, there have recently been some high-level talks and General Janko Bobetko's, head of the Croatian Army Supreme Headquarters, meeting with General Shalikashvili, chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Sullivan, chief of staff of the Army, General Clark, director of strategic planning and operations at the Joint Chiefs of Staff—stands out in particular....

The Foundations of Military Cooperation

Every such meeting helped lay the foundations for military and security cooperation between the two countries, coordinated views of the two ministers, and their personal relations (which the Americans consider to be an important factor in building trust) go beyond official professional relationship and proscribed courtesy.

In view of all that, the content of the "Memorandum" can be qualified as an agreement between the two friendly parties on their future cooperation regarding the questions of vital importance for national security of both countries by means of useful and binding agreements.

Before signing the "Memorandum," Minister Susak will meet a U.S. delegation composed of highest Pentagon and State Department officials in Pentagon. Defense Secretary Perry, Assistant State Secretary R. Holbrooke, General Shalikashvili, General Clark, J. Kruzel, assistant to the deputy defense secretary—who initialed the "Memorandum" together with Minister Susak during his recent visit to Zagreb—will also attend the meeting. The signing ceremony will take place after the meeting.

Judging by statements made so far, especially those made when the "Memorandum" was initialed in Zagreb, the two sides are willing to develop and improve their military cooperation. In keeping with principles of the UN Charter and key CSCE documents, of course, with a special emphasis on peaceful solving of conflicts and on the principle that borders cannot be changed by force. It is particularly important for Croatia that those principles be applied, while it has both special (regarding Croatia in this case) and general significance for the United States. It stems from the global position of the United States as the only superpower, but also from a growing display of determination to ward off particularism that is tearing Europe to pieces.

Restrictions Because of Embargo

A democratic orientation in organization and creation of armed forces, civilian surveillance of its development, finances, defense planning, etc., have recently been mentioned in Zagreb and hence must be included in the "Memorandum." A logical conclusion is that the agreement on cooperation between the two ministers is not aimed against a third country; rather, it is an opportunity for Croatia to join a process leading toward European military and political integration called "Partnership for Peace."

There is no doubt that this is a great opportunity for Croatia and that the cooperation with the United States will have to comply with restrictions imposed by the arms embargo on countries created after the collapse of former Yugoslavia. We should, therefore, not expect the signing of the "Memorandum" to result in importing weapons and military equipment overnight, nor that U.S. forces will rush to be deployed along Croatia's borders. Such illusions are bound to be created by design both to thwart the process of U.S.-Croatian military and security cooperation and to preserve the imbalance of military forces in this region and particularism that has lately been causing disagreement in the west of Europe.

Training of Croatian Officers

U.S. weapons will not start "dropping down into Croatia out of a clear blue sky." Establishing a balance of armed forces in the region combined with stabilizing political negotiations is the strategic goal of the cooperation.

Considering the said restrictions, an "unattractive" but extremely important cooperation in the form of training for Croatian officers and compensation for military

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education infrastructure which left for Belgrade together with the JNA [Yugoslav National Army]—will be one of the first concrete steps. It is estimated that there is only some 2 percent of teaching aids and other infrastructure left in Croatia. Furthermore, the European Community did not fulfill its promise that they would make up for everything that the JNA took away or destroyed. Fortunately, most teachers also went to Belgrade, so compensation is necessary in that field as well, but it will be done by the West, which is our strategic orientation anyway.

In short, that is the content and the form of the "Memorandum," which is a prerequisite for all future concrete agreements, as well as its military and political strategic significance.

Article Views Croatian Stakes in Bosnian War

AU0912124994 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 26 Nov 94 p 13

[Article by Frane Plancic: "Much at Stake—Even More To Gain"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The grand finale to one of the most dramatic periods of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina lasted for more than a month. The agreement made in Belgrade this Wednesday seems to have finally silenced the weapons and there appears to be sufficient determination on both sides to carry it out on the political level, whatever that may entail.

It is blindingly obvious—especially judging by UN decisions on the demilitarization of the Bihac area and the fact that other parts of west Bosnia were left to Abdic's forces—that Izetbegovic is the biggest loser. Again, alas, and definitely.

Karadzic also suffered a defeat, though not such a terrible one. His renegade state creation has lost much of its territory—the loss of the area around Kupres seems to have been the hardest blow—now it is clinging even closer to the corridor and there have also been some losses in the vicinity of Sarajevo. They got the west of Bosnia, accomplished a "humane transfer" of most forces of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps; they are struggling in the quicksand of international sanctions; they forced Milosevic to take a step further toward recognizing Croatia under coercion.

NATO Has Decided

According to tangible criteria (territory, the development of armed forces, and political power) Herzeg-Bosnia is the winner of the final round of this period of war. Applying the same criteria, but with the emphasis on political growth, the Republic of Croatia seems to be the most promising winner. Apart from having done much to deserve the winning title itself, Zagreb must give some credit to Belgrade, which—whether or not we want to admit it—helped much by losing the battle on the international scene.

Such a political situation in the aftermath of the armed finale of this period of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina now more than ever stems from achievements on the battlefield. Especially as NATO, the external military factor, played a crucial role.

We must remember that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army led by the Bihac Corps—which was in terrible shape at the time: besieged, exhausted, unarmed, poorly equipped, almost clinically dead—began the final round. The Bihac Corps has nevertheless managed to start an ambitious array of battles expecting the much-needed backup of other Bosnia-Herzegovina Army corps and probably also of Croatia and NATO.

They did not make it, the corps lacked the inner strength to pull it off, as did other corps. NATO did what it was mandated to do (the protection of UN forces and self-protection in the framework of the "no-fly zone" operation) perhaps even faster than the standard procedure allows, while Croatia may have put more at stake than it should have.

If we go over NATO's share in the finale of this war period in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a fine-tooth comb, we can see that it performed its task of protection and self-protection correctly and efficiently, that it regained some self-esteem and cohesion, and that it was all made possible because of the seemingly insignificant fact that M. Albright, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, presides over the UN Security Council this month. Given that position and the support of Washington, she was able to speed up the process of the military intervention of NATO air forces.

Deliverance From the Air?

Those who are unfamiliar with the situation on the ground in the greater area of west Bosnia might say that the involvement of Bosnian and NATO forces did not save the 5th Corps and the area between Bihac and Kladusa. Facts point to the conclusion that the 5th Corps undertook a kind of a suicidal battle, consciously trying to give itself a mortal blow. We could see that from the fact that they failed to make qualitative changes before combat, i.e. they were left without antitank and counter-battery support, there was no brunt of attack, while the shifting of battle intensity was carried out in a rather chaotic manner.

Considering such conditions on the ground, allied air forces could do very little or nothing, even if they had reacted promptly and with more determination. Suspended under one wing of every NATO aircraft were missiles and bombs and there were Russian and French weights under another. Consequently, NATO had to restrict its activities to strictly defined defense and self-defense operations.

NATO was allowed to carry out defensive operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina only if asked by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], i.e. never. Only recently did NATO

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obtain permission from President Tudjman to carry out such defensive operations in occupied Croatian areas. Let us hope they will do a good job.

NATO aircraft carried out their self-defense missions as soon as they could (the Albright effect), they took advantage of their supremacy, technical and technological advantage of their weapons and equipment, tactical choice of time and location of attack, etc. The Serb rebels took a couple of severe blows, especially with regard to their morale, but they also sustained heavy material losses. NATO self-defensive actions have a particular military and political value in that they were performed in Croatian occupied areas (the Tudjman effect) without hesitation, with a clear message, and with long-term political significance.

It is unfortunate and unfair that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, least of all the 5th Corps, will not enjoy the amenities of defensive and self-defensive NATO actions. The fact that the Republic of Croatia has already gotten a glimpse of that and that there is probably more to come yet, is one of the more tangible achievements of Croatian strategy whose painstaking development, trial-and-error improvement, finally produced some results. The leadership of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has no such accomplishments or unavoidable ramblings to boast of since the beginning of the aggression, so we cannot expect it to take part in the distribution of gains and results of NATO self-defensive air strikes. In short, one reaps what one sows.

Indeed, Croatia did work hard on it and played for the highest stakes in the grand finale of this phase of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. Only as late as Tuesday did Minister Granic officially state that Croatia was prepared to intervene militarily but that it had been warned against it, for the problem of west Bosnia (as well as of Croatian occupied areas) could be solved with much less risk.

Bobetko's Prediction

This statement of Granic's was preceded by an even more straightforward statement from Gen. Bobetko, head of the Croatian Army Supreme Headquarters, before he left for Washington. Many seem to have overheard Bobetko saying that the head of the U.S. Armed Forces advised him against an intervention and said that they are to expect "the unexpected to start happening soon." And it happened in the form of NATO air strikes. So now everybody is "surprised" and some are disappointed with their "inefficiency."

Advocates of realpolitik will not fall for such emotional conclusions, but will follow the said line of reasoning, which mentions stakes and gains. There is no denying that Croatia put a great deal at stake when it threatened to get involved in UNPA [UN Protected Area] zones and possibly also in west Bosnia.

We can safely say that the threat was taken most seriously among the leading UN members as well as among western countries. Their assessment of the situation on the ground probably helped them deduce that the intervention of the Croatian Army would soon mean the end of the rebel Serbs on Croatian territory, a beginning of the end to the rebel Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a serious danger of spreading the war beyond tolerable limits, should the Yugoslav Army decide to get involved as well. The defeat of all Serb armed forces would be imposed as the only solution and a most urgent task. However, the Security Council has still not reached consensus on that solution. The Croatian Army was thus contained, and the military and political pressure of allied forces threatened to blow up the heads of Martic and Milosevic in Belgrade on Wednesday....

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Albanian-Language University Deemed 'Illegal'

AU1312170694 Skopje MIC in English 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At yesterday's session presided over by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, the Macedonian Government discussed the request to found a university in Albanian language in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], submitted by the initiators, so-called associations and Albanian political subjects in Macedonia, and took the following stance:

The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia foresees the nationalities in the Republic of Macedonia to have the right to study in their mother-tongue in the elementary and secondary education, which means that the submitted request is not in accordance neither with the Constitution nor the existing Law for specialized secondary school training.

In relation to the training of teachers for holding classes in the mother-tongue, as part of the constitutionally defined rights, the government took a stance, as part of the university, to decide about the forms which will enable such education in the only system of education, which opens the possibilities for full realization of the right of the minorities, determined with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. [sentence as received]

Going from the fact that the submitters of this initiative are undertaking extensive measures for its realization, independently from its constitutional and illegal foundation, and particularly misleading the citizens, promising the opening of such a "university," gathering funds from them in the process. as well as preparing objects where such a university" would be located, the government points out that it will undertake all the legal measures which are at its disposal, in order to suspend these illegal activities.

The government underlines that the responsibility for the consequences developed from these illegal activities undertaken by the initiators, and particularly because of the possible deterioration of the inter-ethnic relations, is beared by the bearers of this non-constitutional and illegal initiative.

Students Protest University

LD1312214494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1824 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 13 Dec—A group of several hundred Macedonian students protested this afternoon outside the parliamentary building of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] against an initiative to set up an Albanian-language university in Tetovo which, according to the initiative committee, is to open on 17 December.

Mitko Krzovski, president of the FYROM Students' Union, told journalists that he did not know who was behind the protest but added that the students' demands would be respected.

This afternoon UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] headquarters in Skopje issued a statement denying reports of its alleged support for an Albanian-language university.

In the same statement, Hugo Ansen, UN representative in the FYROM, explained that except for showing understanding of the need for all nationalities to have education in their mother tongues, "UNPROFOR has neither supported nor discouraged this controversial initiative."

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Federal

Vuk Draskovic Defends Accused General

95BA0052A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 4 Nov 94 p 13

[Article by Vuk Draskovic: "J'Accuse"]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Vlada Trifunovic was torn between his oath and his helplessness. His oath ordered that both Triglav and Karawanken be defended. The Supreme Command started the army fleeing, without designating why the army was fleeing, nor from whom, nor where it would stop.

General Vlada Trifunovic, former commander of the former Varazdin Corps of the former army of the former Yugoslavia, is being tried again.

The new state's military court has been ordered that General Trifunovic, in its third assault, has to be overthrown.

He has been freed twice, and twice the Supreme Military Court has canceled the freedom of this noble officer of an army that no longer exists.

What is his crime, and who are those who want to proclaim him an enemy of the Fatherland?

At the end of the summer of 1991, he abandoned the Varazdin barracks and allowed them to fall into the hands of Croatian paramilitary forces. That is his crime.

But, esteemed military prosecutors and judges, why were there paramilitary forces in a state whose army was the seventh strongest in Europe? Was General Trifunovic a member of the Supreme Command? Did he sit in the General Staff? Did General Trifunovic order the army to abandon the state's western border, and withdraw without any sense, reason, or goal?

General Trifunovic was a desperate person who, for weeks, only defended the barracks in Varazdin, waiting in vain for the General Staff to tell him what the goals of the war were and where the Fatherland's new borders were!

His Supreme Command told the surrounded general that there was no war, and so there were no goals of the war. People were sitting at the General Staff who were commanding the attack against the Varazdin barracks, as well as people who broke up both the general's army and his Fatherland. The people who are trying him today were also sitting at the Supreme Command.

The general was torn between his oath and his helplessness. The oath demanded that both Triglav and Karawanken be defended, and not just the barracks at Varazdin. The Supreme Command, however, without General Trifunovic's agreement, cut Slovenia off from the body of the Fatherland, and started the army fleeing, without designating why the army was fleeing, nor from whom, nor where it was to stop.

The general saw that his Supreme Command was burying his Fatherland and army. He was faced with a choice: whether to drive 300 of his soldiers and officers to their deaths, or to save their lives.

He chose life. He did not want to sacrifice so many lives for nothing, in order to attach them to the carcass of a Fatherland that was no longer the Fatherland, and to the glory of a disgraced and sold-out army without glory. He disabled the weapons and sent the soldiers back to their mothers. To him, their commander, those soldiers were not clay pigeons on the firing range of an inhuman intelligence that [text missing in original].

Varazdin had been in someone else's state for a long time. Varazdin would have been in that state even if General Vlada Trifunovic had slaughtered his own soldiers and himself. The only difference is that those 300 corpses would not have seen what happened next and how. They would not have known the situation of pointless massacres and the fragmentation of the state to which they had sworn an oath.

Those who are trying General Trifunovic, those who are ordering that he must be convicted, are the ones to blame for that collapse of the Fatherland, the army's defeat, all the columns of dead and crippled people, the devastated land, the homeless, all the misfortune and the hell that we are living through, and the ruins of our national and military honor.

I accuse them—their false braid and stars, their ignorance, their ideological blindness, their slavish morality, their greed, their masters, and their disgrace.

The general is one of hundreds and thousands of Dreyfusses from our former army.

In defending those Dreyfusses, I am defending the honor of Serbian officers against the treason and dishonor of the so-called officers and their civilian leaders who have reported to ruffians and criminals disguised under the caps and uniforms of glorious Serbian military leaders.

Both Stepa and Misic and Putnik and Bojovic are ashamed because so many Serbian generals and officers have been arrested, investigated, beaten, tried, used as rags and disgraced as people, at the demand of various Arkans, Seseljs, or Bokans.

Certainly General Vlada Trifunovic and all our other generals, officers, and soldiers who are the victims of treason and not traitors, do not need to be defended by me or anyone else. They are defended by their accusers. They are defended by the happy truth that they are on the other side.

It can only honor General Trifunovic that Seselj and Arkan, two years ago, drafted an indictment against him. The honor also belongs to the military judges who twice threw the indictment for that kind of intelligence and the facts and patriotism into the wastebasket.

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This third assault is the fiercest. The military judges have been ordered to throw the law and their own consciences into the wastebasket, and issue a conviction at the dictation of the blindness and wretchedness of those who have unforgivably trampled upon both their oaths and the Fatherland.

In Tudjman's Croatia, Vlada Trifunovic has been declared a war criminal, and in his own Serbia, a traitor.

Those two indictments are the general's two big medals. I congratulate him.

Serbia

Hungarians, Serbs Support Joint Amnesty Proposal

LD1012233494 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 10 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In Vojvodina, Serbs and Hungarians want to submit a joint amnesty bill. Szilveszter Varga's report from Belgrade speaks about the possibility of cooperation:

[Varga] Serbs and Hungarians want to submit an amnesty bill jointly to the Serb and Yugoslav house of representatives, the chairman of the Association of Hungarians in Vojvodina [VMSZ] told Hungarian radio. Ferenc Csubela stressed that with the proposal—to be worked out jointly with the Democratic Reform Party of Vojvodina—they would like to see the creation of the conditions needed for the return of the several tens of thousands of Hungarians and some 100,000 Serbs who had fled from the war. The VMSZ chairman expressed his hope that the Serb parties would also deal with the problems of the Hungarians during the upcoming and more peaceful period, because the Hungarians of Vojvodina are unable to settle their fate on their own without discussions and cooperation.

The VMSZ and the Democratic Reform Party also jointly support the reacquisition of the territorial autonomy of Vojvodina. In response to my question regarding which he considered more important—Vojvodina's territorial autonomy or the minority self-determination of the Hungarians—Ferenc Csubela replied as follows:

[Begin Csubela recording] I do not like to talk about priorities, because both are extremely important. The issue of autonomy of Vojvodina's Hungarians cannot be placed above the issue of Vojvodina's independence or the issue of territorial autonomy in general. [end recording]

Opposition Parties Want Bosnian Talks To Resume

LD1312215394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2030 GMT 13 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 13 (TANJUG)—The Bosnian Serb leadership is quite ready for the resumption of talks and establishment of lasting peace, Democratic Party Leader Zoran Djindjic said Tuesday.

The Democratic Party is one of the most influential opposition parties in Serbia. Djindjic met with the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale on Monday.

Djindjic's written statement released to the press said this readiness complied with the equal treatment of the Bosnian Serb Republic and the other warring sides and the lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia.

"Since the Bosnia Contact Group has enabled the onset of talks on exchanging territories and constitutional organization without the previous acceptance of the draft map, the Democratic Party believes the opportunity should be used to find lasting peace," said Djindjic.

The Contact Group this summer proposed a plan for the territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina on a 51-49 percent ratio between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb state.

Bosnian Serbs did not accept the plan because they were not satisfied with the quality of the given territories, but agreed that talks should continue.

The opposition Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) Tuesday welcomed the signs of good will of the Bosnian Serb leadership to continue the talks.

"The Contact Group's more clear concept (in favor) of negotiations is also moving in this direction," SPO federal and republican deputy Milan Bozic told a press conference.

This is a good chance for the Bosnian Serb leadership to preserve their honour while abandoning their categoric rejection of the peace plan, Bozic said.

President of Serbia's opposition party, the League of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia, Goran Latinovic said Tuesday an end to the war in Bosnia had "come into view."

Latinovic said the solution was to accept the international peace plan and then to reach agreement on delimitation through direct, separate talks between the warring sides.

Kosovo

Kosovo Leaders Address Islamic Conference

AU1312114694 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No 506 12 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the Republic of Kosova, is chairing a delegation of Kosova at the 7th Islamic Conference taking place in Casablanca (Morocco). Addressing the Conference, Dr. Bujar Bukoshi said the "situation in Kosova continues to worsen by the day as a consequence of Serbian military and police occupation". Kosova Prime Minister said

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Serbia is acting as "the figurehead of Orthodox fundamentalism" and has marred Kosova and its people. "The regime in Belgrade continues to undertake measures aimed at destroying the physical, national, cultural and spiritual integrity of the Albanians of Kosova. For this undertaking it implements means such as killings, torture, house raid, long term imprisonment and other threats. During the last four years only, close to one million people have passed through Serbian police procedures, thousands have been imprisoned, hundreds have been killed by fire arms and four hundred thousands been forced to flee Kosova. This is the price my people are forced to pay to the Serbian aggressor", said Kosova Prime Minister. Dr. Bukoshi underscored that every initiatives on Kosova have been met with Serbian obstruction. "At the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, nothing has been achieved on the question of Kosova, despite remaining on the agenda as a cause for concern. Authorities in Belgrade repeatedly avoid dialogue. Serbia, by treating the question of Kosova as a purely "internal" matter, and by refusing to allow the presence of any third party mediation, prevents the Conference from dealing with the Kosova issue", Kosova prime minister said. Addressing the Conference, Albania's Deputy Foreign Minister Arian Starova said the crisis in the former Yugoslavia started in Kosova. "Greater Serb terror hits out at the Albanians every day", Mr. Starova said, adding that "the Kosova issue has not to merely with respect of human rights. It is a question relating to recognition of the political entity of self-government of the Albanians". Albanian deputy foreign minister said Albania has insisted on a dialogue between the legitimate institutions of Kosova, its leadership, and the Belgrade authorities with the participation of a third party. "The Republic of Kosova stands for the demilitarization of Kosova, an end to silent [quiet] ethnic cleansing, placing it under international guarantee, conditions which should pave the way for a settlement of the Albanian issue in Kosova and the Balkans, Mr. Starova said.

Albanian Official Rejects Division, Autonomy

AU1412104894 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Dec p 7

[Interview with Dr. Fehmi Agani, deputy president of the Democratic League of Kosovo, by Jovo Paripovic; place and date not given: "We Will Not Be a Serb Colony for Much Longer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosovo is again at the center of media attention, although there is an attempt to create the impression—through all the means, including the "FRY" [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] not issuing visas to foreign reporters—that the issue of Kosovo is a completed chapter in politics. As overall solutions in Croatia and Bosnia emerge, regardless of the speed of their completion, the "reading" of Kosovo is becoming increasingly topical, and it all seems as if the circle is closing where it had initially been open as far as the Serb national concept is concerned.

The Serb "Resistance Movement" is being activated in Kosovo, warning Milosevic that, in resolving the Serb national issue, he must go all the way, as he was promising during the "happening of the people." At the same time, Ibrahim Rugova started his tour of West Europe in order to speed up the discussion of Kosovo and the search for the solution, and to overcome the present situation, which is unbearable for the Albanians. Rugova has recently stated that this is so in his interview for the Belgian LE SOIR by giving the example of the suffering of seven Albanian activists who died after being tortured in police stations in August and September, and by pointing out that the Serbs are "the inevitable partner" in the resolution of the Kosovo issue, but that they also had to "abandon the logic by which they wish to keep Albanians slaves."

We discussed this with Dr. Fehmi Agani, deputy president of the Democratic League of Kosovo and Rugova's right hand man. He is said to be the party ideologist and the architect of all Rugova's moves.

We started the interview by asking Mr. Agani to state his opinion on the appearance of the so-called Resistance Movement of the Serbs of Kosovo, which is headed by more or less the same people who started it in the 1980's.

[Agani] The dust that has been raised by the Serb "Resistance Movement" has not caused any excitement among the Albanians in Kosovo. They are indifferent toward the movement because it is conducted from other centers. The Serb "Resistance Movement" is an extremist nationalist movement with a false name, just as everything in the makeup of the Greater Serbian nationalism called "the anti-bureaucratic revolution" was false. As before, it is located in Kosovo, and it has Kosovo roots and a Kosovo flavor of a certain kind, but in essence it is a Serb movement of dissatisfaction and disappointment, within nationalist formations, with the general crisis of the Greater Serbian concept and the inability to actualize it.

As a movement of the Serbs of Kosovo, which is what this partly is, it expresses the general crisis of the Serb rule in Kosovo, which has led to the disintegration of the economy, to the complete separation of the peoples, to political confrontations, and to everything that characterizes the situation in Kosovo. The intention is to mobilize emotions—that is, if there are any left.

Covering Up the Dissatisfaction

[Paripovic] You have mentioned a crisis of the Greater Serbian concept. Do you have only Kosovo in mind or other areas too?

[Agani] The Greater Serbian concept as a whole is undergoing a crisis. In Kosovo, it is in permanent crisis, because it has not found support anywhere, not in any of the classes of the Albanian society. Since Serbia cannot withstand this tension, it now has to adjust to some new

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situations, and it must make certain concessions. Resistance emerges, there is dissatisfaction, and demands are made. However, if you look at these demands, you will see that they have very little to do with Kosovo, since the first demand of the "Resistance Movement" says that "Serbia must define itself as the state of the Serbian people," by which everything is revealed.

[Paripovic] Slobodan Milosevic has been ignoring the leaders of the "Resistance Movement" and fighting them through his spokesmen from the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], especially regarding the points addressed as a threat to him, as well as to the establishment in power. However, at the same time, his spokesmen are talking about the so-called Albanization of Kosovo.

[Agani] I think that the people who are presenting the thesis on the Albanization of Kosovo are, in a way, following Slobodan Milosevic's wishes—or directions, if you will. In fact, the position of the SPS and the people in power toward this movement has been quite undefined. The people in power would like to use this movement if the movement imposes the Kosovo issue as primarily a Serb issue, so that, in part, they could neutralize the demands of the Albanians and the situation that the world is familiar with. However, they are afraid of broader repercussions, and that is why they are trying to cover up the dissatisfaction in a way, but they are not putting any limits on it.

[Paripovic] Mr. Rugova went on his tour of West Europe with the main goal of actualizing the resolution of the Kosovo issue. Judging by his contacts so far and what he has communicated to them, he has been trying to draw attention away from the common phrase "Kosovo is a Serb issue," and to interest the international forces in becoming involved in the resolving of the issue, not leaving the Albanians and the Serbs alone as partners in resolving it. Do you agree with this?

[Agani] The Kosovo issue is becoming topical primarily because of the crisis that the Serb rule in Kosovo has gotten into, and, secondly, because of certain international pressures, as well as the Serbia's need to lift the blockade it is under. We got stuck with the main question of whether the matter can be resolved by the Albanians and Serbs or with the international presence. The thesis that Kosovo is an internal Serbian issue is completely unacceptable to us. If we accepted it, then the main issue regarding the status of Kosovo would be prejudiced. It is also unacceptable because, in essence, the issue of Kosovo is an international issue, an issue that demands international intervention.

[Paripovic] Does the world not acknowledge the possibility of an independent Kosovo?

[Agani] I think that the world is demanding a solution in the form of an autonomy that would resemble the 1974 autonomy, not completely realizing that such autonomy is no longer possible. That state no longer exists, nor does the same form of federation. I think that the world would not oppose the independence of Kosovo, but it is now looking for easier solutions to avoid bloodshed. This is why it is considering autonomy, but that cannot be a permanent solution for Kosovo.

Division of Kosovo—a Sure Conflict

[Paripovic] Since you have mentioned the possible solution and the search for a solution by which bloodshed would be avoided, I would like to remind you of a solution offered as a possibility—the division of Kosovo, which would inevitably lead to bloodshed. Is, as rumor has it, Dobrica Cosic behind these plans?

[Agani] I do not have enough arguments for this, but I believe that this concept is very much present, and that the circles around Cosic support it. However, I think that this solution has no prospects. In fact, in that case, there would be a real conflict in Kosovo, since, with the location, the ethnic structure, and the concept of Kosovo there is no basis for a division. Serbia would not settle for 10 percent of Kosovo, so division would only be possible through the movement of the people, which is impossible to do.

[Paripovic] You have mentioned a crisis of the Serb rule in Kosovo. Albanians have been removed from the senior positions, while Milosevic has been receiving complaints about the Serb rulers of Kosovo from the Serbs and the SPS, saying that they have been sinking into organized crime.

[Agani] You see, perhaps this is not only characteristic of Kosovo. All of Serbia has sunk into organized crime. However, the situation in Kosovo is that the Albanians are completely excluded from public life, and Kosovo is being ruled by a small circle of Serbs with the support of Serbia and the police. This small circle of Serbs has been squabbling over positions. Each of them is doing four or five jobs and receiving salaries and large incomes in four or five places, while fighting about the sixth or seventh position.

[Paripovic] There has been talk that Milosevic has expressed the wish to talk to Mr. Rugova "in private."

[Agani] This was allegedly said during Mr. Rugova's meeting with Owen and Stoltenberg in Geneva. We do not have official confirmation of this. It is possible that such an offer was made, because it had been made before, but our movement believes that contacts are possible only within the framework and in the presence of international institutions and their representatives.

[Paripovic] There are differences in approach here. On the Serb side, there have been announcements of talks, but "with the Albanians loyal to Serbia."

[Agani] In Kosovo, Serbia can talk to those who are in its service. Fortunately, there are few such people in Kosovo. These people are people no one here has any regrets about, and they are not important to anyone. This is one thing. The other thing is that it is obvious that the

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problems of Kosovo are such that they demand more radical changes to the situation. More radical changes require negotiations, because there is a difference in concepts and forces. This is not a talk between like-minded people, but a discussion of the status of Kosovo from different standpoints.

[Paripovic] What are the demands you would make for such negotiations to take place?

[Agani] All the people who are involved in politics in Kosovo are obliged by the results of the 1985 referendum. At this referendum, 87 percent of the potential voters participated, and everyone supported the Republic of Kosovo.

Radicalism Only Verbal for the Time Being

[Paripovic] They supported an independent and open Kosovo, did they not?

[Agani] They supported an independent and sovereign Kosovo as a provision, and in the further modalities we said that Kosovo would be a state that would be completely open toward all its neighbors, including Serbia, to the extent that Serbia could not only exercise certain cultural and historical interests, but also certain current ones. This openness would be implemented by an international guarantee.

[Paripovic] Apart from these efforts, your movement also comprises some more radical ones. You call them verbal radicalism, but you also point out that if the present situation in Kosovo is not resolved soon, the radicalism could grow into something that is not only verbal.

[Agani] I think this assumption has a good basis. At the moment, the concept of the peaceful solution to the Kosovo issue has full support, or that of a great majority, so that the more radical moves are in a minority. However, no people would settle for a suppressed position such as that in which the Albanians are. It is obvious that unless the solution is found in the foreseeable future, this more radical faction, which is now marginal, will become central.

[Paripovic] This could lead to many shocks, could it not?

[Agani] Certainly. We are aware that those who represent certain more radical positions are aware of the fact that, if there is a conflict, the Albanians will suffer incomparably more than the Serbs. However, there are opinions that this great suffering will also have to result in liberation from the colonial position that Kosovo is in.

[Paripovic] Are you saying that the Albanians are unarmed?

[Agani] They are not well-enough armed for even a small-scale war, let alone a greater and more serious one. However, I said that no Serb concept should be based on the Albanians being unarmed. If the situation continues to be unbearable, then conflict will be inevitable, regardless of how well-armed we are. However, if conflicts start, then it is not difficult to deliver weapons to the warring sides, or to buy them.

[Paripovic] This is evident on the territories of the former Yugoslavia where there are conflicts at present.

[Agani] Yes. As far as Kosovo is concerned, it would be in a more favorable position if it were acquiring weapons.

Former Policemen Issue Statements; Tortured

AU1212092494 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 9 Dec 94 p 10

[Unattributed report: "Former Albanian Policemen of Kosova Cruelly Tortured"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Defense lawyers Xhafer Maliqi, Bajram Kelmendi, Drita Hajdari, Nekibe Kelmendi, Destan Rukigi, Fazli Balaj, Hasan Hoti, Rexhep Haxhimusa, and Rifat Abdullahu held a second news conference in Prishtina yesterday, alerting the public once again to the cruel tortures to which the Albanian former policemen of Kosova have been subjected to since their arrest in the second half of November on trumped-up charges of allegedly forming an internal affairs ministry of the Republic of Kosova.

Xhafer Maliqi, chairman of the Kosova Law Chamber, began by saying that the defense lawyers were able to meet their clients for a second time on the previous day [7 December], and they had observed that most had been tortured by personnel of the Serbian state security service, although the lawyers had not been told that the court had entrusted the investigations to state security personnel.

He said that serious procedural violations are occuring with the aim of extracting statements from the detainees by force, to suit the investigators and the Serbian regime.

Mr. Maliqi said that his client Sheremet Ahmeti had been tortured over every part of his body for five days and five nights, including with electric shocks, and that this detainee had not been allowed to sleep for five days and nights.

Mr. Maliqi said that he had requested from the investigator and president of the Serbian court in Prishtina that Sheremet Ahmeti be examined by forensic doctors, but this request was not heeded.

Bajram Kelmendi, Avi Mehmedoviqi's defense counsel, testified to the torture of his client and serious procedural violations.

He said that investigations against Avdi Mehmedoviqi were being conducted by Serbian state security personnel, although no court decision had been made concerning this. Kelmendi said that Serbian security

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personnel were compiling what purported to be statements by those arrested only after they had been interrogated several times and after continual torture.

Prosecutor Refuted

Kelmendi said that his client has been sentenced for supposed violations of internal regulations while in prison, and, following this conviction, is no longer permitted even written contact with his family for the duration of the investigations, which could be as long as six months. In this meeting with his client, Kelmendi noticed marks of torture on his body.

Drita Hajdari, lawyer of Avdi Mehmedoviqi and Haki Mehmeti, rejected the statement by Serbian Prosecutor Brklac, who had said at a news conference last Friday [2 December] that those arrested are not tortured and that legal procedures are being used against them. Drita Hajdari told journalists about the content of Avdi Mehmedoviqi's statements to the investigator, which included an admission that his colleagues had gathered information in the interests of the citizens of Kosova, that they had collected data about the paramilitary formations of Seselj and Basri Pllana, and that they had planned to report this information to the competent authorities in Kosova and abroad, with the aim of averting the outbreak of a conflict in Kosova.

Referring to her other client, Haka Mehmeti, she said that he too had been subjected to continual torture and that he is in a grave physical and mental state. She went on to inform journalists about the ploys the Serbian authorities resort to in order to prevent by any means possible any contact between lawyers and their clients.

Defense lawyer Nekibe Kelmendi described the violations of procedure and the torture administered to her client Blerim Olloni, whom the police had handed over to the investigator on 24 November. However, he had been interrogated by Serbian state security personnel on 27, 28, and 30 November and on 1,3,4, and 5 December. Lawyer Kelmendi said that her client had been tortured particularly on 28 November [Albanian independence day] over all parts of his body and using all kinds of means. [passage omitted]

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